LEADERS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND

FOREIGN POLICY IN NON-DEMOCRACIES

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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
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(Scott D. Sagan)

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Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies.

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Abstract

What explains differences in the foreign policy decisions of different types of

authoritarian leaders? Are democratic leaders really different from all authoritarian

leaders in their decisions to use military force? When do authoritarian leaders face

domestic accountability for their international behavior? In this dissertation, I attempt

to answer these questions, advancing a growing body of scholarship that focuses on

the domestic political incentives of leaders as a way to comprehend foreign policy

decisions. Unlike most previous research, however, I focus on how these domestic

pressures vary across non-democracies. I propose that when domestic actors can

overcome their coordination dilemma to remove leaders, even autocratic leaders must

make foreign policy decisions in the shadow of domestic punishment. In particular, I

argue that previous research has underestimated the extent to which non-democratic

leaders are domestically accountable for foreign policy. Even within regimes with

small "winning coalitions," where the support of only a small group of individuals is

required to stay in power, elites often have the means and incentives to coordinate to

remove the ruler as long as the leader does not control access to high office and the

leader has not tampered with military institutions, using them to both spy on potential

rivals, and to reduce the likelihood of coups and other types of removal from office.

I also introduce a rich new source of regime type data that allows me to distinguish my

explanation from existing theories, building on and augmenting work by scholars in

comparative politics. This new dataset allows me to study subtle variations in non-democratic institutions – differences not picked up in existing measurements of regime characteristics, but that nevertheless have important implications for states' international behavior. I describe how we can distinguish between two general types of authoritarian leaders. On the one hand, there are "constrained" authoritarians who do not personally control top government appointments, and have not tampered with normal military organization. On the other hand are "unconstrained" authoritarians who have seized personal control of civilian and military institutions, appointed cronies to both civilian and military positions, and taken related steps to insulate themselves from removal at the hands of rivals. Some "semi-constrained" leaders in between these two extremes, I find that most leaders of the leaders in my sample either both control civilian appointments and interfere with military institutions to insulate themselves from coups, or do neither.

Using these data, I explore a number of observable implications of the theoretical argument. One chapter analyzes how war outcomes affect leader tenure. I find that constrained authoritarians are approximately as likely to lose office after defeat in war as democratic leaders. In sharp contrast, unconstrained authoritarians manage to hold on to power even in the face of serious military defeat. Another chapter deepens this analysis, and attempts to establish a causal (rather than merely correlational) relationship between authoritarian regime type and war outcomes by examining five historical cases in which a leader initiated a war that ultimately ended in defeat. Next, I build on these insights about the domestic consequences of military defeat to ask

whether leaders' expectations about accountability also influence their decisions to get involved in military conflicts in the first place. I first assess how regime type affects patterns of victory and defeat in war. Counter to the "democratic advantage" hypothesis, I find that constrained authoritarians are approximately as likely to win wars as democrats. Unconstrained authoritarians, on the other hand, are much less likely to win their wars than other regime types. I then show that these same patterns hold at lower levels of military conflict, namely in Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), which are militarized conflicts short of war. For both wars and MIDs, I show that alternative explanations do not better explain the patterns I observe, including showing that levels of democracy do not explain the disparity in war outcomes among regime types. A final empirical chapter looks at the implications of non-democratic accountability for a related area of international behavior: signaling and crisis bargaining. I show that leaders who can impede domestic elite coordination have difficulty generating audience costs and credible threats. In contrast, authoritarian regimes in which leaders are more constrained – even if the regime wholly lacks liberal institutions – are able to generate credible threats as effectively as democracies.

Finally, I summarize the conclusion that reappears throughout the manuscript: unconstrained dictators who can render their tenure secure from domestic elites are indeed the "rogues" we suspect, picking fights, starting disastrous wars, and surviving in office only to repeat the cycle. In contrast, leaders who do not control access to high office, and who do not have the means to monitor and punish potential challenges to their rule, are nearly indistinguishable from democracies on a number of important

dimensions of foreign policy. These are findings of great relevance not only to

scholars of international relations, but also for policymakers, who can learn from these

findings to better tailor their policies to the incentives of different types of

authoritarian leaders.

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This dissertation could not have been written without the support of a large number of advisors, family members, colleagues, and friends.

Throughout graduate school, my advisers pretty much resembled the platonic form of the dissertation committee. Ken Schultz, my dissertation chair, provided incredibly helpful guidance at every stage of this project. From the very beginning, when I was working on the field paper that sparked the entire dissertation, Ken was both encouraging and patient. In retrospect, I realize that the constant knocking of a second-year student must have been pretty annoying - but Ken never once let me feel it! Moreover, at many points throughout the project, Ken suggested a crucial reframing that influenced the entire dissertation, for example, viewing this as a project about "accountability" rather than "leader insecurity". That insight in particular guided me out of a morass and towards what you read here today. I cannot thank him enough. Next, Scott Sagan helped me from literally day one, when he taught Stanford's International Security graduate seminar. Scott always had a knack of helping me distill the most important insights, helping me package them in a way that was understandable to others, and making connections to other scholarship in the field. Moreover, both in his own remarks, and by facilitating my pre-doc fellowship at CISAC in my final year, Scott always helped me link my research to real-world issues.

(I think he may have also mentioned my name to the folks at Cornell... Thanks Scott!) Next, Jim Fearon had the incredible knack of being both utterly intimidating and unfailingly supportive. Intimidating, because ... well because he is Jim, and has a brain like a computer. Supportive, because he really gave me the sense that he believed in the project – most dramatically, when he talked me off the ledge when I was tempted to ditch the whole interstate war thing and heed the siren song of civil war studies. Jim kept me focused on finding the kernel of this project even when my dissertation prospectus was a complete mess, and encouraged me to keep working even when I felt like I had hit a dead end. Finally, Mike Tomz went above and beyond what could possibly be asked of an advisor throughout my time in graduate school. I learned more from Mike and his mentorship than from any other single source. His constant support, feedback, and example were inspirational, truly the hallmark of my graduate career at Stanford. I feel honored to have been able to work so closely with him, both on my dissertation and shared projects, and hope that our collaboration (as both colleagues and friends) continues long after I have left Stanford. I cannot put my gratitude into words.

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but also an unwavering friend and supporter. Dara, you were my rock! I'm not sure

how I would have made it without you. I couldn't decide whether to mention you

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Despite a trend towards political and economic liberalization over the past century, non-democratic states remain some of the most important actors in contemporary world politics.[1] China, led by a single-party authoritarian government, is poised to become another global superpower. Russia, falling deeper into the grip of authoritarianism, perseveres as a political and economic force, as well as an influential member of the UN Security Council. The Middle East, a region whose mix of resource wealth and political grievances provide many opportunities for international conflict, is composed primarily of non-democratic states. Across the world, monarchs and other unelected leaders control nearly 70 percent of existing crude oil reserves.[2] Moreover, the idea that democracy engenders peace is widely accepted among contemporary democratic leaders, and is even sometimes used as a rationale for using military force to overthrow foreign dictatorships.

Nevertheless, important differences in these authoritarian regimes' international behavior are clearly apparent. While North Korea, Iran, and more recently, Russia, are viewed by many as international rogues, other countries such as China have proven to be relatively responsible, cooperative actors in international affairs. Why this difference? Why are some non-democracies more reluctant to settle disputes through

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[1] From 1800 to 1960, 83 percent of all country-years are classified as non-democracies (defined here as states whose Polity IV score is 5 or lower). Even in 2003, after several waves of democratization, 47 percent of countries were non-democracies according to this measure.

[2] Calculated using estimates reported by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), posted January 9, 2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilreserves.html.

force than others? Why do some non-democracies allocate resources to hopeless wars, while others pick their fights much more carefully? Why are some authoritarian regimes able to make credible threats and promises, while the pronouncements of others are dismissed as bluster? Why are some authoritarian leaders reliable partners, while others behave like rogues? Current scholarship provides few systematic answers, having focused more on the variation in international behavior between democracies and non-democracies (Doyle 1983, Lake 1992, Russett 1993, Reiter and Stam 2002, Schultz 2001). Far less research has investigated the remarkable differences in foreign policy among non-democratic states.

Given the "rise of authoritarian great powers" and the durability of non-democratic institutions in areas such as the resource-rich Middle East, the lack of attention to differences in foreign policy among authoritarian regimes represents a startling omission with important consequences not only for scholars' understanding of the domestic sources of international behavior, but also for real-world contemporary foreign policy.[3] I advance a growing body of scholarship that focuses on the domestic political incentives of leaders as a way to comprehend foreign policy decisions (Goemans 2000, Chiozza and Goemans 2003, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003). Like much of the existing literature on domestic politics and international relations, I argue that leaders' motivations to stay in power can help us understand their decisions about foreign policy. Unlike most previous research, however, I focus on how these domestic pressures vary across non-democracies, and I

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[3]Azar Gat, "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007

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offer fresh insights about the nature of accountability, particularly in the absence of democratic institutions. I propose that when domestic actors can overcome their coordination dilemma to remove leaders, even autocratic leaders must make foreign policy decisions in the shadow of domestic punishment. In particular, I argue that previous research has underestimated the extent to which non-democratic leaders are domestically accountable for foreign policy. Even within regimes with small "winning coalitions," where the support of only a small group of individuals is required to stay in power, elites often have the means and incentives to coordinate to remove the ruler as long as the leader does not control access to high office and the leader has not tampered with military institutions, using them to both spy on potential rivals, and reducing the likelihood of a military coup.[4]

I also introduce a rich new source of data that allows me to distinguish my explanation from existing theories. While several scholars have used Barbara Geddes' regime typology to test for differences in foreign policy between military, single party, and personalist regimes (Peceny et al. 2002), these composite regime categories make it difficult to tell *which* aspects of different regime types are causing observed behavior. I therefore have generated a new dataset based on the individual regime characteristics

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[4] As will be discussed later, I argue that Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) overlook the extent to which even leaders of small-selectorate polities may be held accountable by their supporters. I argue that by not taking into account the possibility of elite coordination in autocratic politics, the authors misestimate the size of the selectorate for many countries. Moreover, by not taking into account variation in the extent to which leaders control membership in the "winning coalition," selectorate theory does not recognize that elites' expectation that they will remain in the winning coalition after leader turnover depends on whether or not the leader controls access to high office.

that Geddes originally collected to create her codings.[5] This trove of data yields more than a dozen separate indicators for regime characteristics unavailable in any other existing dataset. I also expand the coding of the most relevant of these individual variables temporally and geographically, collecting data on all war participants between 1918 and 1999, including the post 1945 country years that Geddes did not code. This new dataset allows me to study subtle variations in non-democratic institutions – differences not picked up in existing measurements of regime characteristics, but that nevertheless have important implications for states' international behavior.

Plan for the Manuscript

The manuscript proceeds as follows. Chapter Two develops an argument about domestic accountability in authoritarian regimes, in which the key considerations are whether the leaders can monitor and punish regime insiders, and personally controls appointment to high office. I first present an argument about variation in accountability across authoritarian regimes. I then discuss a number of mechanisms through which the ease of domestic punishment could affect a state's foreign policy behavior. The chapter culminates in the series of testable predictions about conflict behavior that I assess in subsequent chapters.

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[5] Sincere thanks are due to Barbara Geddes for her generosity and collegiality in sharing her original coding sheets with me, as well discussing individual cases in some detail.

Chapter Three turns to questions of method and measurement, providing a detailed discussion of how I developed and coded indicators for the theoretical concepts discussed in Chapter Two. In this chapter, I describe my data collection procedures, analyze how regime type various temporally and geographically, compare my regime type codings to those created by other scholars, and attempt to demonstrate the validity of my indicators. I describe how we can distinguish between two general types of authoritarian leaders. On the one hand, there are "constrained" authoritarians who do not personally control top government appointments, and have not tampered with normal military organization. On the other hand are "unconstrained" authoritarians who have seized personal control of civilian and military institutions, appointed cronies to both civilian and military positions, and taken related steps to insulate themselves from removal at the hands of rivals. While some leaders fall in between these two extremes, I find that most leaders of the leaders in my sample either both control civilian appointments and interfere with military institutions to insulate themselves from coups, or do neither.

Chapter Four begins the empirical investigation of the relationship between regime type and international conflict by analyzing how war outcomes affect leader tenure. I find that constrained authoritarians are approximately as likely to lose office after defeat in war as democratic leaders. In sharp contrast, unconstrained authoritarians manage to hold on to power even in the face of serious military defeat. I examine the data from various angles, showing how the results change when questionable cases are recoded. I also evaluate plausible alternative explanations for my findings, such as the

possibility that constrained authoritarians are merely more "democratic" – i.e., that they allow greater political participation by ordinary citizens – than their unconstrained counterparts. Counter to the conventional wisdom, I find that a country's level of democracy does not, in fact, explain variation in punishment rates among authoritarians.

Chapter Five deepens this analysis, and attempts to establish a causal (rather than merely correlational) relationship between authoritarian regime type and war outcomes by examining five historical cases in which a leader initiated a war that ultimately ended in defeat. The first case I examine is the defeat of Saddam Hussein, the quintessential unconstrained authoritarian, in the Persian Gulf War. Why was Saddam able to survive a military setback that would have surely toppled most other leaders? Three of the remaining cases are constrained leaders who were ousted within two years of leading their countries to military defeat: Galtieri of Argentina after the Falklands War; Kuwatli of Syria after the Palestine War; and Hiranuma of Japan after the Nomonhan Incident with the Soviet Union in 1939. In each of these cases, I show that the war outcome – or in the case of Hiranuma, a contemporaneous foreign policy issue – played a pivotal role in the leader's ouster at the hands of other domestic elites. The fifth and final case is King Farouk of Egypt, who was coded as a somewhat rarer "semi-constrained" leader in that, as King, he controlled appointments to high office, but had not tampered with military institutions.[6] Farouk was ousted in a coup

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[6] As I'll discuss at various points throughout the manuscript, this is not true of all monarchs, who may be constrained, semi-constrained, or unconstrained, just like military or single-party leaders.

approximately four years after leading Egypt to defeat against Israel; I ask both why he survived as long as he did, and why he was eventually ousted.

Chapter Six builds on these insights about the domestic consequences of military defeat, and asks whether leaders' expectations about accountability also influence their decisions to get involved in military conflicts in the first place. I first assess how regime type affects patterns of victory and defeat in war. Counter to the "democratic advantage" hypothesis, I find that constrained authoritarians are approximately as likely to win wars as democrats. Unconstrained authoritarians, on the other hand, are much less likely to win their wars than other regime types. I then show that these same patterns hold at lower levels of military conflict, namely in Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), which are militarized conflicts short of war. For both wars and MIDs, I show that alternative explanations do not better explain the patterns I observe, including showing that levels of democracy do not explain the disparity in war outcomes among regime types.

Chapter Seven looks at the implications of non-democratic accountability for a related area of international behavior: signaling and crisis bargaining. I show that leaders who can impede domestic elite coordination have difficulty generating audience costs and credible threats. In contrast, authoritarian regimes in which leaders are more constrained – even if the regime wholly lacks liberal institutions – are able to generate credible threats as effectively as democracies.

Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusion that reappears throughout the manuscript: unconstrained dictators who can render their tenure secure from domestic elites are indeed the "rogues" we suspect, picking fights, starting disastrous wars, and surviving in office only to repeat the cycle. In contrast, leaders who do not control access to high office, and who do not have the means to monitor and punish potential challenges to their rule, are nearly indistinguishable from democracies on a number of important dimensions of foreign policy. These are findings of great relevance not only to scholars of international relations, but also for policymakers, who can learn from these findings to better tailor their policies to the incentives of different types of authoritarian leaders.

Chapter 2: A Theory of Accountability and Foreign Policy in Non-Democracies

What explains state behavior in international politics? After decades of focusing on system-level explanations for states' international behavior, scholars have more recently turned to domestic politics for insights. Some have focused on how domestic institutions generate variation in foreign policy outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999, Schultz 2003); other have focused on how norms and ideas about the use of force affect leaders' preferences (Maoz and Russett 1993, Risse-Kappen 1995). An important thread in all of this literature has analyzed how democratic political institutions empower citizens to hold leaders – the primary decision-makers in international relations – accountable for their foreign policy decisions (Reiter and Stam 2002).

While this research has led to many important insights, it focuses mainly on the differences between democracies and autocracies. The argument is usually that democratic leaders are more likely to be held accountable for foreign policy (and other) decisions than non-democratic leaders, and that this induces them to make different choices internationally. In democracies, the argument goes, elections, constitutions, and representative bodies allow voters and elites to punish leaders by removing them from office through formal, regularized procedures. In non-democracies, by contrast, no popular audience possesses institutionalized means for sanctioning the leader, whether directly or through elected representatives.

International relations scholars tend to assume that removing dictators is extraordinarily difficult, dangerous, and unpredictable, and that dictators are therefore relatively unconstrained by domestic pressures when they make foreign policy decisions.[7] This is an assumption shared by countless books and articles investigating the relationship between domestic institutions and regime type.[8] While some have looked beyond democracy to argue that the size and interests of groups with the ability to punish the leader affect patterns of accountability (Goemans 2000, Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003), most existing research remains rigidly focus on the supposed accountability advantage of democratic states.

In this chapter, I question the conventional wisdom that authoritarian leaders are uniformly immune to domestic punishment for their international behavior. I argue that not only do authoritarian regimes vary greatly – and systematically – in the extent to which domestic groups can hold leaders accountable for foreign policy decisions, but that many autocratic leaders, like their democratic counterparts, conduct relations with other states in the shadow of domestic punishment. The possibility for punishment then affects leaders' decisions both directly and indirectly. Directly, by causing them to be more selective and cautious about using military force abroad because they fear the domestic consequences, and indirectly, because the institutions

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[7] See, for example, McGillivray and Smith (2000) p. 815, who argue that "ousting authoritarian leaders is more costly [than ousting democratic leaders], often requiring social unrest and possibly even civil war."

[8] For a recent and forceful articulation of this idea, see Reiter and Stam (2002).

that lead to accountability also improve the accuracy and realism of leaders' perceptions of the effects of their policy decisions.

To develop this argument, the chapter proceeds in five sections. First, I focus on how leader "accountability" – or rather, a credible threat to punish the leader domestically – can be generated in authoritarian states. I argue that two features of domestic political regimes are key to predicting when domestic audiences can hold leaders accountable for foreign policy performance, and critique the conventional wisdom that accountability varies according to the strength of a state's liberal democratic institutions. Second, I discuss the links between foreign policy outcomes and leaders' tenure in office, arguing that even small elite audiences will have incentives to punish leaders after serious foreign policy errors such as defeat in war. This leads to the third section, a discussion of both direct and indirect mechanisms through which leader accountability affects leaders' decisions. I then present a series of testable implications of the theory that are assessed in subsequent chapters. Finally, I discuss several alternative theories linking domestic institutions and international behavior, and how these can be distinguished from my argument.

Cross-National Variation in Domestic Accountability: A Theory of Institutions and Ouster

The conventional wisdom has long been that while democratic leaders are vulnerable to removal from office as a consequence of bad foreign policy decisions, authoritarian leaders have such a grip on power that their foreign exploits only rarely affect their tenure. This conventional wisdom, though, is worth questioning. I will argue below that not only do autocratic regimes vary systematically in the extent to which the leader is vulnerable, but some non-democratic leaders are significantly more dependent on the continued support of domestic audiences than is commonly assumed. I draw on a growing literature in comparative politics to explain that even in the absence of democratic institutions, autocratic leaders depend on domestic support to survive in office (Geddes 1999 and 2003, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003, Haber 2006).

Below, I develop a simple theory of leader accountability even in the absence of democratic procedures for removing leaders. Although domestic accountability may take a much less extreme form than a leader actually being ousted, I argue that the ability to remove the leader from office underpins even less serious forms of punishment. To simplify the argument, I therefore focus on whether any domestic groups have the incentives and ability to actually remove the incumbent leader. The problem of removing a leader can be viewed as one of strategic interaction between individuals or groups in society (Weingast 1997). The ways that domestic groups can

overcome the problems inherent in ousting a ruler thus reveal the factors that allow some autocrats to avoid punishment, while others must act in anticipation of domestic accountability.

The question facing any disgruntled subject – no matter what the political regime – is whether the benefits of participating in the removal of an unsatisfactory leader outweigh the potential costs. Below, I argue that the costs to participating in a leader's removal can arise from two major sources. First, the citizen may face costs, such as imprisonment or death, for attempting to oust the leader in the first place, especially if the leader is not ultimately removed. The extent to which the leader can punish citizens for disapproval, and physically make ouster more difficult, affects the magnitude of these "costs of ouster". A second set of costs arises from uncertainty about one's welfare under a new leader. I call these the "costs of turnover." Citizens who were favored under one incumbent may not do as well under a new leader. This is especially true for regime insiders, who face uncertainty about whether they will keep their positions under a new ruler (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Together, the costs of ouster and the costs of turnover affect the ability and incentives of regime insiders to coordinate to install a new ruler.

The Costs of Ouster

The first set of costs involves the difficulty of planning and executing the leader's removal. As argued above, removing a leader requires the coordination of regime

insiders, which calls for common knowledge about when and how the ouster will take place. It also requires that the regime insiders can, if necessary, back up their removal of the leader with the threat of force, or resist the leader's attempts to defend himself against forcible removal from office. I will discuss both of these "costs of ouster" – the costs of creating common knowledge, and the costs of physically dislodging the leader – in turn.

First, consider the costs of creating common knowledge. The potential costs of revealing opposition to the leader (required, obviously, to coordinate with other regime elites) will increase when the leader can monitor and punish disloyal elites. When individuals face a high probability that their criticism or plans will be detected before any ouster takes place, or the punishment for criticizing the incumbent is sufficiently high, common knowledge about the plans to oust will be difficult to create. Individuals may find it preferable to conceal their preference to oust the leader at all – or, in the words of Timur Kuran, to engage in "preference falsification." (Kuran 1991)[9]

Societies vary dramatically in the extent to which the leader can monitor and punish citizens for criticizing them. In democracies, legal protection for freedom of speech and assembly – backed by courts that protect these rights – usually preclude the

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[9] Kuran's analysis of preference falsification and revolutionary bandwagoning in the context of the Eastern European revolutions is closely related to the logic I develop here. However, my analysis is focused less on the rapidity of coordination than variation in the likelihood of coordination across regime types.

incumbent from monitoring and punishing citizens for voicing opposition. Thus, most individuals in democracies can express their preferences openly, avoiding this first source of costs. In non-democratic regimes, on the other hand, the leader and elites can collaborate in making it costly for ordinary citizens to coordinate, punishing those who criticize the regime or engage in political organization against the rulers. However, non-democracies vary greatly in the extent to which *regime insiders* are subject to monitoring and punishment by the leader. While regular citizens cannot challenge the leader without risking their lives, elites can oust leaders given certain incentives – including acceptable costs of voicing dissent.

The classic way leaders can monitor regime insiders is to develop a private military and/or intelligence organ, separate from the regular security forces, and under the leader's sole control.[10] Stalin, Saddam Hussein, and Pinochet all used their control over such forces to punish dissent. Stalin, for example, because of his control over the secret police, was able to fire, arrest, imprison, and kill officials as he saw fit. But in subsequent regimes, the leader was never able to create private forces of this nature. After Stalin's death, the Communist Party strongly limited the power of the KGB to try and sentence the accused, and made sure that it could not be used as a private force at the leader's discretion. After 1953, trial and sentencing for political crimes were carried out by civilian bodies free from the exclusive control of Khrushchev and

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[10] The ability to create private security forces implies some breakdown of coordination among elites in the first place. It may therefore be more useful to think of different regimes as different "equilibria," some of which are more stable than others. The question then becomes whether the leader is currently in an equilibrium in which he is likely to face punishment.

Brezhnev. (In fact, because Khrushchev did not personally control the KGB or other secret police forces, he did not learn of the plans for his own ouster until the Politburo meeting that actually removed him.)[11] As will be argued in Chapter 3, this logic implies that one indicator of the leader's ability to create high costs of ouster is whether he personally controls the security forces, allowing him to spy on his colleagues.

While the first costs of ouster relate to the leader's ability to detect criticism or coups before they are carried out, the second type of costs of ouster concern whether the leader can use parts of the armed forces to physically squelch attempts at takeover by elites once they have actually been set into motion. Risa Brooks (1999), focusing on the Arab world, argues that coups are a major concern for authoritarian leaders, and details a number of ways that leaders prevent coups from being carried out successfully. Regime elites must consider the possibility that once the leader gets wind of a plot, he will use force to physically prevent his removal, typically by calling in the army or palace guard. Indeed, in response to these concerns, some leaders create ultraloyal security forces designed specifically to protect them against coups and other attempts at domestic ouster (as distinct from military forces whose role is to protect the country from foreign armies). Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard is a notable example. As with the costs of creating common knowledge, the key indicator

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[11]Tomspon 1991. A related tactic is for the leader to disrupt the military hierarchy, since this is a natural place for coordination to occur. Quinlivan (1999) refers to both building parallel security forces and rearranging the military command as "coup-proofing" the regime, a concept that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 on victory in war.

here is whether the leader is able to engineer the loyalty of the security forces, or at least segments of them.

In sum, the first way that leaders can insulate themselves from domestic punishment is to personally control the security forces, or tamper with them in a way that makes it difficult for elites to carry out a military coup. In Chapter 3, I will discuss my strategy for measuring whether the leader has achieved this type of personal control, by focusing on whether the leader has taken tangible (and thus, observable) steps such as repeatedly purging disloyal soldiers and officers, tampering with the regular lines of military hierarchy, and related measures.

The Costs of Turnover

Potential coup-makers must not only create common knowledge under the nose of the incumbent, but they must also assess what their personal role inside the regime would be under new leadership. In other words, they must compare their individual payoffs from replacing the leader to their welfare under the current incumbent. For the average citizen, welfare under any leader is primarily a function of the leader's competence and policy preferences. For regime insiders, however, the leader may also control access to private goods such as high office.[12] Regime insiders – precisely the group whose cooperation is required for ouster – thus have the additional concern of whether they will retain their post under a new leader. Therefore, the second key

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[12]BdM et al argue that the leader controls these perks in all regimes; I argue in contrast that leader control over perks varies quite widely.

variable determining variation in regime insiders' preferences about turnover is how likely they are to maintain their privileged insider status under new leadership.[13]

Different regimes have different rules governing the allocation of high government posts. At one extreme are regimes in which the leader personally appoints ministers, cabinet members, or the head of the army. When high government office is held at the discretion of the individual leader, regime insiders cannot be sure that they will retain their privileged status under a new leader. A new ruler will have different cronies and is likely to purge many who were loyal to the previous incumbent. Moreover, in the absence of anyone to enforce promises *ex post*, a challenger cannot credibly promise to retain even those individuals who help topple the incumbent and bring him to power (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). This logic sheds light on why many dictators, including Saddam Hussein and Kim Il Sung, have filled top offices with relatives and other loyal associates – cronies who were so tightly enmeshed with the current leader that they would probably be thrown out by a new leader. Emperor Haile Selassie, ruler of Ethiopia from 1930-1970, chose ministers by personally recruiting "plebians" from the hinterland; since these ministers had no independent power base or special qualifications, they would be certain to be removed after an ouster – and therefore remained devotedly loyal to the Emperor (Kapuscinski 1984).

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[13] In selectorate theory, the probability of staying in the winning coalition is w/s – (size of the winning coalition)/(size of the selectorate).

But in some authoritarian regimes, an independent institution – such as a political party or military organization with its attendant rules of promotion – determines top positions in government. In those regimes, the perks to be attained through high office do not flow solely from personal preferences of the leader.[14] Rather, institutionalized practices determine high posts according to rules such as seniority or intra-party election.[15] Moreover, these rules do not typically change when a new leader comes to power: truly institutionalized rules are difficult to change unless there is a fully-fledged "regime change". In regimes with institutionalized rules about the allocation of appointments, regime insiders' future political livelihood therefore does not depend on the incumbent.[16] Of course, the leader may do his best to alter the institutions in order to give himself a greater say in appointments. But the rules help elites coordinate against attempts by the leader to transgress and install his own cronies by clearly defining what counts as a violation of these rules.

In the Soviet Union after Stalin, for example, party officials from across the USSR elected the Central Committee, which in turn chose the membership of the Politburo. Accordingly, when Khrushchev was ousted, the institutions were unaltered, and nearly all top officials retained their positions since they had been elected to the Central Committee by the Party Congress rather than placed there by Khruschchev personally.

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[14] In the language of selectorate theory, the probability of maintaining the perks of high office are significantly greater than w/s, since the leader does not appoint high office to the same extent (or control who is in the winning coalition).

[15] Enforcing rules about the allocation of posts presents a coordination problem of its own: what is to stop a leader from simply ignoring the rules? I assume here that the rules facilitate coordination by regime insiders to punish leaders who attempt to violate them, much like Weingast (1997).

[16] Of course, it is possible that some of the leader's close advisors will be ousted along with him. But the remaining regime insiders could expect to retain office.

Similarly, in military regimes, military hierarchies and seniority rather than personal ties play an important role in promotion to and maintenance of high office. The Argentine military junta between 1976 and 1983 consisted of a leader who shared power with the chiefs of the army, the navy and the air force, which are not appointed by the leader (though the leader did make key cabinet appointments). Therefore, while the regime was able to exert its will on the population indiscriminately, no single leader was ever able to change the rules of the game and stack the junta with cronies whose political future depended on his own.[17]

In sum, when regime elites are deciding whether they should oust a leader, they take into account two factors. The first is the costs of ouster, or the costs of planning and executing the leader's removal. These depend on whether the leader can detect elites' plans, can punish them for opposing him, and can physically resist their attempts to remove him. The costs of ouster are therefore higher when the leader personally controls the security forces. The second cost that regime elites take into account is the cost of turnover, or whether elites who participate in the ouster will be able to maintain their favored positions under new leadership. I argued that this is more likely, i.e. the costs of turnover are lower, when the top government positions are determined by an organization such as a political party, or an institution such as military hierarchy and promotion, rather than being at the discretion of the individual leader. If the latter, there is no guarantee that a new leader won't simply jettison temporary allies for more

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[17] See Linz and Stepan 1996 p. 190-194

trusted cronies, and so elites may be better off simply sticking with the status quo and keeping the incumbent.

Implications for Measuring Regime Type

Above, I argued two factors affect whether elites in authoritarian regimes can credibly threaten to remove the leader: first, whether the leader has tampered with military institutions, allowing him to deter and resist forcible removal from office, and second, whether the leader personally controls access to high government office, making elites more uncertain of their political futures under new leadership. What remains to be discussed is how these two features interact. I argue here, and provide evidence in subsequent chapters, that the two factors are additive: leaders who control either appointments or the military are more insulated from punishment than those who control neither, and leaders who control both appointments and the military tend to be less accountable than leaders with only one of these "tools" at their disposal.

Accordingly, in later chapters I will differentiate between three types of authoritarian leaders. Leaders who both controlled appointments to high government office, and who had tampered with the military (either by overturning normal military hierarchy, purging large sections of the army, or creating new security forces loyal to themselves personally) are coded as "unconstrained authoritarians." Leaders who neither control access to high office nor have tampered with the military are considered "constrained

authoritarians." Between these two extremes are leaders who have carried out one, but not both, steps to ensure their security. I term them "semi-constrained authoritarians."

How Foreign Policy Affects Leader Tenure

Above, I described how domestic institutions (or lack thereof) affect the likelihood that a leader can be ousted by domestic elites, whatever their specific grievance. Ultimately, I will link these same domestic institutions to leaders' foreign policy decisions. But an interim step is required. For domestic institutions to affect leaders' foreign policy decisions, leaders must expect that ex post, they will be held to account for their foreign policy choices. This section therefore discusses the literature on the link between foreign policy and domestic approval, and highlights at least one area of foreign policy that is particularly likely to elicit disapproval, no matter what the audience: defeat in war.

Retrospective and Prospective Judgments about Candidates
Countless scholars have suggested that the quality of a leader's foreign policy affects his survival in office. In American politics, a large literature examines how incumbents' economic policies affect their support among the electorate. While some disagreement exists over the precise mechanism, one of the central findings of this literature is that economic outcomes such as macroeconomic performance influence vote choice in Presidential elections (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988,

Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2003). Voters take the past into account when deciding who should lead them in the future.

Scholars of international relations have addressed similar questions, focusing on how domestic audiences assess leaders' international behavior. Despite early skepticism that voters care about foreign policy, the more recent consensus is that voters do pay attention to foreign policy when it comes to selecting (or retaining) a candidate in office.[18] Some argue that domestic audiences value the leader's competence or ability, and that the outcomes of leaders' foreign policy choices provide audiences with useful information about how competent the leader really is. In this view, audiences prefer to remove leaders when unfavorable international outcomes reveal that the leader is less competent (Smith 1998).[19]

Another possibility is that domestic audiences make prospective judgments, keeping leaders in office as long as they are the most likely, among the available candidates, to safeguard their future welfare. How future welfare is determined is up for debate, though some scholars argue that it is in part a function of the future foreign policy goods that the leader can provide.[20] These goods might be material, but they might also be psychological; for example, some authors have argued that if an individual identifies with a group (such as a country or a sports team), that group's performance

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[18] For a recent review of the literature, see John H. Aldrich, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp, "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection," *Annual Review of Political Science*, pp. 477-502, 2006.

[19] See Johns (2007) for a helpful discussion of various forms of retrospection with different levels of sophistication.

[20] Bueno de Mesquita et al 2004.

can influence the individual's sense of well-being.[21] But it is also possible that even if individuals' welfare is not affected by foreign policy outcomes directly, they may use foreign policy competence to differentiate candidates.[22] Candidates may also refer to foreign policy in normative terms, linking a candidate's foreign policy stance to shared values within their community. Similarly, defeat in war might allow rivals to the leader to claim a rhetorical advantage by claiming a nationalist cause as the nation rallies to oust the incumbent and restore lost honor.

It is likely that both prospective and retrospective judgments affect domestic support; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver (2007) show survey evidence from the 2004 Presidential election that both prospective and retrospective evaluations of the war in Iraq affected vote choice. Aldrich et al (2006), in a recent review of the link between foreign policy and elections, also allude to both prospective and retrospective judgments. Moreover, failure in war might also affect tenure less directly. First, failure in war provides a public event that can help coordinate rivals to the leader, both within the elite and among mass opposition.[23]

Are Authoritarian Audiences Different?

While debate remains over the specific mechanisms though which, and reasons why, domestic audiences translate world events support for their leaders, all of these

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[21] See for example Gries (2006) p. 315.
[22] Aldrich et. al. (2006).
[23] Both Ken Schultz and Hein Goemans have suggested this possibility to me.

perspectives agree that the outcomes of foreign policy decisions matter for *democratic* leaders' survival in office. A remaining question, though, is whether the same is true in authoritarian regimes. More generally, we might wonder whether the composition, size, or identity of the audience affects whether it looks to foreign policy decisions or outcomes when deciding whether to retain the incumbent vs. replace him with someone new.

My argument is that war and conflict outcomes affect audiences' preferences about the incumbent versus other potential candidates, and that leaders who lose international disputes find their stature lowered in the eyes of domestic observers. I provide cross-national evidence that this is indeed the case in both Chapters 4 and 5.[24] As I'll discuss below, I agree with others who have argued that domestic audiences take into account the costs (of ouster and turnover) and benefits (of replacing the leader with someone more competent or promising) of ousting a leader, and that this affects whether they will attempt to punish the leader.[25] But I disagree that all else equal, authoritarian elites have little incentive to care about important foreign policy decisions such as loss in war.

When it comes to any type of policy, foreign or domestic, one of the most important and well-publicized decisions a leader can make is whether and how to employ military force against other states. While using force can be an effective way to settle

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[24] In Chapter 7, I also provide evidence that authoritarian audiences view another foreign policy decision – escalating a crisis and then backing down – negatively.

[25] Bueno de Mesquita et. al 2004.

international disputes, it also costs money and lives, and can sour a country's relations with neighbors and trading partners. Victory or defeat in international crises is therefore likely to factor into domestic evaluations of the leaders' performance, and may make rival contenders for top office seem more attractive.[26] Moreover, elites in the regime may actually wish to scapegoat the leader, removing him from office as a way to shore up the regime (there is some evidence, for example, that this factored into the removal of Galtieri after Argentina's defeat in the Falklands War).

In contrast, some perspectives, such as Bueno de Mesquita et al's selectorate theory (described in greater detail below) argue that we should view foreign policy matters such as war outcomes as public goods. The fact that domestic audiences in authoritarian regimes are smaller than those in democracies means that leaders can pay off supporters with private goods. Public goods such as foreign policy therefore do not, according to selectorate theory, loom large in the calculations of domestic elites when the selectorate is small.

While I take this possibility seriously, and discuss it in greater detail later in this and later chapters, the view I develop in this manuscript is that authoritarian audiences do not automatically care less about foreign policy than democratic audiences, at least when it comes to serious foreign policy questions such as war or dispute outcomes. Like democratic audiences, authoritarian audiences may of course care more about other issues, such as their economic well-being or other goods the leader can provide,

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[26] See, for example, Reiter and Stam (2002) for a recent discussion.

or values he might embody. But when the costs of ouster and turnover are relatively low, as they are in many authoritarian regimes, elites will be motivated to punish their leaders for serious foreign policy missteps. This, I will argue, can occur in regimes with both large and small selectorates.

To a large extent, my focus on war and conflict outcomes sidesteps broader questions about states' foreign policy preferences. Scholars are at odds over the general determinants of state's foreign policies, pointing to a plethora of factors such as countries' relative position in the international system, domestic and international norms (which may themselves be influenced by domestic institutions), public opinion, economic structure, and many others. This dissertation does not ask, for example, why some states prefer war over peace more generally, or why some states appear more comfortable using force to settle international disputes. My focus is on dispelling the idea domestic accountability does not matter in authoritarian states, not examining the content of the policies that might lead to accountability. Focusing on a relatively uncontroversial policy failure – defeat in war and military disputes – allows me to compare rates of domestic punishment in situations that domestic audiences will judge similarly no matter what their broader foreign policy preferences.

How Domestic Institutions Affect Foreign Policy

The final step is to link the same institutions that predict whether leaders can be ousted

– whether the leader controls access to high office, and has tampered with the security

forces – to important patterns of foreign policy. There are both direct and direct

mechanisms through which the institutions described above may influence foreign

policy. They may influence foreign policy directly, by causing leaders to act in ways

to avoid punishment, but they will also operate indirectly, by improving the quality of

decisions made by leaders.

"Indirect" Effects on Foreign Policy

The first way that accountability influences leaders' foreign policy decisions is that

rational leaders will behave in ways to avoid incurring that punishment – domestic

institutions affect foreign policy *through* their effects on leaders' incentives. Above, I

emphasized that I was not proposing a general theory of foreign policy preferences.

But I did argue that no domestic audience has incentives to reward a leader who drags

the country into losing wars, rather than simply staying out. We would therefore

expect leaders who can be held accountable domestically to also be more selective and

cautious about which wars they fight. This should be manifest in higher rates of

victory for accountable leaders than unaccountable leaders.[27] I test this possibility in

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[27] One possibility that might lead to a different prediction is that authoritarian leaders have
systematically more to gain from war, perhaps because they can retain a larger share of the spoils, or
because the war is a way to legitimate their domestic rule. Therefore, even if some authoritarians are

Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, I also test the related possibility that authoritarian leaders are subject to costs not only for defeat, but also for escalating a crisis and then backing down.

"Direct" Effects on Foreign Policy

In addition to the indirect ways that institutions might affect leaders' incentives, it is also possible that they influence countries' foreign policies more directly, in particular by affecting the quality of the judgments made by policymakers and their ability to deploy military fore effectively. Below, I discuss a number of possible mechanisms.

a) Quality of Intelligence and Prediction

Leaders who have not insulated themselves from internal criticism, and have not tampered with military hierarchy or purged competent segments of the army, may actually be able to make more accurate estimates about the effects of possible policy decisions than unconstrained leaders. First, in regimes where the leader does not personally control appointments, he is less likely to be surrounded by cronies and yes-men than if he does select candidates for high office. Constrained authoritarians are more likely to have subordinates and advisors who are both able and willing to speak up about foreign policy matters and point out flawed reasoning or faulty assumptions. Moreover, since they know that they will be held accountable for the consequences of

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likely to be punished for losing a war, they may also have more to gain from winning. I do not find evidence for this in the wars I have studied.

their decisions, constrained authoritarians will have incentives to actively seek out such advice before making decisions.

A number or scholars have made similar arguments, but have argued that democracies have a unique advantage in terms of accurate and informed decision-making.[28] They argue that the freedom of the press and democratic institutions allow the public to scrutinize the government's rationales for war, both before and after the fact. But there are at least two problems with the proposition that a democratic "marketplace of ideas" can lead to better decision-making. The first is that, due to the classified nature of much of the information involved in security-related matters, the public may not be privy to the information required to judge the leader's foreign policy decisions. Knowing this, citizens may delegate significant decision-making authority to the executive (Kaufmann 2004). Ironically, government elites in an authoritarian regime may have a better picture of whether the leader's decision was a sound one. Second, the so-called "rally effect" may reduce the public's desire to criticize the leader. While it is unknown whether elites in authoritarian regimes are similarly likely to rally around the leader in times of crisis, the rally effect likely mutes the efficacy of the marketplace of ideas. In sum, there are reasons to think that informational differences between constrained and unconstrained authoritarian regimes may be as great as, or greater, than differences between democracies and non-democracies.

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[28] See for example Reiter and Stam (2002), Kaufmann (2004).

b) Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness

A second way that military institutions may affect foreign policy directly is that the very moves the leader takes to insulate himself from power may also inadvertently weaken his military capacity. A number of scholars have argued that the very same institutional changes that leaders implement to shore up their rule can also make their militaries less able to fight effectively (Brooks 1998, Biddle and Zirkle 1996, Quinlivan 1999). I discuss this possibility in much greater detail in Chapter 6, but as above, the important point is that the important distinction may not be between democracies and non-democracies, but rather between variants of authoritarianism. Some leaders have tampered with the military hierarchy in order to prevent coups, while others have left military hierarchy and chains of command intact, as well as not personally selecting top leaders.   Tampering with the military in this way in order to maintain regime stability can diminish military effectiveness both by reducing the competence of the military command, and making it more difficult to implement sophisticated battlefield tactics[29]

In sum, there are both direct and indirect mechanisms through which the institutions outlined above may affect foreign policy decisions and behavior. Some leaders have the freedom to make risky foreign policy gambles without being forced to factor in the domestic consequences of losing power. Although, like any leader, they may wish to ensure their state's survival under anarchy, they suffer few domestic consequences for

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[29] See, for example Biddle and Long (2004), Brooks (1998).

miscalculating or making decisions that actually decrease the country's security. They are also freer to indulge their hunches and whims or to make foreign policy decisions for idiosyncratic reasons. In short, they are less selective than their constrained counterparts. The following section summarizes this logic and lays out a series of testable implications to be assessed in later chapters.

Testable Implications

I argue above that non-democracies vary systematically in their tendency to hold leaders accountable for war and conflict outcomes. Forward-looking leaders who know that they may face accountability for defeat in international disputes, therefore, take the possibility of punishment into account when deciding to start wars, make threats, escalate crises, and take other risky foreign policy decisions. Moreover, if the relationship between regime characteristics and foreign policy decisions does exist because of regime characteristics' effects on accountability, we should observe higher rates of *ex post* punishment for leaders who cannot monitor dissent, and who do not control appointments. The theory therefore leads to the following array of testable implications in different areas of international behavior, each of which will be taken up in a separate chapter:

H1: Punishment. (Chapters 4 and 5)

Leaders who can monitor dissent and control access to high office will be less likely to

be punished after defeat in wars and other international disputes. If accountability

indeed drives the relationship between regime characteristics and war outcomes, we

would expect that leaders who can monitor elites and dismiss them from their posts

easily will face a smaller risk of losing office, conditional on losing a war, than leaders

who cannot.

H2: Selectivity and Victory   (Chapter 6)

Increased selectivity should be manifest in higher rates of success in wars and military

disputes. Initiating a losing interstate war is perhaps the most serious foreign policy

error a leader can commit. Losing a war implies loss of life, wealth, and possibly

territory, without achieving desired policy objectives, and therefore seems among the

strongest grounds for removal from office. A similar logic applies to smaller

militarized disputes: leaders who lack the tools to prevent their own removal will be

more cautious about their initiation of and involvement in disputes than leaders who

can monitor dissent and who control access to high office.

H3: Audience Costs and Credibility in Crisis Bargaining (Chapter 7)

Leaders who cannot monitor dissent or control access to high office should be able to

generate greater audience costs, defined as the potential costs a leader would incur for

making a threat and then backing down, or failing to carry through on the threat in the

face of resistance. As Fearon (1994) has suggested, higher audience costs can

improve states' ability to signal resolve by making threats more costly. Moreover, the level of audience costs may vary by regime types; leaders who are more accountable should find it easier to credibly jeopardize their political future by making public threats. The targets of their threats should therefore be less likely to resist. As I'll argue in greater detail in Chapter 7, leaders who cannot monitor and punish, and who do not control access to high office, are less likely to find their threats reciprocated, whether or not they are democratic. A leader who can spy on regime insiders and select those who hold high office, on the other hand, is much more likely to face resistance from the targets of threats.

Accountability and Foreign Policy: Alternative Perspectives

The above section argued that two features of domestic politics – the leader's ability to monitor and punish defection, and whether the leader controls the ultimate perk of access to high office – are particularly important for understanding when leaders can be held domestically accountable for foreign policy (and other) decisions. Alternative theories argue that different attributes of regimes are responsible for variation in foreign policy.

One of these theories is selectorate theory by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow. The selectorate framework distinguishes polities based on two core institutional features: (1) the size of the selectorate (the set of people in a regime with

influence over the choice of leader), and (2) the size of the winning coalition (the subset of the selectorate whose support is required to keep the leader in office, and who, importantly, receive "special privileges" in return).

A key assumption made by Bueno de Mesquita et al. is that the leader's supporters, who receive extra perks in return for their support, cannot predict with any certainty whether they would retain these private goods under a new leader. Rather, they will only retain these perks with a probability determined by the ratio of the size of the winning coalition to the size of the selectorate; that is, the new regime insiders will be selected with equal probability from the members of the selectorate.[30] Members of the status quo winning coalition are therefore extremely unlikely to defect to the challenger if the selectorate is small relative to the size of the winning coalition. Leaders in regimes with a small winning coalition and a large selectorate are, according to this logic, particularly unaccountable to the regime insiders.

In contrast, I argue that the logically prior question is whether the ruler controls access to high office. When high offices are controlled by institutionalized procedures such as hierarchy-based promotion or party elections, members of the winning coalition have a strong likelihood of maintaining their privileges even under a new leader. Thus, the likelihood of their inclusion in the winning coalition even after a leadership change allows them to be more responsive to the competence and policy preferences

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[30] They term this ratio the "loyalty norm" because a low ratio induces high levels of loyalty in current members of the winning coalition. Potential challengers, it is argued, cannot promise credibly that members of the winning coalition can keep their perks with probability greater than the loyalty norm.

of the ruler when they make the decision to oust. Only in regimes where the leader controls access to high office would the winning coalition-to-selectorate ratio induce loyalty to the leader. Thus, the conclusions of selectorate theory would only apply to a subset of political regimes.

The question remains, however, whether non-democratic and democratic regimes vary systematically in terms of what *kinds* of foreign policies and goods, if any, their leaders must provide to avoid removal from office. If autocratic regimes vary predictably from democratic regimes in this regard, autocrats may be relatively unconstrained in the realm of foreign policy despite conditions that allow for elites to remove these leaders from office.

Selectorate theory forwards precisely such an argument: domestic institutions directly affect the mixture of goods and policy the leader needs in order to satisfy key domestic supporters and, in particular, public goods – among which they count foreign policy – are not important to autocrats' supporters (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, 2003). According to selectorate theory, leaders of small-coalition systems have little incentive to expend resources (or even much thought) on national defense or success in war. For example, "To stay in office, [small-selectorate leaders] must only provide more [private goods] than their challenger can credibly promise... Therefore, the incumbent autocrat's comparative advantage in distributing private goods and in reserving resources for that purpose remains unaltered following military defeat (p. 234)." Similarly, "(p)rovided she does not expend resources on the war

effort, [an autocratic leader] typically survives whether she wins, loses or negotiates (p. 237)."

Above, I criticized the assumption that regime insiders remain loyal whenever the ratio of the size of the winning coalition to the size of the selectorate is low, arguing that this would only apply to regimes in which the leader personally controls access to high office (and the goods that go along with high office). If correct, this critique alone would weaken the conclusion that incumbents mainly need to compete with challengers on the basis of private goods. But a second assumption, that foreign policy decisions and outcomes are public goods, also deserves scrutiny. Foreign policy influences the private payoffs of regime insiders both directly and indirectly. Directly, elites (though perhaps not the dictator) may individually be more affected by the costs of war, such as lost revenue from oil fields or the threat of regime change. Indirectly, foreign policy can serve as an indicator of the relative quality (competence, ability, or strength, Bueno de Mesquite et al 2002, p. 267) of the incumbent vis à vis a potential challenger. For example, leaders who lose wars or embroil the country in pointless crises may reveal that they possess poor judgment, are inexpert in military affairs, or simply have a higher tolerance for risk than regime insiders prefer. All of these would presumably be an indicator of the leader's ability to provide private goods in other domains. Indeed, these were precisely the sorts of issues that the Central Committee cited when it removed Khrushchev from office. Thus, even if BdM et al are right that public goods are less important to small-coalition leaders than they are to

leaders with large winning coalitions, they neglect the private-good aspect of foreign policy.

In addition to selectorate theory, another set of explanations uses the logic of diversionary war to explain variation in foreign policy across regime types. Applying this logic to authoritarian states, Lai and Slater (2006) argue that the legitimacy and stability of the *regime* is the key to understanding states' incentives to initiate militarized disputes, distinguishing between military and party-based regimes. Military regimes, they argue, are "systematically more vulnerable to collapse" than party-based regimes (p. 117). They are therefore more "belligerent internationally to compensate for this lack of domestic institutional capacity" (p. 117), picking foreign fights more frequently than their more stable and legitimate party-based counterparts.

The theory presented here differs from the regime stability hypothesis in two regards. First, I argue that since leaders are the primary decision-makers in international affairs, it makes sense to focus explicitly on the incentives of the leader, rather than the regime as a whole. Moreover, my theory makes nearly the opposite assumption about when leaders will be motivated to initiate conflict. While diversionary war theory assumes that insecure governments will use foreign conflict to divert domestic criticism, I assume that insecure leaders will be less likely to initiate conflict the less likely they think they are to win.[31]

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[31] Mansfield and Snyder (2005) take a related approach, arguing that democratizing mixed regimes are especially war-prone compared to democracies and autocracies. Their logic is that elites in

The arguments described above must be taken seriously, and can be tested against my own arguments. For example, selectorate theory implies that states with larger winning coalitions should be more selective about their wars and more likely to obtain favorable outcomes in disputes, regardless of whether or not the leader can monitor dissent or control appointments. Selectorate theory also predicts that leaders with a large winning coalition to selectorate ratio should be more likely to be punished for losing wars, again regardless of the institutional features I posit to be most important. Throughout the manuscript I will test the predictions of alternative perspectives against my own.

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democratizing states are especially insecure and find it difficult to manage competing domestic interests within their new democratic institutions. Elites therefore attempt to divert public support by fomenting nationalism, which, Mansfield and Snyder argue, increases the probability that the democratizing state will select into wars. Like diversionary theory, this argument makes a different assumption than mine about the relationship between insecurity and conflict initiation. Moreover, my theory would suggest that differences between democratizing and other states have more to do with the institutionalization of the regime, and elites' expectations that they would be able to survive the leader's turnover.

Finally, Goemans (2000) analyzes leaders' incentives to avoid not merely removal from office, but severe punishment such as exile or death. Goemans argues that leaders are especially attuned to the probability of *severe* punishment, and argues that the likelihood of severe punishment for different war outcomes varies systematically by regime type. When democrats lose wars only moderately (i.e., with minor population losses), they merely lose office; when dictators lose wars moderately, their repressive apparatus maintains intact and they can prevent overthrow. In contrast, leaders of anocracies cannot prevent severe punishment even if their loss in war is only moderate. Leaders of mixed regimes are therefore especially likely to do anything possible to prevent any loss in war.

Chapter 3: Methods and Measurement

In the previous chapter, I argued that two aspects of domestic politics in particular affect whether regime elites will hold non-democratic leaders accountable for foreign policy decisions. First, I argued that regime insiders will be more reluctant to participate in a leader's ouster when they face a high probability of detection and punishment for plotting. Thus, when the leader can monitor regime elites, he is less likely to be held accountable for his decisions. Second, I argued that regime insiders take into account whether they will be able to retain the perks of regime membership if a new leader is installed. This is more likely, in particular, when the leader controls political appointments. In contrast, if institutionalized procedures such as intra-party elections or seniority-based promotion determine access to high government jobs, regime insiders will be more likely to hold the leader accountable for foreign policy (and other) choices. How, though, do we measure these concepts – the leader's ability to monitor and punish regime insiders, and the leader's personal control over appointments to high government offices – empirically?

Measuring the Power to Punish and Appoint

Scholars have long been interested in the effects of domestic political institutions on international behavior, drawing on datasets such as Polity IV, Freedom House, and the

World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Marshall and Jaggers 2002, Beck, Clark, et al 2001) for information about country-specific regime characteristics. While these datasets have led to many insights regarding international affairs, they provide little information on the two variables I identify above. Below, I provide more detail about how data on these characteristics will be collected.

But first, I briefly describe existing sources of cross-national data on the domestic characteristics of authoritarian regimes and assess the variables and sample of countries they cover.

Polity IV[32]

- Covers most independent states from 1800 onwards

- Does not contain any information about private security forces, politicization of the military, or disruption of the military hierarchy

- Contains a variable, XCONST, that attempts to measure variation in executive constraints, but pilot research in which I spot-checked specific observations suggests that the measure does not consistently capture differences in executive accountability across authoritarian regimes[33]

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[32] Marshall and Jaggers (2002)

[33] For example, Argentina under its military junta in 1976-1983 has the lowest possible value on XCONST, indicating minimal constraints on the executive. My research indicates that while the junta was not subject to constraints from the broader public, the junta could (and did) remove individual leaders, who were ultimately responsible for foreign policy decisions. Another example is China under General Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang is listed as the "least constrained" type of leader, even though my research indicated that Chiang did not control appointments to high office until at least 1937.

Winning Coalition/Selectorate[34]

- Covers most independent states from 1918 onwards

- Does not contain any information about private security forces, politicization of the military, or disruption of the military hierarchy

- Does not contain information about the extent to which the leader controls appointments

Gandhi and Przeworski Regime Typology (2006)

- Differentiates between monarchies, military regimes, and civilian regimes

- Only covers the years 1946-1996

- Does not contain any information about private security forces, politicization of the military, or disruption of the military hierarchy

- Does not contain information about the extent to which the leader controls appointments

Geddes Authoritarian Regime Typology[35]

- Differentiates between military, single party, personalist, and hybrid regimes

- Only covers regimes from 1946-1999 that ultimately survived for more than 3 years

- Does not cover monarchies, Iran, or post-Soviet Republics.

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[34] Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003.
[35] Geddes (2003)

- Although Geddes' regime types are constructed in a way that correlates with whether leader has private security forces, has politicized the military, disrupted the military hierarchy, and personally controls appointments, the typology does not measure these factors directly.

In sum, existing data do not provide information that reflect how insulated the leader is from challenges from within his own regime – the most likely source of accountability in authoritarian states. Moreover, even cruder regime typologies do not cover the pre-1945 period, significantly limiting the sample of war participants that could be studied.

Data Collection Procedures

A new dataset, however, allows me to measure these concepts directly, for a substantial time period. Below, I describe how I collected regime type data, including my strategies for ensuring validity and replicability and avoiding endogeneity or hindsight bias in the coding. These procedures are based in part on research funded by the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant #SES-0720414, "Leaders, Accountability, and Foreign Policy in Non-Democracies," from the period 8/1/2007-7/31/2008.

Many researchers are familiar with Barbara Geddes' classification of dictatorships into military, single party, and personalist regimes.[36] In order to code regime type, Geddes gathered information about a large number of domestic political variables for each regime, which she then distilled into regime categorizations. Geddes' research included questions about whether the regime is led by a party, the military, or neither; the extent to which institutions determine policy and access to high office; whether the leader holds elections, and whether these elections are essentially plebiscites; whether the military hierarchy has been maintained; and who controls the security forces. Regimes are then assigned a raw score by aggregating the answers to a battery of yes/no questions.[37] Three groups of questions reflect the characteristics of three regime types (personalist, single party, and military); countries are assigned to categories based on which group of questions receives the most "yes" answers. Surprisingly, though, while many researchers have used Geddes' regime typologies, these "raw" data have never been exploited. Geddes generously shared these raw data with me.

For the tests in this manuscript, I focus on two indicators that closely capture the dimensions highlighted in my theory. To measure whether the political survival of

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[36]For example, Geddes' categorization has been used in analyses of types of dictatorships and their conflict behaviors. See for example Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002 and Kinne 2005. See Geddes 2003, pp. 48-49 for descriptions of each regime type.

[37] Geddes argues that typically, "the greatest threat to the survival of the leader in office – though not necessarily to the survival of the regime – comes from inside [the] ruling group, not from outside opposition." She classifies countries as military regimes, single-party dictatorships, personalist regimes, and hybrids of these types according to their "different procedures for making decisions, different characteristic forms of intra-elite factionalism and competition, [and] different ways of choosing leaders and handling succession.." Geddes 2003, pp. 225-227.

regime insiders depends primarily on the survival of the leader, I used the question "Does the leader personally control access to high office?" The leader's ability to monitor and punish internal disloyalty was gauged with the question: "Has normal military hierarchy been seriously disorganized or overturned, or has the leader created new military forces loyal to himself personally?"

Geddes coded each of these variables with a yes/no answer for 3071 country-years. (The appendix contains a full list of the other variables for which Geddes has collected data.) The Geddes data provide the backbone of the 1945-1999 dataset. However, the new dataset contains missing values both for countries not coded by Geddes, and even for those countries coded by Geddes for many variables. The Polity IV dataset contains 6,716 country-years between 1946 and 1999. 2,217 of these years are democratic, and Geddes collected data on 3,016 of the non-democratic country-years. The remaining nearly 1,500 country-years remain to be coded. For example, Geddes did not code monarchies and unconsolidated regimes in her research, though monarchies in particular can easily be coded on the dimensions described above. Indeed, I did so for all monarchies included in the sample of war participants analyzed in chapters 3 and 4.

Whenever possible, I carry out research to fill in the missing values. For the sample of the 82 war participants between 1919 and 1999 analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4, for example, 23 lacked information about regime characteristics, either because the leaders were monarchs or because the observation fell outside Geddes' 1945-1999

sample period. I was able to fill in nearly all of the missing values for these war

participants. For the larger country-year sample, research is still ongoing.

Scholarly Sources

Based on Geddes' descriptions of her coding, I generated a set of criteria for

answering each question. I worked with a team of research assistants, gathering

information mainly from scholarly books and articles. I developed and validated my

criteria by applying them to a sample of country-years that Geddes had originally

coded and found that I was typically able to replicate her codings for those country-

years. The coding procedures are described in the following paragraphs.

Determining whether the leader "personally controls access to high office" required

defining a number of complex concepts: personal control, access, and high office.

What counts as "high office" depends on the specific country and time period. As

Bueno de Mesquita, et al. have argued, the number of people who hold substantial

political power in a given country varies. In most non-democratic states, high office

includes positions such as the heads of important ministries (finance, war, etc), and the

head of the armed forces. In democracies, the list of high offices would expand to

include the highest members of the judiciary, and potentially members of legislative

bodies. For each country I coded, I compiled a list of positions that were characterized

as resembling "high office" by journalistic and scholarly observers.

The next step was to establish whether the individuals who served in high government positions did so at the personal whim of the leader, or whether their tenure was subject to the confirmation and/or continued assent of some group other than the leader himself. In many authoritarian regimes, such as Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, the leader is able to appoint friends and cronies to high office without any formal (or even informal) consent required by other regime insiders. In other autocracies, such as China under Chiang-Kai-Shek (at least until 1937), the North Vietnamese Communist regime, or Japan in the 1930s, the leader cannot simply hire and fire at will. In these regimes, appointments are usually subject to an institutionalized process that gives other regime actors input or veto power over the appointment process. In some cases, access to high office is controlled by intra-party elections, such as in the post-Stalin Soviet Union, or by seniority in the military hierarchy, such as in many military regimes.

In sum, in determining whether a leader "personally controlled access to high office," I worked with research assistants to collect information about a series of questions:

- What are the "high offices" or main positions of power within the regime? Please list them.
- Who holds these offices, and how are the people in these positions related to the leader?
- How were these individuals selected?
- What does it take for the leader to fire these individuals?
- Do appointments to high office depend mainly the individual's "personal" relationship to the leader (kinship, marriage, clan affiliation, etc) rather than the individual's objective qualifications?

- Alternatively, does a political party or junta collectively determine high-level appointments? (i.e., the leader does not control these decisions on his own).

Based on this information, I then asked RAs to write narratives "defending" their decision whether to code the leader as controlling appointments or not. Whenever possible, I would ask multiple students to reach independent conclusions based on their own research. We then engaged in an iterative process of critiquing the students' narratives, proposing counterarguments and conflicting evidence, until we were satisfied with the coding decision. Naturally, there was enormous variation in the particular strategies that leaders used in order to consolidate their control over appointments, so it was difficult to construct any kind of numerical coding scheme that could reflect all of the myriad differences between leaders. The process of writing narratives and then defending them seemed to allow the research team to reach defensible conclusions in disparate contexts, while remaining as transparent as possible about the rationales behind coding decisions.

I used an analogous process for determining whether the leader had undermined the military hierarchy and/or created new military forces loyal to himself personally. In this case, I worked with research assistants to collect data on the following subquestions:

- Did the leader retire large groups of officers, or conduct large purges of the army, for reasons other than nationalization of the armed forces?
- Are there parallel chains of command in addition to "regular" chains of command?

- Are promotions within the armed forces based primarily on individuals' "personal" relationship to the leader (kinship, marriage, clan affiliation, etc) rather than merit or seniority?
- Did the leader create completely new military forces loyal to him personally?
- Did leader found, create, or expand the army or other armed forces? (If so, describe)

As before, I worked with the students to determine a yes/no answer to the overall question of whether the leader either disrupted the military hierarchy or created new military forces loyal to him personally. We then wrote narratives defending these codings and describing what led to the final determination.

I also took steps to attempt to avoid being influenced by biased judgments about a regime's political institutions. For example, Ido Oren argues that a country's own interests might influence its perception of another country's political regime.[38] Observers might perceive a country as "more autocratic" (and hence "bad") if it behaved counter to the observer's interests, or acted especially belligerently. Alternatively, observers might misperceive a leader as being more inclusive, and less despotic, if his country acted in accordance with the leader's values. Observers might also assign attributes to a regime for consciously instrumental reasons. For example, one way to discredit a leader would be to call him a "despot" who terrorizes his own people, while one might be tempted to attribute more benign and democratic qualities to a friendly regime. In order to guard against this possibility, I compared and cross-referenced as many sources as possible, paying careful attention to whether individual

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[38] Oren 1995.

sources might be biased (for example, not putting too much emphasis on authors who might have an unconscious or conscious political agenda, such as regime exiles or retired regime insiders, while placing greater emphasis on research by professional scholars and published by respected university presses). I also attempted to rely on tangible patterns of behavior – for example, hard evidence that the leader had purged the military, or had fired a succession of top officials and replaced them with family members – rather than relying on observers' perceptions of a leader's behavior or intentions.

Journalistic Sources to Avoid Endogeneity or Hindsight Bias

One possible problem with the procedures described above is that they cannot prevent "hindsight" bias. When leaders are ultimately ousted, observers may infer that the leader must have been insecure throughout his entire regime, even if there was no reason to believe that this was the case ex ante. One way to solve this problem is to use newspaper sources to track statements about domestic politics in the country on a yearly basis. A surprising amount of information related to the two indicators above can be found in newspaper accounts. This information can be used either to corroborate retrospective evaluations of regime characteristics, or as the main basis of the regime type codings.

For each country I coded, I therefore had researchers take a second, complementary approach: collecting all possible newspaper coverage of the regime *before the leader*

even declared war. While obviously this method has drawbacks of its own, such as the limitations inherent in relying primarily on information that is in the public record, contemporary news reports allow insight into how observers characterized the regime before being tainted by knowledge about how the leader ultimately lost office. While the information available through newspaper accounts was significantly less detailed than the information available in scholarly sources, the conclusions reached were nonetheless quite similar to the conclusions reached using secondary sources. In the few cases where there were discrepancies in the portrayal of the regime by contemporaries vs. historians, I did not see clear patterns in how or why the accounts varied, offering some confidence that the information I collected was not biased in systematic ways.

Overview of the Data

Who, then, are these "unconstrained" dictators who personally control access to high office and have tampered with military institutions? Who, in contrast, are the "constrained" dictators who, I argue, can be punished by domestic audiences for foreign policy missteps because they neither personally control high government appointments, nor have overturned regular military hierarchy? And who are the semi-constrained leaders that fall between these two extremes? Table 3.1 summarizes the distribution of regime type codings for the 1945-1999 period (see Chapter 4 for a summary of the data for war participants from 1919-1999). The most common of the

regime types coded by Geddes are constrained authoritarians and unconstrained

authoritarians. Leaders who control appointments are likely to have tampered with the

military, and vice versa.

Table 3.1: Regime categorizations by Country-Year, 1946-1999

Category	Definition	Total
Stable Democracies	All countries with a Polity score of 6 or higher, whose Polity scores have not changed substantially within 3 years.	1,929
Constrained	Non-democracies in which the leader has neither tampered with the military hierarchy/created new forces, nor personally controls appointments	618
Military Hierarchy Only	Non-democracies in which the leader has overturned the military hierarchy/created new forces only	42
Appointments only	Non-democracies in which the leader personally controls appointments, but has not tampered with the military	330
Unconstrained	Non-democracies in which the leader has both tampered with the military and personally controls appointments	819
Monarchies[39]	Regimes with hereditary succession	429
New/Unstable Democracies	Countries with a Polity score of 6 or higher, whose Polity scores have changed by 3 points within 3 years.	314
New/Unstable Authoritarian	Non-democratic countries whose Polity scores have changed by 3 points within 3 years	1,087
Missing	Countries such as the Bahamas, Luxembourg, and Iceland, which are not included in the Polity IV dataset.	595
Other Non-Democracies[40]	Regimes that fit none of the above categories. Non-democracies that are not monarchies, but were not coded by Geddes	1,067
Total		7,230

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[39] Monarchies can also be coded on the dimensions described here. Since Geddes did not, however, collect data on monarchies, I include them as a separate category for parts of the analysis. For the portions of the analysis in which I augmented Geddes data with my own data collection, I code monarchies in terms of controlling appointments and security forces, just like other regimes.

[40] As with monarchies, I code these "other non-democracies" on the two dimensions discussed here whenever possible, completely eliminating this category for the parts of the analysis that that analyze only way participants.

Table 3.2: Regime Categorizations by Region, 1946-1999

Regime	Europe	Mid. East	Africa	Asia	Americas	T
Democracy	864	82	134	357	492	1,9
Constrained Authoritarian	191	28	129	139	131	6
Tampered with Military Only	0	0	6	25	11	?
Controls Appointments Only	66	24	115	70	55	?
Unconstrained Authoritarian	73	199	315	84	148	8
Monarchies	0	332	26	71	0	4
Other Non-Democracies	121	80	437	247	182	1,0
New/Unstable Democracies	89	26	66	57	76	?
New/Unstable Authoritarian	120	147	367	250	203	1,0
No Regime Data	127	17	84	136	231	?
Total	1,651	935	1,679	1,436	1,529	7,2

Table 3.2 shows how the regime type codings are distributed regionally. As one might imagine, democracies tend to be clustered in Europe and the Americas, though they appear in all regions. The constrained authoritarian regimes are distributed relatively evenly across regions. They are most common in Eastern Europe, where they include communist regimes such as the Soviet Union after Stalin (the Stalin years, in contrast, were considered "unconstrained") and other Warsaw Pact communist states. They are also common, however, in Asia, where they include China after Mao, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Myanmar under the military regime; Africa, where examples include Burundi through the 1970's and 1980's, Tanzania under Mwinyi (after Nyerere, personally controlled appointments), and Cameroon under Ahidjo; and Latin America, including Mexico under the PRI, and Brazil, Chile, and Argentina under their military regimes.

Unconstrained authoritarians are also found on all continents, though they are most common in Africa and the Middle East, followed by Latin America. African examples include Uganda under Amin and Museveni, Somalia under Siad Barre, Zimbabwe under Mugabe, and many others. Middle Eastern examples include Libya under Qaddafi, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Egypt under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, and Syria under Assad. In Latin America, Haiti and Paraguay were ruled by "unconstrained" dictators for much of their histories, as was the Dominican Republic under Trujillo and Panama under Noriega.

Recall that there are two types of "semi-constrained" authoritarian regimes; neither is very common. The first, countries in which the leader has tampered with the military and/or created new military forces loyal to himself personally, is found primarily in Asia, such as China under Mao. Chile under Pinochet also falls into this category, however, according to Geddes. The second type, regimes in which the leader controls appointments, but has not tampered with the military, is also rare, but examples include Cuba under Castro, Yugoslavia under Tito, Kenya under Kenyatta, and Tanzania under Nyerere.

Monarchies are heavily concentrated in the Middle East. "Other" authoritarian regimes – countries whose Polity scores have been stable for 3 years, but which were not considered "regimes" by Geddes' definition and were hence not coded, tend to occur more often in Africa than other regions, though they occur in all regions. Countries without any regime data at all also appear in all regions; these are usually tiny countries such as Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Bahamas, Malta, the Seychelles, Vanuatu, etc.

Table 3.3 shows how the regime type codings are distributed temporally. As the table indicates, the distribution of regime types is relatively stable across decades. There are slightly more constrained authoritarians in the 1970s and 1980s than there were during other decades, due in part to the rise and decline of communism in many countries. Unconstrained authoritarianism appears to have declined in the 1990s, while the proportion of new/unstable authoritarian regimes rose. No striking or

concerning patterns stand out, however – certain regime types are not, for example, concentrated heavily in certain decades. It is also important to keep in mind that since we do not have data regime type data for all country-years, the proportions viewed here should be viewed with caution.

Table 3.3: Proportion of Regime Types by Category and Decade

Regime Type	1945 - 1959	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	All years
Democracy	281	300	323	404	621	1929
	0.25	0.24	0.22	0.25	0.34	0.27
Constrained Authoritarian	62	101	184	187	84	618
	0.06	0.08	0.13	0.12	0.05	0.09
Unconstrained Authoritarian	128	146	213	214	118	819
	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.13	0.06	0.11
Monarchy	67	58	95	106	103	429
	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06
Other Non-Democracy	204	218	211	233	201	1067
	0.18	0.18	0.14	0.15	0.11	0.15
New/Unstable Democracy	60	46	41	44	123	314
	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.04
New/Unstable Authoritarian	237	243	205	127	275	1087
	0.21	0.20	0.14	0.08	0.15	0.15
No Regime Data	26	34	82	188	265	595
	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.12	0.14	0.08
Tampered with Military Only	12	18	10	2	0	42
	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Controls Appointments Only	32	62	97	95	44	330
	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.05
Total	1109	1226	1461	1600	1834	7230
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Next, it is interesting to see how the Geddes regime type data correspond to other measures of regime type, in particular the Polity dataset and Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s selectorate measure. In addition to evaluating my own theory, this dissertation also examines whether other theories better fit the data. For each of the empirical tests, I derive predictions from existing arguments about the importance of democratic institutions for foreign policy, and also from another theory specifically about variation in non-democracies: Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s selectorate theory.

First, Table 3.4 shows countries' Polity scores by regime type; 10 being the most democratic, while -10, the lowest rating, denotes the most autocratic countries. The most interesting pattern in the table concerns the differences between constrained and unconstrained authoritarian leaders. I argued in Chapter 2, and will demonstrate empirically in subsequent chapters, that constrained authoritarians should exhibit markedly different foreign policy behavior than unconstrained authoritarians. Even if I do show differences between constrained and unconstrained autocracies, one possible counter-argument might be that these differences are due to "constrained" countries' overall higher levels of democracy. Table 3.4 shows that while constrained and unconstrained autocrats do have Polity scores that are statistically distinguishable from each other, the difference between the average scores for each autocratic country is less than one point, out of a total 20. The measures I employ therefore appear to be measuring something different from typical measures of regime type.

Table 3.4: Polity Scores by Regime Type

Regime Type	Mean	95 % Confidence Interval	N
Democracy	9.13	(9.07, 9.18)	1875
Constrained Authoritarian	-6.21	(-6.42, -5.98)	615
Tampered with Military Only	-7.86	(-8.02, -7.69)	42
Controls Appointments Only	-6.66	(-6.90, -6.43)	330
Unconstrained Authoritarian	-7.15	(-7.28, -7.01)	818
Monarchies	-7.99	(-8.27, -7.72)	429
Other Non-Democracies	-3.55	(-3.84, -3.25)	1067
New/Unstable Democracies	7.83	(7.68, 7.98)	309
New/Unstable Authoritarian	-3.77	(-4.07, -3.46)	862
Total	-0.49		6347

Next, I compare my regime type measures to the measures raised by selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003). Chapter 2 discusses the logic of the selectorate argument in some detail; I briefly recount the arguments here. Selectorate theory suggests that two core institutional features – (1) the size of the selectorate, or the set of individuals with influence over the selection of the regime's leader, and (2) the size of the winning coalition, or the subset of the selectorate whose support is required to keep the leader in office, and who receive special perks in return – affect leaders' (foreign) policy decisions. When the winning coalition is small, leaders can pay off core supporters privately instead of providing public goods. Moreover, when the ratio of the winning coalition to the selectorate (w/s) is small, members of the winning coalition are highly unlikely to oust the leader in favor of a challenger because they cannot be assured of similar private benefits under the new leader. Therefore, the leader would only be held accountable for foreign policy

decisions when the w/s ratio is sufficiently large. To test the predictions of selectorate theory, I use the measures of w/s provided by Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003. How does their measure compare with my regime type codings?

Table 3.5 tabulates Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s selectorate measure against my regime type codings. For now, the relevant question is to what extent the Geddes indicators of leader constraints correlate with Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s main predictor variable, w/s, defined as the size of the minimum winning coalition divided by the size of the selectorate. If w/s, which ranges between 0 and 1, is highly correlated with the Geddes measures, it might be difficult to disentangle the effects of selectorate size from the effects of leader constraints. However, Table 3.5 indicates that this does not appear to be the case. Although constrained authoritarians have slightly larger w/s ratios than unconstrained authoritarians, the differences are small: a difference of .04, or four percent of the possible range. As with the democracy measures, the adapted Geddes data appear to be measuring something new.

Table 3.5: w/s by Regime Type

Regime Type	Mean	95 % C. I.	N
Democracy	0.92	(.91, .92)	1911
Constrained Authoritarian	0.42	(.40, .43)	593
Tampered with Military Only	0.47	(.43, .51)	42
Controls Appointments Only	0.38	(.36, .40)	314
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.38	(.37, .40)	819
Monarchy	0.30	(.29, .31)	386
Other Non-Democracy	0.51	(.49, .52)	1054
New/Unstable Democracy	0.80	(.78, .81)	314
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.40	(.39, .42)	1065
No Regime Data	0.75	(.74, .76)	567
All Regimes	0.60	(.59, .60)	7065

Validating the Regime Type Codings

The above sections described coding procedures and compared my measures of regime type to commonly-used existing measures. However, the question remains: do the measures capture the underlying concept of interest, whether the leader can be punished by domestic elites for foreign policy decisions?

If the measures do capture the underlying concept, then we should be able to observe some predictable patterns. First, while no other datasets measure constraints on authoritarian leaders directly, some datasets do measure related concepts. The most obvious is the "executive constraints" (*xconst*) measure provided by the Polity IV dataset. The description of the *xconst* measure indicates that it should capture, to at

least some extent, the underlying question of whether the leader can be held accountable by a domestic audience:

> Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002)

The problem with this measure for assessing accountability in non-democracies, however, is that it relies on "regular" limitations on the executive's power, rather than "irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations."[41] As Chapter 2 argued, the threat of coups, including both military coups and "palace coups" at the hands of political elites, is more predictable and credible in some regimes than others, and therefore must be included in any measure of potential leader accountability. Leaders who do not personally control appointments would find it more difficult to deter palace coups, while leaders who have not tampered with the military in order to ensure its loyalty will find it difficult to protect themselves from military coups.

Nevertheless, even if the *xconst* measure captures variation among authoritarian regimes only imperfectly, we would expect constrained autocrats to have higher

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[41] Note, moreover, that the Polity definition of executive constraints is somewhat internally inconsistent, since "the military in coup-prone polities" is cited as a potential accountability group, but "irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups" are explicitly excluded from the coding rules.

executive constraint scores than unconstrained autocrats, on average. Table 3.6 shows

the number and proportion of country-years, by Geddes regime coding, according to

their *xconst* scores. 64 percent of unconstrained authoritarians are considered by

Polity IV to have "unlimited" executive authority, while only 27 percent of

constrained authoritarians receive this coding. Similarly, only 25 percent of

unconstrained authoritarians are coded as having "Slight to Moderate Limitations on

Executive Authority," while 57 percent of constrained authoritarians fall into this

category. Extremely few authoritarian regimes of any type are seen as having more

constrained executives (though again, recall that the Polity measures take into account

only formal and regular constraints, and therefore may underestimate the true

constraints perceived by leaders). In sum, our confidence in the validity of the Geddes

measures is increased as they appear to be correlated with a conceptually related

measure from a different dataset.

Regime Type	Unlimited Authority: No regular limitations (1)	Intermediate Category (2)	Slight to Moderate Regular Limitations (3)	Intermediate Category (4)	Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority (5)	Intermediate Category (6)
Democracy	0	0	0	3	205	173
	0	*0*	*0*	*0.00*	*0.11*	*0.09*
Constrained Authoritarian	168	49	349	28	21	0
	0.27	*0.08*	*0.57*	*0.05*	*0.03*	*0.00*
Tampered with Military Only	15	21	6	0	0	0
	0.36	*0.50*	*0.14*	*0.00*	*0.00*	*0.00*
Controls Appointments Only	120	66	141	3	0	0
	0.36	*0.20*	*0.43*	*0.01*	*0.00*	*0.00*
Unconstrained Authoritarian	523	81	208	2	4	0
	0.64	*0.10*	*0.25*	*0.00*	*0.00*	*0.00*
Monarchy	196	113	99	0	9	6
	0.46	*0.26*	*0.23*	*0.00*	*0.02*	*0.01*
Other Non-Democracy	308	121	442	23	91	15
	0.29	*0.11*	*0.41*	*0.02*	*0.09*	*0.01*
New/Unstable Democracy	0	0	0	3	74	54
	0.00	*0.00*	*0.00*	*0.01*	*0.24*	*0.17*
New/Unstable Authoritarian	286	89	325	54	91	7
	0.33	*0.10*	*0.38*	*0.06*	*0.11*	*0.01*
Total	1616	540	1570	116	495	255
	0.25	*0.09*	*0.25*	*0.02*	*0.08*	*0.04*

*Number of country-years falling into each xconst category. Proportion of country-years, by regime type, are in italics.

Validity Continued: Elite Stability

A second way to validate the measures used in this dissertation is to compare how risky removing the leader is for the personal fortunes of other regime elites. In regimes with "constrained" leaders, I argued, the ouster of a leader should be relatively routine, and less likely to require massive political and social upheaval. This is because in constrained regimes, the leader is not able to concentrate power in his own hands to the extent that the entire system disintegrates when he is removed from office. Regime elites should have a high probability of retaining their privileged positions, since they do not serve at the personal pleasure of the incumbent. On the other hand, in regimes in which leaders are relatively unaccountable, the leader's removal is more likely to entail the collapse of the entire ruling edifice, since no genuine institutions remain to rule the country once the leader is gone. The exception, of course, is when a clear successor has been arranged in advance; as in the case of the Kim family in North Korea, this is often a blood relative of the removed leader.

One way to assess whether elites in constrained authoritarian regimes are indeed more likely to survive the leader's turnover is to compare regime change after leaders of different regime types are ousted. I operationalize regime change as the change in Geddes regime type from one year to the next. We would expect unconstrained authoritarians to have a higher likelihood of post-succession regime change than constrained leaders, for whom removal does not also entail the downfall of all of the elites they have promoted. Is this the case in practice?

Table 3.7 indicates that as expected, the ouster of "constrained" leaders leads to substantially less regime change, on average, than the ouster of "unconstrained" leaders.

Recall that because of the construction of my regime type measure, these switches among authoritarian regime types can take place in different ways. The first is that the "rules of the game" changed, according to Geddes – the current regime was replaced by a new one. A second possibility is that the regime's Polity score changed by at least 3 points (either becoming more democratic, or more autocratic), placing the regime in the "new/unstable authoritarian" category or perhaps even "new/unstable democracy" category.

In contrast, the regime change variable is coded as 0 when the "rules of the game" have not changed substantially, i.e. when the leader's successor and regime elites are able to carry on business as usual. For example, in the Argentine military junta, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, numerous Presidents lost office while the junta survived. Similarly, Khrushchev's loss of office in 1964 did not result in the fall of the Communist Party from power, and his successors' discretion was similarly limited by institutionalized Party influence over political appointments. Keep in mind that the amount of regime change in democracies is likely underestimated, since for democracies, this measure of regime change would only pick up cases in which a

democratic country became authoritarian. It would not, for example, pick up cases of

a leader's party being voted completely out of office.

Table 3.7: Probability of Regime Type Change After Leader Succession*

Regime Type	Pr(regime change) in country-years in which no leader was removed	Pr(regime change) in country-years in which leader left office	Total
Democracy	0.01	0.04	0.02
	1377	485	1862
Constrained Authoritarian	0.03	0.28	0.06
	534	89	623
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.02	0.50	0.06
	771	62	833
Monarchy	0.03	0.28	0.04
	401	25	426
Other Non-Democracy	0.04	0.37	0.09
	926	156	1082
New/Unstable Democracy	0.38	0.39	0.38
	214	57	271
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.25	0.25	0.25
	808	160	968
No Regime Data	0.02	0.15	0.04
	269	40	309
Tampered with Military Only	0.07	0.75	0.15
	29	4	33
Controls Appointments Only	0.04	0.71	0.07
	314	17	331
Total	0.07	0.20	0.09
	5643	1095	6738

*Proportion of country-years switching from one regime to another, with N below

Table 3.7 indicates, first, that regime change is very rare both in democracies and in authoritarian leader-years in which leaders do *not* lose office. Recall that the only way a democracy could switch regime categories would be to become significantly more democratic or more autocratic – this measure would not pick up a change in the ruling party if the political institutions stayed the same. It is therefore difficult to compare the figures for democratic leaders to the figures for authoritarian leaders. In regimes in which a constrained leader lost power, the country switched regimes 28 percent of the time. The percentage is similar for monarchs and leaders in new/unstable regimes, though slightly higher for leaders of "other non-democracies". The loss of power by an unconstrained leader, in contrast, led to a regime change 50 percent of the time, and is even higher for the smaller categories of semi-constrained leaders. While in all cases, ousting a leader is much more likely to result in regime change compared to years without a leadership succession, elites in regimes with "semi-" or "unconstrained" leaders are likely to find themselves particularly imperiled, with a worse than 50-50 chance that the rules of the game will remain the same. In sum, the regime type codings appear to reflect the types of dynamics we would expect if they were valid indicators leaders' personal constraints.

Qualitative Research

In addition to assessing patterns of behavior quantitatively, using the yearly regime type codings, I supplement the analysis with qualitative case study research wherever

possible. One possible approach to carrying out case study analysis would have been to select a very small number of countries and carry out detailed longitudinal analyses of their countries' changing institutions and foreign policies. This would provide the reader with an idea of the theory's "big picture", but makes the analysis vulnerable to the critique that the small number of cases does not reflect the many cases that went unresearched.

In this manuscript, therefore, I take a slightly different tack: rather than a small number of longitudinal analyses, I focus on those specific snapshots of time that are most relevant for assessing the validity of the theory. Assessing different observable implications requires different approaches to selecting cases and carrying out the analysis. For example, in Chapters 3 and 4, which tests the theory's predictions about punishment after war, the small number of war initiators in my sample period made it possible to research a high proportion of the cases in which a leader was removed from office after losing a war, allowing me to verify that in those cases, the war outcome did indeed contribute to the leader's removal rather than being epiphenomenal. When possible, I also conducted case studies of puzzling cases for the theory – leaders who survived when the theory predicted that they would be punished, and leaders who were punished when the theory predicted that they would survive – to see whether the predicted mechanisms nevertheless played a role in the leader's decision calculus.

Chapter 4: Post-War Punishment in Authoritarian Regimes: Cross-National Evidence

Many theories of politics assume that the most important motivation of politicians is to retain office. Building on this insight, I argued in Chapter 2 that state leaders – the primary decision-makers in international affairs – assess how the consequences of important foreign policy decisions could affect their grip on power. The fear of being ousted, in turn, influences their international behavior and causes them to avoid situations that might jeopardize their future in office.

The domestic consequences of foreign policy decisions, however, depend in large part on domestic institutions. Most of the existing literature has argued that a country's overall level of democracy is a key predictor of whether the leader will be punished domestically. I questioned this conventional wisdom, arguing that there is great heterogeneity among authoritarian states, and that when it comes to punishment for foreign policy choices, the most important question is not whether citizens enjoy political rights and freedoms, but rather whether regime elites possess the means and the motivation to punish the leader for bad decisions. In some regimes, domestic institutions ensure the loyalty or fear of domestic elites, rendering punishment unlikely. In other countries, leaders have not undermined the potential for punishment at the hands of elites, even if the regime does prohibit political participation by ordinary citizens.

In this vein, I argued that there are two key features of domestic politics that explain whether domestic audiences possess the means and incentives to punish the leader. The first is whether the leader has tampered with military institutions in an effort to ensure soldiers' and officers' loyalty (and fear), which reduces the likelihood of a military coup, and may also allow the leader to spy on and intimidate potential political opponents. The second institutional feature is whether the leader personally controls access to high office, as opposed to regime elites working their way up through party or military ranks based on seniority or skill. When the leader personally controls appointments, this increases the likelihood that a regime insider will lose his privileged status if the incumbent is ousted in favor of a new (and unpredictable) replacement who might have favored cronies of his own. When the leader controls these features of politics, it is much more difficult, and less tempting, for domestic rivals to punish the leader for inferior foreign policy decisions. In contrast, when domestic institutions play a large role in promotion to high office and prevent the leader from manipulating military institutions, these leaders will be more likely to lose office or otherwise be punished for unwise policy decisions.

This chapter uses new data on regime type to test a core assumption of the broader theory: that the domestic institutions I have identified systematically predict which autocrats are more likely to be punished for adverse foreign policy outcomes. I argued in Chapter 2 that audiences rely on the outcomes of foreign policy decisions in deciding their level of support for the incumbent. One of the most unambiguous examples of foreign policy failure is to lead one's country to wartime defeat. Patterns

of ouster should therefore be evident in the aftermath of this most serious of foreign policy reversals.[42]

While other scholars have studied post-war accountability, existing research has typically compared the punishment of democratic leaders to autocrats without taking into account differences among different types of autocracies.[43] Goemans (2000) studies leader punishment in some detail, but focuses on the severity of punishment rather than the overall likelihood of punishment, and differentiates only between democracies, autocracies, and "mixed regimes." To date, no research, to my knowledge, explores variation in punishment between authoritarian regime types beyond differentiating between "autocratic" and "mixed" regimes.

In this chapter, I analyze the consequences of wartime defeat on leaders' tenure in office for war participants between 1919 and 1999. My main goals are to assess whether "constrained" autocrats are indeed punished at higher rates than

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[42] Although leaders may attempt to avoid decisions that will result in their ousting, "selecting out" of losing wars, leaders make decisions about foreign policy under conditions of enormous uncertainty, and "even the best-laid plans often go awry." If leaders are indeed accountable at different rates, this should be reflected in their fates after policy reverses, though the effects of regime type might be muted somewhat (Schultz 2001b)

[43] See, for example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 89 (4): 841-55, Goemans, Hein E. 2000. *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, and Chiozza, C. and H. E. Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science*, July 2004, 48(3): 604-619. Debs, Alexander and Hein E. Goemans, "War! Who is it Good For? The Relationship between Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts*, Aug 28, 2008

"unconstrained" autocrats after losing wars, and how the rates of punishment for constrained autocrats compare to punishment rates for democratic leaders. In order to do this, I scrutinize the data from many angles, measuring regimes in various ways, and carrying out tests to make sure that other factors that are potentially correlated with my regime type measures do not better explain the patterns of punishment I observe.

In the following chapter, I deepen the analysis by turning to a series of five case studies to assess whether, how, and why constrained authoritarians are unable to insulate themselves from punishment, while unconstrained autocrats can typically survive even devastating wartime defeats.

Testing the Argument

One of the most unambiguous examples of foreign policy failure is the prosecution of a war that ultimately results in defeat. As I argued in Chapter 2, domestic audiences could be motivated to punish leaders for a variety of reasons. From the perspective of competence, the losing outcome may suggest that the leader's decision was flawed to begin with and that a new leader would make better future policy decisions. From the perspective of reputation, the domestic audience could have strong incentives to replace the leader with someone who appears less aggressive or threatening to neighbors. In contrast, little recommends a losing leader to a domestic audience, no matter what its size or composition. The question, then, is whether leaders who

personally control appointments to high office and have tampered with the security

forces are indeed less likely to be punished for become involved in a losing war.

It is reasonable to assume that if leaders expect punishment, they will behave in ways

to avoid it. Rational leaders would carefully choose those courses of action least

likely to induce punishment. Indeed, later chapters will show that in countries in which

domestic institutions make it easier for audiences to punish their leader, rulers appear

to avoid punishment-inducing behaviors, rarely initiating losing wars and generally

being more selective about using military force to settle disputes. If leaders do act

strategically in order to avoid punishment, then the rates of punishment we observe in

practice will be lower than the "theoretical" likelihood of punishment leaders would

face if they were not acting in anticipation of punishment (see, for example, Schultz

2001b). In other words, an analysis of rates of punishment would be biased against

finding evidence of punishment. However, if we assume that leaders of different

regime types are all similarly strategic, and since we are more interested in how rates

of punishment vary across regime type than in getting accurate estimates of the

absolute likelihood of punishment, strategic selection should not pose a problem for

the analysis.

Using the Correlates of War (COW) Interstate War dataset (version 3.0), I identified

all participants of wars begun between 1919 and 1997 (the date through which COW

data are currently available). There are 153 individual cases of war participation in the

sample period.[44] However, many of these war participants were only peripherally

involved in the conflict. To my knowledge, no comprehensive data exist describing

the amount of resources (financial or human) committed to each conflict; however, the

COW dataset and a more recent dataset by PRIO report the number of battle-related

deaths experienced by each participant.[45] The COW data reports only the number of

battle deaths sustained by the state's armed forces, while the PRIO data report deaths

sustained by both armed forces and the country's civilians. Since the latter count

casualties more comprehensively, I use the PRIO data and code countries as

participants if they experience greater than 500 battle-related deaths of soldiers or

civilians.[46] For example, although countries such as Italy, Qatar, Oman, and

Morocco are coded as participants in the 1991 Gulf War, none of them suffered a

single battle death according to either the COW or PRIO dataset, and it is difficult to

think of them as genuine "participants" in the Gulf War. I also omit the World War II

participants from the sample since the war-fighting coalitions were so large and the

decisions to join were arguably not "typical." This coding left 82 war participants in

the sample, listed in Table 4.1.[47]

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[44] Or 151, if you do not include France and Bulgaria's re-entries into World War II as separate cases.
[45] Lacina and Gleditsch 2005.
[46] When using the PRIO battle deaths data, I made several exceptions. First, for Cambodia's participation in the Vietnam War (war # 163), I substituted the COW battle deaths value since the PRIO value was missing. Second, for Honduras' participation in the Football War (war # 175), I used the COW battle deaths value because the PRIO value appeared to be in error. Finally, I used COW's estimate of battle deaths for Soviet participation in the 1929 Sino-Soviet War, as the PRIO figure appeared to be in error.
[47] This approach is not unproblematic. Most worrisome is that these cutoffs omit at least two cases in which a democracy waged a low-cost and victorious conflict that was clearly viewed as a "war" by the participant despite the low number of casualties: the UK in the Falklands War, and the US in the Gulf War. This means that the rate of victory in war may be underestimated for democracies or other regimes that have fought low-cost victorious wars. A better approach would be to define war

I next define a trichotomous variable, *outcome,* that distinguishes whether the war

resulted in victory, a draw, or defeat for the participant. Of the 82 war participants in

the sample, 28 are coded by the COW authors as winners, 15 as having tied, and 39 as

losers. I also differentiated between initiators and targets, according to the COW

criteria. Of the 82 war participants, 36 initiated their wars, while 46 were coded either

as targets, or as having joined a war after hostilities had already begun.

I also define a dichotomous variable, *ousted,* which measures whether the leader

remained in power two years after the December 31 of the year of observation. (For

war participants, the year of observation starts on the date that the war ended; leaders

who were removed before the war ended receive a "1" on the *ousted* variable.) Data

on the leader's departure, as well as some data on the mode of departure, are from the

Archigos database on political leaders (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).[48] I

chose this timeframe to reflect the fact that political processes, particularly democratic

processes, take time and that it may take several years after the end of the war for the

leader to be removed from office in practice.

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participants based on some measure of troop participation. Data collection on troop and resource
allocation is currently underway.

[48] I made two changes to the Archigos codings. First, I changed the coding of Chiang Kai-Shek's ouster
in 1937 The Archigos dataset lists Chiang as losing office in 1937 after the Fall of Nanking, when
most of the formerly Nationalist Chinese territory came under control of the Communists. However,
Chiang continued to be the political leader of the Nationalist Chinese, who retreated inland after the fall
of Nanking. I therefore do not code Chiang as losing office in 1937. Second, the Archigos dataset
codes Emir Jaber Al-Sabah of Kuwait as losing office in 1990 after the invasion of Iraq, when he fled to
Saudi Arabia. However, since Al-Sabah set up a government-in-exile and returned to the throne as
soon as Kuwait was liberated, I do not consider him to have lost office.

Finally, I coded countries' regime types according to the categories defined in

Chapters 2 and 3. Since Geddes does not code regimes prior to 1945, I collected data

on all authoritarian war participants in my sample between 1919 and 1945. I also

coded all authoritarian war participants that were left uncoded by Geddes, either

because they were monarchies or because Geddes had a missing value on one of the

relevant regime characteristics.[49] Leaders who both controlled appointments to high

government office, and who had tampered with the military (either by overturning

normal military hierarchy, purging large sections of the army, or creating new security

forces loyal to themselves personally) are coded as "unconstrained authoritarians."

Leaders who neither control access to high office nor have tampered with the military

are considered "constrained authoritarians." Between these two extremes are leaders

who have carried out one, but not both, steps to ensure their security. I term them

"semi-constrained authoritarians."

The 82 war participants, their regime type, the war outcome, and the leader's fate are

listed in Table 4.1.[50]

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[49] I was able to reach regime type determinations for all of the authoritarian war participants except 3: Yemen 1934, Mongolia 1939, and Honduras 1969. In all three cases, the historical record was too sparse to reach firm conclusions at the time of writing. This is not surprising, since all three of these countries were very small. According to the Correlates of War population estimates, Yemen had a population of 2,648,000 in 1934, Mongolia had a population of 742,000 in 1939, and Honduras had a population of 2,565,000 in 1969. Attempts to locate additional sources for these countries are ongoing. Moreover, I coded Hungary in 1956 as "no regime data" because the Hungarian government had just been overthrown at the time of the Soviet invasion.

[50] This table includes all conflict participants who meet three criteria: 1) The conflict is considered a war by the Correlates of War project; 2) more than 500 of the country's troops died during the conflict; 3) the war was not part of World War II (since these observations are highly interdependent). Future research will analyze the World War II participants as well.

Table 4.1: War Participants, 1919-1997

COW War#	Abbrev	Year	Leader	Deaths	Initiate?	Outcome	Polity IV	Regime
109	POL	1919	Pildsudski	17278	0	Win	8	New/Unstable Democracy
109	RUS	1919	Lenin	23000	1	Lose	-1	New/Unstable Authoritarian
112	HUN	1919	Kun	3670	0	Lose	-7	New/Unstable Authoritarian
112	CZE	1919	Masaryk	1200	1	Win	7	New/Unstable Democracy
112	ROM	1919	Ferdinand I	1800	1	Win	-4	New/Unstable Authoritarian
115	GRC	1919	Venizelos	19362	1	Lose	-66	Foreign Interruption
115	TUR	1919	Mehmet VI	13000	0	Win	-66	Foreign Interruption
116	TUR	1919	Mehmet VI	875	0	Draw	-66	Foreign Interruption
118	CHN	1929	Chiang Kai-shek	3200	0	Lose	-5	Semi-Constrained Authoritarian
121	CHN	1931	Chiang Kai-shek	33333	0	Lose	-5	Semi-Constrained Authoritarian
121	JPN	1931	Inukai	6667	1	Win	1	Constrained Authoritarian
124	BOL	1932	Salamanca	25000	0	Lose	2	Constrained Authoritarian
124	PAR	1932	Guggiari	12000	1	Win	-3	Constrained Authoritarian
125	YAR	1934	Yahya	2000	0	Lose	-10	No Regime Data
127	ITA	1935	Mussolini	4359	1	Win	-9	Unconstrained Authoritarian
127	ETH	1935	Selassie	16000	0	Lose	-5	Unconstrained Authoritarian
130	CHN	1937	Chiang Kai-shek	1541063	0	Lose	-5	Unconstrained Authoritarian
130	JPN	1937	Konoe, F.	319647	1	Win	1	Constrained Authoritarian
133	RUS	1938	Stalin	717	1	Lose	-9	Unconstrained Authoritarian
133	JPN	1938	Konoe, F.	526	0	Win	1	Constrained Authoritarian
136	RUS	1939	Stalin	6831	0	Win	-9	Unconstrained Authoritarian

COW War#	Abbrev	Year	Leader	Deaths	Initiate?	Outcome	Polity IV	Regime
136	MON	1939	Choibalsan	3000	0	Win	-9	No Regime Data
136	JPN	1939	Hiranuma	8440	1	Lose	1	Constrained Authoritarian
142	RUS	1939	Stalin	71124	1	Win	-9	Unconstrained Authoritarian
142	FIN	1939	Kallio	23157	0	Lose	4	Constrained Authoritarian
145	THI	1940	Phibun	700	1	Win	-3	Unconstrained Authoritarian
147	IND	1948	Nehru	1500	1	Draw	-99	New/Unstable Democracy
147	PAK	1948	Jinnah	6000	0	Draw	-4	New/Unstable Authoritarian
148	EGY	1948	Farouk	1500	1	Lose	1	Semi-Constrained Authoritarian
148	SYR	1948	Kuwatli	1000	1	Lose	5	Constrained Authoritarian
148	JOR	1948	Hussein	1000	1	Lose	-10	New/Unstable Authoritarian
148	ISR	1948	Ben Gurion	6074	0	Win	-99	New/Unstable Democracy
151	USA	1950	Truman	27304	0	Draw	10	Democracy
151	UKG	1950	Atlee	1078	0	Draw	10	Democracy
151	TUR	1950	Menderes	889	0	Draw	7	Democracy
151	CHN	1950	Mao Tse-Tung	401000	0	Draw	-8	New/Unstable Authoritarian
151	PRK	1950	Kim Il-Sung	465000	1	Draw	-7	New/Unstable Authoritarian
151	ROK	1950	Rhee	357248	0	Draw	-3	New/Unstable Authoritarian
154	HUN	1956	Gero	2502	0	Lose	-7	No Regime Data
154	RUS	1956	Khrushchev	669	1	Win	-7	Constrained Authoritarian
157	EGY	1956	Nasser	1921	0	Lose	-7	Unconstrained Authoritarian
160	CHN	1962	Mao Tse-Tung	722	1	Win	-8	Semi-Constrained Authoritarian
160	IND	1962	Nehru	1383	0	Lose	9	Democracy
163	USA	1965	Johnson	45783	1	Lose	10	Democracy
163	ROK	1965	Hee Park	4407	0	Lose	3	New/Unstable Authoritarian

COW War#	Abbrev	Year	Leader	Deaths	Initiate?	Outcome	Polity IV	Regime
163	CAM	1970	Sihanouk	2500	0	Lose	-9	New/Unstable Authoritarian
163	DRV	1965	Ho Chi Minh	1131558	0	Win	-8	Constrained Authoritarian
163	RVN	1965	Khahn	744407	0	Lose	-3	Constrained Authoritarian
163	PHI	1966	Marcos	1000	0	Lose	5	Constrained Authoritarian
166	IND	1965	Shastri	3000	1	Lose	9	Democracy
166	PAK	1965	Ayub Khan	3000	0	Win	1	Unconstrained Authoritarian
169	EGY	1967	Nasser	3000	0	Lose	-7	Unconstrained Authoritarian
169	SYR	1967	El-Atassi, N.	600	0	Lose	-7	Unconstrained Authoritarian
169	JOR	1967	Hussein	696	0	Lose	-9	Unconstrained Authoritarian
169	ISR	1967	Eshkol	983	1	Win	9	Democracy
172	EGY	1969	Nasser	5000	1	Draw	-7	Unconstrained Authoritarian
175	HON	1969	Lopez Arellano	1200	0	Lose	-1	No Regime Data
175	SAL	1969	Sanchez Hernandez	2000	1	Win	0	Constrained Authoritarian
178	IND	1971	Gandhi, I.	3241	1	Win	9	Democracy
178	PAK	1971	Yahya Khan	7982	0	Lose	-77	New/Unstable Authoritarian
181	EGY	1973	Sadat	5000	1	Lose	-7	Unconstrained Authoritarian
181	SYR	1973	Al-Assad H.	3100	1	Lose	-9	Unconstrained Authoritarian
181	ISR	1973	Meir	2222	0	Win	9	Democracy
184	CYP	1974	Sampson	5500	0	Lose	7	Democracy
187	CAM	1975	Pol Pot	830	0	Lose	-77	New/Unstable Authoritarian
187	DRV	1975	Le Duan	1660	1	Win	-7	Constrained Authoritarian
189	CUB	1977	Castro	700	0	Win	-7	Semi-Constrained Authoritarian

COW War#	Abbrev	Year	Leader	Deaths	Initiate?	Outcome	Polity IV	Regime
189	SOM	1977	Siad Barre	3500	1	Lose	-7	Unconstrained Authoritarian
189	ETH	1977	Mengistu	1800	0	Win	-7	New/Unstable Authoritarian
190	UGA	1978	Amin	1650	1	Lose	-7	Unconstrained Authoritarian
190	TAZ	1978	Nyerere	1597	0	Win	-7	Semi-Constrained Authoritarian
190	LIB	1978	Qaddafi	600	0	Lose	-7	Unconstrained Authoritarian
193	CHN	1979	Hua Guofeng	26000	1	Win	-7	Constrained Authoritarian
199	IRN	1980	Khomeini	390200	0	Draw	-88	New/Unstable Authoritarian
193	DRV	1979	Le Duan	19000	0	Lose	-7	Constrained Authoritarian
199	IRQ	1980	Saddam Hussein	254300	1	Draw	-9	Unconstrained Authoritarian
202	ARG	1982	Galtieri	746	1	Lose	-8	Constrained Authoritarian
205	ISR	1982	Begin	1000	1	Draw	9	Democracy
208	CHN	1987	Deng Xiaoping	1650	1	Draw	-7	Constrained Authoritarian
208	DRV	1987	Nguyen Van Linh	1350	0	Draw	-7	Constrained Authoritarian
211	IRQ	1990	Saddam Hussein	28326	1	Lose	-9	Unconstrained Authoritarian
211	KUW	1990	Al-Sabah	600	0	Win	-10	Constrained Authoritarian

Some key patterns of interest are summarized in Table 4.2. I first calculate the proportion of leaders who left office within two years of the end of the war, conditional on the war outcome. Table 4.2 shows these data with both the outcome variable and the regime type variable disaggregated.

[Table 4.2 about here]

The patterns depicted in the table indicate that "constrained" autocratic leaders are quite similar to democratic leaders, and sharply different from other types of authoritarian leaders, in terms of the likelihood that they will be ousted after losing an interstate war. For example, all four democrats who lost a war left office within two years, while six out of eight constrained autocrats left office after wartime defeat. This contrasts sharply with semi- or unconstrained dictators. None of the three semi-constrained authoritarians were ousted with two years of defeat in war, and only two out of 13 unconstrained authoritarians were ousted; these less constrained dictators do indeed seem relatively immune from domestic punishment. Below, I will discuss in greater detail the leaders that make up each of these categories and attempt to allay any potential concerns that the coding procedures were biased.

Table 4.2: Proportion of Leaders Who Left Office Within 2 Years, by War Outcome

	Win	Draw	Lose	All War Participants	Non-War Country-
Democracy	0.67	0.75	1.00	0.82	0.4:
	3	*4*	*4*	*11*	*190*
Constrained Authoritarian	0.60	0.00	0.75	0.60	0.2:
	10	*2*	*8*	*20*	*60ε*
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.00	.	0.00	0.00	0.0:
	3	*0*	*3*	*6*	*35ε*
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.00	0.50	0.15	0.15	0.1:
	5	*2*	*13*	*20*	*81*
New/Unstable Democracy	0.00	0.00	.	0.00	0.4:
	3	*1*	*0*	*4*	*31*
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.00	0.40	0.57	0.43	0.3:
	2	*5*	*7*	*14*	*107*
No Regime Data	0.50	1.00	0.75	0.71	0.1:
	2	*1*	*4*	*7*	*59:*
Total	0.32	0.47	0.49	0.43	0.2:
	28	*15*	*39*	*82*	*565*

It is also worth examining the patterns of leadership turnover solely for leaders who did not die of natural causes. Perhaps surprisingly, seven of the leaders (8.5% of the sample) died of natural causes within two years of the end of the war. If these observations are not distributed randomly across regime type categories, it is possible that the fates of these leaders are distorting the patterns in Table 4.2.

The seven leaders who died of natural causes, according to the Archigos dataset, are: 1) Governor-General Jinnah of Pakistan, a "new/unstable authoritarian" who died in 1948 during the First Kashmir War (which resulted in a draw); 2) Nehru of India, a democratic leader who died in 1964, less than two years after India's defeat the short Sino-Indian Assam War; 3) Ho Chi Minh, the "constrained" authoritarian leader of North Vietnam, who died in 1969 during the ultimately victorious Vietnam War, 4) Prime Minister Shastri of India, who died in 1966, about 6 months after India's defeat in the Second Kashmir War; 5) Prime Minister Eshkol, who died in February of 1969, less than two years after Israel's victory in the Six-Day War; 6) President Nasser of Egypt, an "unconstrained authoritarian" who died shortly after a tie in the Israeli-Egyptian War; and 7), the "new/unstable" authoritarian Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, who died in 1990, less than a year after the end of Iran's devastating "draw" in the Iran-Iraq War.

[Table 4.3 about here]

Table 4.3: Proportion of Leaders Who Left Office Within 2 Years, by War Outcome, Excluding Natural

	Win	Draw	Lose	All War Participants	Non-' Coun
Democracy	0.50 *2*	0.75 *4*	1.00 *2*	0.75 *8*	
Constrained Authoritarian	0.56 *9*	0.00 *2*	0.75 *8*	0.58 *19*	
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.00 *3*	. *0*	0.00 *3*	0.00 *6*	
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.00 *5*	0.00 *1*	0.15 *13*	0.11 *19*	
New/Unstable Democracy	0.00 *3*	0.00 *1*	. *0*	0.00 *4*	
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.00 *2*	0.00 *3*	0.57 *7*	0.33 *12*	
No Regime Data*	0.50 *2*	1.00 *1*	0.75 *4*	0.71 *7*	
Total	0.27 *26*	0.33 *12*	0.46 *37*	0.37 *75*	

Table 4.3 shows the data with these "censored" observations dropped from the dataset rather than counting as post-war loss of office. The patterns are consistent with Table 4.2: democrats and constrained authoritarians tend to lose office after wartime losses, whereas unconstrained authoritarians appear extremely resilient even after military defeat.

At this point it is also worth briefly discussing the patterns found for other types of authoritarian leaders, aside from constrained, semi-constrained, and unconstrained authoritarians. Recall that I coded non-democratic regimes that had recently undergone significant institutional change as "new/unstable authoritarians". These are regimes that had experienced a significant change in Polity score (3 points or more) within the last three years. I coded these regimes as new/unstable, rather than investigating their regime type according to my coding criteria, because it would be difficult to determine what the "rules of the game" are for these regimes, and difficult to reach firm judgments about the extent to which the leader had consolidated power. Moreover, many of these regimes would likely have been coded as constrained authoritarians since the leaders had typically only been in power for a short amount of time.

Excluding leaders who died of a natural death within two years of the war's end, there are 12 new/unstable authoritarians in the sample. As Table 4.3 shows, seven of these were defeated in their wars, and of these seven, four lost office within two years of the war's end. Referring back to Table 4.1, the defeated new/unstable authoritarians are

the following (the years given refer to the year the war started; the leader's fate is in parentheses): Lenin in 1919 directly after the Russian Revolution (survived); Bela Kun of Hungary, also in 1919 (ousted by the Romanian army); King Hussein of Jordan in 1948 (survived); Hee Park of South Korea in 1965 (survived); Sihanouk of Cambodia in 1970 (ousted); Yahya Khan of Pakistan in 1971 (ousted); Pol Pot of Cambodia in 1975 (driven out by Vietnamese forces). It is difficult to draw firm inferences from these leaders' fates because their regimes were typically so tenuous or nascent. Future research could investigate these regimes more fully to assess the extent to which they can be coded and/or the extent to which the experiences of these leaders fit the theory.

Another question related to the mode of exit of the leader is whether the departure from office occurred through domestic means, or whether the leader was driven out by foreign troops. It is possible that the results are being driven not through the mechanisms described by my argument about domestic accountability, but rather because victorious foreign forces ousted the rulers in question. Table 4.4 shows the patterns *only* for those rulers who were not removed by foreign forces.

[Table 4.4 about here]

In fact, the rates for constrained authoritarians and democrats do not change; however, the already-low rate of punishment for unconstrained authoritarians who lose wars now drops to a stunning zero: both of the two unconstrained authoritarians who lost

office after losing wars turned out to have been driven out by foreigners. These are Idi Amin of Uganda, who fled in 1979 when Tanzanian troops captured Kampala, and Emperor Selassie of Ethiopia, who was dethroned by the Italians in 1936 (but who, in fact, returned to office after Italy lost Ethiopia to British and South African troops in 1941).

Table 4.4: Proportion of Leaders Who Left Office Within 2 Years, by War Outcome, Excluding Nati[onal] Deposition by Foreign Forces, 1919-1997

	Win	Draw	Lose	All War Participants	Non-[ ] Coun[ ]
Democracy	0.50 *2*	0.75 *4*	1.00 *2*	0.75 *8*	
Constrained Authoritarian	0.56 *9*	0.00 *2*	0.75 *8*	0.58 *19*	
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.00 *3*	. *0*	0.00 *3*	0.00 *6*	
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.00 *5*	0.00 *1*	0.00 *11*	0.00 *17*	
New/Unstable Democracy	0.00 *3*	0.00 *1*	. *0*	0.00 *4*	
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.00 *2*	0.00 *3*	0.50 *6*	0.27 *11*	
No Regime Data	0.50 *2*	1.00 *1*	0.67 *3*	0.67 *6*	
Total	0.27 *26*	0.33 *12*	0.39 *33*	0.34 *71*	

Another important question is whether the patterns of ouster are different for leaders who initiate wars, vs. those who are attacked and are "forced" to fight. Table 4.5 again shows the rates of ouster for each regime type, but this time displays the data only for the smaller sample of targets.

[Table 4.5 about here]

Again, the patterns are consistent. For democrats and constrained authoritarians, losing a war appears to substantially increase their likelihood of being removed from office, compared to winning a war. Moreover, in all cases, the likelihood of leaving office after losing a war is substantially greater than the likelihood of losing office in any given country-year for countries of similar regime types.

Table 4.5: Proportion of Leaders Who Left Office Within 2 Years, by War Outcome, Excluding Natura
Only, 1919-1997

	Win	Draw	Lose	All War Initiators	Non-War Country-Yea
Democracy	0.00 *1*	1.00 *1*	1.00 *1*	0.67 *3*	0.43 *1903*
Constrained Authoritarian	0.57 *7*	0.00 *1*	1.00 *3*	0.64 *11*	0.24 *608*
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.00 *1*	. *0*	0.00 *1*	0.00 *2*	0.08 *358*
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.00 *3*	0.00 *1*	0.17 *6*	0.10 *10*	0.12 *812*
New/Unstable Democracy	0.00 *1*	0.00 *1*	. *0*	0.00 *2*	0.42 *311*
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.00 *1*	0.00 *1*	0.00 *2*	0.00 *4*	0.34 *1074*
No Regime Data	. *0*	. *0*	1.00 *1*	1.00 *1*	0.12 *593*
Total	0.29 *14*	0.20 *5*	0.43 *14*	0.33 *33*	0.29 *5659*

One intriguing pattern that emerges in the tables is that even winning a war appears to hurt the tenure prospects of democratic and constrained authoritarian leaders (though it does not appear to hurt the tenure prospects of other types of leaders, who almost never lose office after winning wars). Table 4.3 – recall that this table included both war initiators and targets, but omitted leaders who died of natural causes – includes two democratic and nine constrained authoritarian leaders who won wars. One of the two democrats lost office within two years of a military victory, and five of the nine constrained authoritarians who won wars also lost office. This ouster rate of .56 compares to a 0.25 probability of constrained authoritarians losing office during peaceful country-years. Two questions arise. First, what explains this odd pattern whereby leaders would be ousted after supposedly "bringing home the bacon" of victory? Second, are the patterns in the table a result of retrospective bias in the coding, whereby leaders are coded as "constrained" if they lost office soon after the observation?

The first question is why victory in war appears to be somewhat hazardous to democrats' and constrained authoritarians' tenure. Out of the two democrats who won wars, one left office within two years. This was Golda Meir of Israel, who led Israel during the 1973 October War, but resigned in 1974 after domestic criticism that Israel should have been more prepared for war, and that the Arabs had scored a strategic victory.[51] (The democratic leader who survived after winning a war was Indira

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[51] See Susan Hattis Rolef, "The Domestic Fallout of the Yom Kippur War," *Israel Affairs,* Autumn 1999, Issue 1, p. 177.

Gandhi of India, who remained in office for 6 years after India's victory over Pakistan in 1971). Similarly, five of the nine constrained authoritarians who won wars lost office. The first was Guggiari of Paraguay, who lost power in August 1932, two months into the ultimately victorious Chaco War against Bolivia. The second was Hua Gofeng of China, who was forced out by Deng Xiaoping approximately 18 months after China's win in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. However, a small number of repeated observations of Japan seem to be most important in driving the puzzling pattern of constrained authoritarians being ousted from office even after winning wars. Japan's period of constrained authoritarianism in the 1930's (described in greater detail below in a case study) coincided with a total of 4 wars during that period, of which it won three: a war against China in Manchuria in 1931, under Prime Minister Inukai; a second war against China in 1937, under Prime Minister Konoe, which it again won, but at a cost of 250,000 deaths; and the Changkufeng conflict against the Soviet Union in 1938, again under Prime Minister Konoe (which, while a military victory for Japan, is viewed as a strategic defeat by some scholars).[52] In this period, the norm was for Prime Ministers to turn over frequently, holding office for only a year or so at a time. It is indisputable that the Prime Minister did not personally control appointments and had not personally tampered with the military. Thus, the strange pattern of constrained authoritarians being "punished" for winning wars appears to be in large part a result of an idiosyncratic time in Japan's history.

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[52] Blumenson (1960).

Robustness to Alternative Coding Decisions

In the same vein, the patterns in these tables are strong enough that the skeptical

reader might wonder whether, given the inherent difficulty of forming objective

judgments about regime type in relatively closed regimes, the codings might be biased

in favor of coding leaders who were ousted after wars as being "constrained," while

coding leaders who survived losing wars as "semi-constrained" or "unconstrained."

Specifically, of the three "semi-constrained" leaders in the sample who lost wars, not

one lost office within two years. Should these leaders really have been coded as

"unconstrained," but were erroneously placed in the "semi-constrained" category,

perhaps because their post-war fate did not conform to the expectations of the theory?

Referring back to the list of leaders in Table 4.1, we see that these three observations

involve Chiang Kai-Shek of China in 1929 and 1931 (both losses in wars against

Japan); King Farouk of Egypt in 1948, and Hussein bin Talal, King of Jordan in 1967.

First, it is worth noting that of the three "suspicious" leaders, none of them initiated

the military conflict that they later survived. Thus, these three leaders are dropped

from the analyses that look only at patterns of defeat for war initiators, results which

confirmed the patterns found in Table 4.3.

Nonetheless, I revisited the coding of each leader to make sure it was merited. The

first leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, clearly belongs in the semi-constrained category. On

the one hand, in 1929 and 1931, China was still usually referred to as a "party dictatorship" rather than a one-man dictatorship[53], and Chiang is not coded as personally controlling appointments because the Kuomintang party played a fairly institutionalized role in government until at least 1937. Chiang also had to contend with numerous rivals for power, including rival warlords.[54] However, when it comes to tampering with the military, Chiang's regime is coded as "yes" for a number of reasons. First, Chiang created "new" military forces loyal to himself personally, essentially building the National Revolutionary Army from scratch and staffing it with officers from his Whampoa military academy who were personally loyal to him.[55] Moreover, Chiang reorganized the top level of the military hierarchy so that it was under his personal control, rather than keeping a civilian commission under the supervision of the Kuomintang party. Linking these institutional features to their consequences for Chiang's security in office, it is perfectly conceivable that Chiang could have used his extensive personal connections in his army, and his soldiers' personal loyalty, to spy on and harass domestic opponents. Rivals of Chiang's rule would have anticipated – to a much greater extent than regime insiders of a leader who did not hold such sway over the military – that any organized opposition would have been detected and potentially damaged their careers..

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[53] Misselwitz, Henry F. "Chinese Leaders Grope for Reform," *New York Times*, November 4, 1928, Misselwitz, Henry F. "New Code Makes Nanking Supreme," *New York Times*, November 25, 1928.
[54] By 1937, incidentally, Chiang is coded as controlling access to high office, having successfully eliminated rivals from power and having turned the KMT party organizations into a rubber-stamp for his preferences.
[55] "…[T]he Academy cadets became more personal followers of Chiang Kai-Shek than staunch supporters of the Kuomintang – unless one regards Chiang Kai-shek as indistinguishable from the Kuomintang." (Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, "The Role of the Military in Chinese Government," *Pacific Affairs* 21:3 (September 1948), pp. 239-251.)

The second potentially questionable coding is of King Farouk of Egypt in 1948, who

unlike Chiang, is considered a semi-constrained dictator because he personally

controlled access to high office, though there is little evidence that he had upset the

military hierarchy or created new forces loyal to himself. Farouk had come to power

in 1936, succeeding his father, Fuad I. Egypt was a "constitutional monarchy" at the

time, though the constitution gave the King the power to appoint the prime minister, to

dismiss the cabinet, delay legislative sessions, and disband the legislature.[56] The King

also repeatedly violated the constitution when he felt that it limited his powers.

Michael Herb writes of the Egyptian monarchy at the time: "In its basic form the

Egyptian constitutional monarchy resembled other large agrarian monarchies in which

the landed nobility did not exercise an institutionalized hegemony over state power. A

king, with his cronies at the palace, ruled, and presided over a corrupt parliamentary

system."[57] Moreover, "Monarchies of the Egyptian sort place a great deal of power in

the hands of one man. When primogeniture governs the succession, as it did in Egypt,

no institutional mechanism exists to insure that the man who inherits power will use it

wisely."[58]

To make sure that assessments such as Herb's were not based purely on a

retrospective judgment at the end of Farouk's rule (thereby not reflecting conditions

before 1948, when the war began), I also carried out an analysis of Egyptian politics

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[56] Vatikiotis (1969) pp. 270-271.
[57] Herb (1999), p. 210.
[58] Ibid. p. 211.

based on newspaper articles printed before the Palestine War. It is true that up to

1948, newspapers portrayed a ruler who appeared less in control of appointments than

the secondary literature indicates, and that Parliament, while corrupt, might be able to

constrain Farouk under some conditions. Table 4.6 below therefore portrays the data

with Egypt 1948 recoded as a "constrained" authoritarian rather than a semi-

constrained leader. While the proportion of constrained leaders who were ousted after

defeat does of course weaken somewhat (.7 rather than .78) , the patterns discussed

previously are confirmed: constrained authoritarians, like democrats, typically face

ouster if they lose wars, and do so at rates higher than they do after victorious wars,

draws, or either peaceful years. Semi- and unconstrained authoritarians, in contrast,

weather defeat in war without major threats to their tenure.

[Table 4.6 about here]

Table 4.6: Proportion of Leaders Who Left Office Within 2 Years, by War Outcome, Excluding Natural Deaths, Egypt 1948 Recoded, 1919-1997

	Win	Draw	Lose	All War Participants	Non-War Country-Years
Democracy	0.50	0.75	1.00	0.75	0.43
	2	4	2	8	1903
Constrained Authoritarian	0.56	0.00	0.67	0.55	0.24
	9	2	9	20	608
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.00	.	0.00	0.00	0.08
	3	0	2	5	358
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.11	0.12
	5	1	13	19	812
New/Unstable Democracy	0.00	0.00	.	0.00	0.42
	3	1	0	4	311
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.33	0.34
	2	3	7	12	1074
No Regime Data	0.50	1.00	0.75	0.71	0.12
	2	1	4	7	593
Total	0.27	0.33	0.46	0.37	0.29
	26	12	37	75	5659

Alternative Explanations: Democracy

It might also be argued that the threshold between "democracy" and "authoritarianism" is too stringent – in Table 4.2, I count as a democracy any regime that has a combined Polity score of 6 or higher. For example, two of these "constrained autocrats" had Polity scores of 5 on the date of their war entries: President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, who joined the Vietnam War in 1966, and President Shukri al-Kuwatli of Syria, who led his country into the disastrous Palestine War in 1948. Might it be that the patterns in the "constrained" category are being driven by regimes that are nearly democratic? Table 4.7 below shows the average Polity scores, by regime, of the observations in the sample (in Chapter 3, I discussed Polity scores by regime of the broader population).

[Table 4.7 about here]

Table 4.7: Average Polity Score by Regime Type, Within Sample[59]

Regime Type	Average Polity Score	95% CI	N
Democracy	8.88	(7.83, 9.92)	8
Constrained Authoritarian	-2.42	(-4.80, -0.042)	19
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	-5.17	(-8.58, -1.76)	6
Unconstrained Authoritarian	-7.00	(-8.24, -5.76)	19
New/Unstable Democracy	7.50	(1.15, 13.85)	2
New/Unstable Authoritarian	-5.30	(-8.18, -2.42)	10
Total	-2.77		64

The table confirms the suspicion that Polity scores of constrained authoritarians in the sample are substantially, and significantly, higher than the Polity scores of other types of authoritarians. Might these differences in levels of democracy also be driving the finding that constrained authoritarians are ousted at higher rates? One way to assess this possibility is to create new categories for non-democracies that are not "full autocracies." Below, I created two new categories for "near-democracies" (Polity scores between 0 and 5) and "mixed regimes" (Polity scores from -5 to -1). Table 4.8 shows the patterns of leaders ousted with the new regime categorizations. By construction, the regimes in the "constrained", "semi-constrained," and "unconstrained" categories now *only* include those regimes with Polity scores of -6 or below – regimes that would be considered fully-fledged "autocracies" even by analyses that differentiate between democracies, mixed regimes, and autocracies (see,

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[59] Excludes regimes where the leader died of natural causes within 2 years of the war's end, as well as transitional regimes or regimes with no Polity scores.

for example, Goemans 2000). Moreover, the table allows a test of whether Polity scores predict patterns of ouster.

[Table 4.8 about here]

Perhaps surprisingly, the patterns from previous tables hold up. Even of the most autocratic constrained authoritarians, one out of two lost power after losing a war: Galtieri of the Argentine military junta after the Falklands War (Polity score of -8) was ousted by the other generals, while Le Duan of North Korea managed to stay in power after Vietnam's loss in a brief war that China initiated in 1979. The remaining six constrained authoritarians, according to the new regime type categorizations, either won (four) or tied (two) their wars.

Table 4.8: Proportion of Leaders Who Left Office Within 2 Years, by War Outcome, Excluding Natu Authoritarian Threshold, 1919-1997

	Win	Draw	Lose	War Total	Nor
Democracy	0.50	0.75	1.00	0.75	
	2	*4*	*2*	*8*	
"Near Democracies" (Polity 0 to 5)	0.60	.	0.67	0.64	
	5	*0*	*6*	*11*	
"Mixed Regimes" (Polity -5 to -1)	0.50	.	0.40	0.43	
	2	*0*	*5*	*7*	
Constrained Authoritarian (< -5 Polity)	0.25	0.00	0.50	0.25	
	4	*2*	*2*	*8*	
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian (< -5 Polity)	0.00	.	.	0.00	
	3	*0*	*0*	*3*	
Unconstrained Authoritarian (< -5 Polity)	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.07	
	3	*1*	*11*	*15*	
New/Unstable Democracy	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.33	
	3	*1*	*0*	*4*	
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.33	
	2	*3*	*7*	*12*	
No Regime Data*	0.50	1.00	0.75	0.71	
	2	*1*	*4*	*7*	
Total	0.27	0.33	0.46	0.37	
	26	*12*	*37*	*75*	

Despite the change in autocracy threshold (and the resulting small N in some of the cells), the findings remain consistent with those from the previous analyses. Although the proportions have dropped, constrained authoritarians – even the least democratic ones – are more likely to lose office after losing wars than they are either during peacetime, or after winning wars. In this respect, they are very similar to democracies. The unconstrained authoritarians, in contrast, are extremely unlikely to lose office whether they win, lose, or don't fight a war at all.

Alternative Explanations: Selectorate Theory

Next, I turn to an alternative explanation for why leaders lose office: selectorate theory. Recall that selectorate theory views foreign policy (such as winning instead of losing a war) as a public good. Selectorate theory would therefore predict that leaders of countries with larger winning coalition-to-selectorate ratios would find their tenure to be more sensitive to their provision of national security (through victory). A larger w/s ratio should therefore predict a higher probability of ouster after defeat in war.

[Table 4.9 about here]

Table 4.9: Risk of Ouster by w/s

	Win	Draw	Lose	Total	Non-War Country-Years
0	1.00	.	0.75	0.83	0.33
	2	*0*	*4*	*6*	*532*
0.25	0.33	0.00	0.50	0.44	0.20
	3	*1*	*14*	*18*	*894*
0.33	0.33	1.00	0.33	0.43	0.26
	3	*1*	*3*	*7*	*348*
0.50	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.14
	8	*3*	*3*	*14*	*1770*
0.65	.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.36
	0	*1*	*1*	*2*	*81*
0.75	0.14	0.33	0.57	0.35	0.31
	7	*3*	*7*	*17*	*1915*
1.00	0.30	0.36	0.50	0.41	0.42
	23	*11*	*34*	*68*	*1403*
Total	0.30	0.36	0.50	0.41	0.28
	23	*11*	*34*	*68*	*6977*

Table 4.9 shows the rate of ouster by value of the predictor variable w/s. The table does not indicate a clear trend in the data: leaders are ousted at similar rates, no matter what size the selectorate. Particularly striking is the fact that of the four leaders with the smallest w/s ratio who lost wars, three of them were ousted, and that of the leaders who lost wars and had a w/s ratio of .25, half were ousted.

In sum, the evidence in this chapter has shown a series of striking and robust pattern of post-war punishment, a pattern that contrasts starkly with the conventional wisdom that authoritarian leaders are systematically less likely to face post-war punishment than democratic rulers. Based on a new dataset of authoritarian regime characteristics, I found that "constrained" authoritarians – authoritarian leaders who did not consolidate personal control of high appointments, and have not tampered with military institutions – are, like their democratic counterparts, punished at high rates after defeat in war. Six out of eight constrained autocrats lost power within two years after losing a war.[60] These general patterns held whether the leaders initiated the war, or were targeted by other states, and held even when considering only the most "autocratic" of constrained authoritarians. On the other hand, unconstrained authoritarians appear remarkably resilient even in the face of defeat. The few unconstrained authoritarians in the sample that did lose power after defeat did so only when they were driven out by foreign forces.

Throughout the chapter, I scrutinized the data to ensure that the results were not driven by biased regime type coding procedures, such as retrospectively coding leaders as "constrained" only if they actually did lose office. The results do not appear to be driven by this type of bias, and recoding or dropping ambiguous cases did not overturn the core finding. Moreover, I found that levels of democracy and selectorate theory do not adequately explain the patterns found in the data (the following chapters, which analyze larger samples of data, will examine this claim in greater detail).

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[60] Excluding authoritarians who died of natural causes while in office, which might unfairly inflate punishment rates.

The following chapters build on these results in several ways. In Chapter 5, I investigate five cases of post-war punishment to understand why the post-war fate of constrained authoritarians is so different from the typical fate of unconstrained dictators, and whether the differences between these regimes support the theoretical arguments I made in Chapter 2. In Chapter 6, I test to see whether these same constrained authoritarians who are punished after losing wars are also less likely to lose military conflicts in the first place. In Chapter 7, I extend the insights to the realm of crisis bargaining, examining whether constrained authoritarians are able to generate international credibility at rates similar to democratic leaders.

Chapter 5: Cases of Punishment, Not Coincidence

The above analysis showed evidence of a correlation between regime type and the likelihood that the leader will be ousted. However, it is important to check that this relationship is not merely coincidental, and that when leaders were removed, it was through domestic processes resembling the elite coordination described in my theory. In this chapter, I investigate the post-war fates of five different authoritarian leaders.

Case Selection

While practicality requires focusing on a small number of cases, it was important to ensure that the way I selected cases did not bias the results, while still allowing us to learn as much as possible about the link between domestic institutions and punishment after war. I therefore used the following criteria to narrow down the initial list. First, I chose to focus on punishment after the most severe form of military conflict – full-fledged war – and focused only on leaders who *initiated* a war that resulted in *defeat*. In other words, I excluded wars in which a country was attacked by another country and responded in self defense, as well as cases in which the outcome was not a clear defeat for one side.[61]

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[61] Future research might ask whether domestic institutions systematically affect how "draws" are interpreted by the public. Perhaps authoritarian leaders, who typically control press coverage to a great extent, are able to frame draws more positively than democrats who are subject to a "marketplace of ideas"?

Recall also that I omitted from the above analysis any war participants who suffered

fewer than 500 battle-related combatant or civilian deaths; I therefore omit those cases

from the qualitative analysis as well. The reasoning for this was that leaders who

initiated a war and were then defeated would represent the strongest stimulus for the

leader to be punished domestically, reducing the possibility that other aspects of

domestic politics, or a domestic perception that the conflict was not particularly

important, could account for any lack of punishment observed. I next excluded from

the list of case studies any countries that had undergone a regime change within the

last three years, since it would be difficult to ascertain the effects of political

institutions that were very new.[62]

The above approach resulted in a list of 13 defeated war initiators, summarized below

in Table 5.1. Which conflicts does this approach omit? For one, it leaves out the

initiators of wars that resulted in a draw, such as the Korean War and the Iran-Iraq

War, despite their enormous death tolls. This is because in many cases, "draws" may

leave room for political persuasion and framing to affect how the domestic audience

perceives the war's outcome, and thus, whether they punish the leader. Focusing more

narrowly on clear-cut defeats allows the case studies to sidestep the question of

interpretation while honing in on the question of punishment.

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[62]These are the authoritarian leaders that were coded as "new/unstable" authoritarians in the analysis in Chapter 4. I used the Polity IV variable "durable", defined as follows: "The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the DURABLE value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline "year zero" (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the DURABLE variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs." I excluded all leaders with a value for "durable" of less than 3 years.

The approach also leaves out leaders who initiated losing wars, but whose countries'

regime had not been consolidated for three or more years, such as the Soviet Union's

initiation of the Russo-Polish War of 1919. There are several reasons for this. First,

since it is typically difficult to determine the operating political institutions of newly-

transitioned regimes, they do not provide clear tests of the argument. Second, it is

possible that the very experience of war affects the institutions that are ultimately put

into place, creating endogeneity between the predictor variables (domestic institutions)

and outcome variables (leader's post-war fate).

[Table 5.1 about here]

Table 5.1: Leaders Who Initiated Wars that Ended in Defeat, 1919-1997

COW War #	State	Year	Leader	polity	Regime Type	Leader's fate	For five case studies, questions investigated.
115	GRC	1919	Venizelos	-66	Foreign interrupt.	Ousted	
133	USR	1938	Stalin	-9	Unconstrained	Survived	
136	JPN	1939	Hiranuma	1	Constrained	Ousted	Ousted by domestic groups who coordinated against him? Was it because of the war?
148	EGY	1948	Farouk	1	Semi-Constrained (controls appts)	Survived (though ousted in 1952)	Why did Farouk survive the war? Why was he ousted 3 years later?
148	SYR	1948	Kuwatli	5	Constrained (near-democracy)	Ousted	Ousted by domestic groups who coordinated against him? Because of the war?
163	USA	1965	Johnson	10	Democracy	Ousted	
181	EGY	1973	Sadat	-7	Unconstrained	Survived	
181	SYR	1973	Al-Assad H.	-9	Unconstrained	Survived	
189	SOM	1977	Siad Barre	-7	Unconstrained	Survived	
190	UGA	1978	Amin	-7	Unconstrained	Deposed by Tanzanian forces	
202	ARG	1982	Galtieri	-8	Constrained	Ousted	Ousted by domestic groups who coordinated against him? Because of the war?
211	IRQ	1990	Saddam Hussein	-9	Unconstrained	Survived	How did Saddam Hussein survive a crushing defeat?

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In this list of 13 cases of defeated war initiators, some striking patterns stand out. First, most of the losers are indeed unconstrained autocrats who should, according to the theory, be able to avoid domestic punishment. Strikingly, not one of these seven dictators was ousted by domestic groups: five survived, and one (Idi Amin) was driven out by foreign forces. Democrats and constrained autocrats are, in contrast, less represented in this list of losing war initiators. Moreover, all of the democrats or constrained authoritarians on the list left office within two years of the war's end.

For this chapter, I focused on five of the cases with the most potential to shed light on the validity of my argument. There are no cases in which an unconstrained dictator initiated a losing war and was subsequently removed from office by domestic actors. However, there are many cases in which unconstrained leaders retained office even after a significant defeat. In order to set up a comparison to the very different post-war fates of constrained authoritarians, I first examine the case of Saddam Hussein, the former leader of Iraq, who survived Iraq's defeat by Coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

I next looked at the 3 cases involving constrained authoritarian leaders who did not control government appointments and did not upset the military hierarchy/create new security forces: Galtieri of Argentina in the 1982 Falklands War; Hiranuma of Japan in 1939, and Kuwatli of Syria (though since Syria at this point had a presidential/parliamentary system that was very nearly democratic, I spend less time

on this case). In all three of these cases, the leader was ousted; in those cases I therefore check to see whether the ouster occurred for the reasons and in the way suggested by my argument.

Keep in mind that these three cases represent the entire set of constrained authoritarians who initiated and lost wars, according to my criteria for inclusion in the sample. Due in part to the small sample size, there were no cases in which a "constrained" war initiator survived a defeat in war, and therefore no truly "anomalous" cases to investigate. However, there is one historical case in which a "semi-constrained" leader survived a loss in war: King Farouk of Egypt after the 1948 Palestine war. I attempt to determine the extent to which punishment was possible, and if so, how Farouk avoided it.

Before beginning the case studies, it is crucial to point out what can and cannot be learned from these historical snapshots. All of these cases represent situations in which a government chose to go to war, and ultimately lost that war. Therefore, we cannot learn anything systematic about the processes by which leaders make "successful" foreign policy decisions – we would be selecting on the dependent variable of "unsuccessful" policy decisions. Nor can the cases tell us anything about the relative likelihood of being ousted post-war compared to the likelihood of being ousted at any given time during a leader's rule – a question explored in the quantitative analysis above.

Finally, it is crucial to remember that these cases appear as the result of a set of strategic choices made by two pairs of states. I argue that leaders' political constraints affect the likelihood that they will choose ultimately unsuccessful policies. If my argument is right, then constrained leaders should be relatively underrepresented in the sample of defeated war initiators. Moreover – and importantly – the leaders that do appear in the sample may not be representative of the "typical" constrained leader, in that they acted in ways not readily anticipated by the theory by initiating an ultimately unsuccessful war despite the hypothesized domestic constraints. It is important to bear these limitations in mind when reading the case studies.

However, these cases *can* shed light on the causal connection between political institutions and punishment (in this case, punishment for war outcomes). In the cases in which leaders are relatively constrained – here measured as failing to personally control political appointments and having left the military hierarchy unmolested – we would expect domestic audiences to coordinate to punish the leader, despite the lack of democratic institutions. We would therefore observe ouster to occur at the hands of domestic elites, and at least in part, because of the war outcome. Was the leader ousted? If so, by whom, and for what reasons? If not, did his ability to cow domestic elites, using his control over high office and the military, promote his survival?

For the material collected for the case studies, I surveyed the historical literature, journalistic sources, and where possible, primary sources, to identify as broad a range of evidence possible. Identifying whether or not the leader was ousted was easy; the

somewhat more difficult task was identifying the underlying reasons for the leader's ouster. When observers disagreed as to the ouster's true causes, I reflected that disagreement in the narrative.

Saddam Hussein Survives the Persian Gulf War

The Regime

Saddam Hussein's dictatorship of Iraq represents one of the most extreme examples of "unconstrained" authoritarianism and its consequences for a state's foreign policy. Saddam Hussein came to power in July of 1979, having worked his way up through the ranks of the Baath party, which had ruled Iraq since 1968. Saddam became Iraq's uncontested leader through massive purges of the top ranking members of the Baath party, "designed to transfer already existing bonds of complicity away from the party and firmly into the person of Saddam," and eliminating any possible rivals.[63] In a horrifying, and effective, attempt to ensure the absolute loyalty of those who survived the purges, Saddam ordered his top ministers to man the firing squads themselves, implicating them in the violence.[64] These early purges presaged Saddam's ongoing strategy of eliminating political opponents through violence whenever he felt threatened.

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[63] al-Khalil 1989, pp. 70-71
[64] Ibid p. 72

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Not surprisingly, the Iraqi regime was considered highly autocratic; after Saddam's

ascent to power, it receives a Polity score of -9 (the lowest possible score being -10).

Like many authoritarians, a free press and genuine political participation were

completely out of the question. Moreover, like most regimes, Iraq retained the

trappings of a rule-bound political system; the government was nominally comprised

of a cabinet, the Revolutionary Command Council (an executive body whose

membership fluctuated but usually remained around twenty), and a 250-member

national assembly nominally elected by Iraqi men – elections that took place under the

watchful eye of Saddam's henchmen.[65]

However, unlike constrained authoritarian regimes in which the leader is subject to

checks from a domestic audience despite a lack of political freedoms for the general

population, these "institutions" were no genuine counterweight to Saddam's personal

influence. Along with the presidency, Hussein controlled every key position in the

regime: he was the chairman of the RCC, the secretary-general of the Baath Party

Regional Command, the prime minister, and the commander-in-chief of the armed

forces.[66] From day one of his rule, Saddam firmly controlled all political

appointments, conferring top positions on close allies and family members. For

example, immediately after becoming president, Hussein reshuffled his cabinet,

created new posts, and filled these posts with close confidants, including cousins and

other relatives.[67]

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[65] Karsh, pp. 119-120
[66] Coughlin, p. 151
[67] Karsh, p. 119

Hussein also tampered with the military extensively. As Woods et al. illustrate in an extensive survey of documents after the fall of Saddam in 2003, Saddam knew that holding on to power "required the neutralization of the military through a harsh regimen of purges and spying on those displaying any independence of mind."[68] Risa Brooks also notes dozens of ways in which Saddam tinkered with the command structure in order to maintain the regime's stability and protect against coups. Saddam's tactics included frequent purges (p. 13, p. 36), the creation of a proliferation of command structures and competing security forces (pp. 52-53), the frequent rotation of top commanders, so they could not build their own loyal bases (p. 52); Saddam personally making high-level decisions even though he lacked real military training (p. 48); and basing promotions on loyalty rather than merit (p. 49), such as appointing his sons Uday and Qusay to lead key forces (pp. 38-39). Not surprisingly, Saddam used these security forces to spy on anyone he wished, commanding the arrest of anyone who displeased him with the wave of a hand.[69]

In sum, Saddam represented the quintessential unconstrained dictator. Those in any position to coordinate to oust Saddam – top government and military officials – had virtually no incentives to do so. It would have been clear to any regime insiders from at least 1979 onwards that their position within the regime depended on Saddam's personal survival. Regime insiders knew that they little political future if they either fell out of favor with Saddam, or Saddam fell from power. Moreover, even if they did

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[68] Woods et. al, p. 3
[69] Woods et al. pp. 3-7, Coughlin p. 115

try to oust Saddam, their attempts would have been detected easily, and punished harshly, even with death. As a consequence, and as Saddam's survival after Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War will indicate, unconstrained dictators rarely lose office even after disastrous foreign policy decisions.

The Gulf War

Observers attribute Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait in August of 1990 to a number of factors. Economic considerations were at the top of the list. Saddam's war with Iran, which had lasted from 1980 to 1988 and resulted in half a million battle-related deaths, had left Iraq's economy in shambles.[70] Revenues from Iraqi oil reserves were not enough to cover the high expenses of its military rearmament program (including its nuclear weapons development program) and also to cover its debt repayments.[71] By 1990, Iraq owed non-Arab creditors over $50 billion in debt, and another $30 to $40 billion to the Gulf States, in particular Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.[72] But Saddam felt Iraq deserved forgiveness on the latter loans because it provided security to its neighbors.[73] In February of 1990, Iraq was further devastated by a severe drop in the price of oil. Hussein blamed the price drop on OPEC, believing that its members, in particular Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, were not adhering to their agreed-upon quotas.

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[70] Karsh, pp. 201
[71] Simpson , p. 116
[72] Marr p. 205, p. 220
[73] Marr p. 220, Simpson p. 118

The international political and strategic context also contributed to making Kuwait an attractive target. In addition to Kuwait's perceived role in the deterioration of the Iraqi economy, Iraq and Kuwait had a number of border disagreements. Most pressing was Iraq's need for greater port access to the Gulf, for both commercial access and to develop a navy; Kuwaiti territory could obviously provide such access. Moreover, the USSR had recently collapsed, which might hurt the Iraqi security forces since the USSR had been a main supplier of weapons to Iraq. At the same time, relations between the U.S. and Iraq had already been deteriorating due to the U.S. alliance with Israel and also because of the U.S.'s criticism of Iraq's human rights record.[74] All of these factors led Saddam to develop a sort of "conspiracy theory" in which Kuwait was colluding with the U.S. and Israel in order to weaken Saddam's grip on power.[75]

Predictably, only Saddam's innermost circle was consulted in the decision to invade – Saddam himself, "and a few close family associates and cohorts he could trust... There was no prior consultation with the minister of defense, the chief of staff, the head of the air force, or most civilian leaders."[76] The Iraqi Republican Guard was mobilized in July of 1990, the same month Saddam met with the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie. Hussein interpreted Glaspie's noncommittal stance as an indication that the US would not intervene to protect Kuwait in the event of an Iraqi invasion.[77]

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[74] Marr, pp. 223-4
[75] Marr, p. 224
[76] Marr, p. 226.
[77] Karsh, pp. 215-216

On August 2, 1990, 100,000 Iraqi troops started their invasion of Kuwait and quickly conquered the tiny country and its army of 16,000.[78] The international response was swift and harsh; UN Security Council Resolution 660, condemning the hostility and demanding that Iraq withdraw, passed the very same day. The U.S., already with a number of troops in Saudi Arabia, asked the UN for authorization to use force in order to liberate Kuwait. Authorization was granted and Hussein was given a deadline. The deadline passed and the Gulf War began on January 17, 1991.[79]

It took less than six weeks for the coalition forces to severely debilitate the Iraqi military. Losses in men and equipment were extreme, including 150,000 Iraqi casualties.[80] On March 2, the UNSC passed Resolution 686, outlining the conditions Iraq had to meet in order for a cease fire to take place. The terms were accepted by Iraq and a week later the coalition forces withdrew.[81]

Saddam's Survival

To the astonishment of the international community, Saddam survived Iraq's devastating loss in the Gulf War with his power relatively unshaken. How did he do so? One possibility is that Saddam's control over the press would have allowed him to conceal the extent of Iraq's defeat. Indeed, immediately after the coalition forces withdrew, Hussein and his regime attempted to frame the war as a strategic victory for

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[78] Karsh, pp. 217-218
[79] Marr, p. 235.
[80] Karsh, pp. 244-266.
[81] Marr, pp. 239-240.

Iraq; Iraq had stood up to 31 nations, including the U.S., in what Hussein referred to as "the mother of battles".[82] The regime also insisted that the coalition forces would have never proposed a cease-fire if it had not feared the Iraqi Republican Guard.[83]

However, evidence suggests that the Iraqi people were not fooled, and to the displeasure of the regime, the "victory myth" did not catch on. Indeed, in March of 1991, uprisings erupted in Baghdad, southern Iraq and in the Kurdish lands of northern Iraq.[84] The uprisings (raised mostly by Shiites in southern Iraq and around Baghdad, and by Kurds in the north) ultimately failed for a number of reasons. First, many Shiites had expected that Iran, with a majority population of Shiites, would support a rebellion. However, having only recently ended a long and bloody war with Iraq, Iran had little interest in becoming involved in another quagmire and, instead, continued its focus on maintaining peaceful relations with its neighbor.[85] Second, many Iraqis were frightened by the consequences that they could face from Hussein's brutal regime.[86] Support from abroad, which would have encouraged the Iraqi people, was also absent. U.S. President Bush encouraged the Iraqi people to overthrow their dictator, but military or economic support from the U.S. and other Western powers was not forthcoming.

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[82] Cockburn, p. 6
[83] Marr, p. 240
[84] Marr, pp. 241-242
[85] Marr, p. 246
[86] Coughlin, p. 281

The most important reason that the rebellion failed, however, was that the Iraqi political and military elite did not support it. Although some soldiers and officers did join the intifada, the crucial military leadership, which would have provided the required structure and organization, did not.[87] The structure of incentives that Saddam had so carefully crafted did its work: the Republican Guard remained intact, and its leadership remained loyal to Hussein. This was in large part because the leadership was comprised of Hussein's family and close confidants, who would have lost power along with Hussein had he fallen from office. Ordinary soldiers also behaved in accordance with their training, fearing that if the rebellion failed, they would face serious punishment.[88] Without support from within the military and political elite, the Republican Guard successfully contained the rebellions.

There is also little evidence that regime elites strongly considered ousting Saddam. Cockburn and Cockburn report that an Iraqi source told them that senior generals were considering a coup before and after the war. However, the generals never carried out their plans, not only because they were afraid of detection, but because they were concerned that Saddam's ouster would fuel a Shiite uprising against the ruling Sunni minority of which they were a part. To the dismay of the Americans who wished to see Saddam ousted, the generals found it "more expedient…. to rally around Saddam."[89] After the war, in the summer of 1992, evidence emerged of a plot by two Republican Guard brigades, though it was detected and its supposed planners executed

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[87] Marr, p. 246.
[88] Marr, p. 247
[89] Cockburn and Cockburn, p. 38

or arrested. A similar supposed plot was foiled the following year.[90] I found no evidence in the secondary sources of any plot that even came close to successfully ousting Saddam.

Hussein also regained control of Iraq by relying on tribal groups to keep the peace in the mountainous regions of the north and the southern countryside. Hussein rearmed the shaikhs of those tribes that had remained loyal to him or had supported the regime in the first place, and relied on them to keep order in the countryside.[91] Hussein also turned to his family, giving two of his family members top positions when he reshuffled the cabinet after the war.[92] Finally, he committed a purge of the military and had many "conspirators" imprisoned or executed.[93] Hussein, not only because of the fear that his brutal regime instilled in the masses, but also through the support and fear he had engendered within the ruling elite, was able to survive arguably the worst military mistake of his leadership.

Galtieri is Ousted after Defeat in the Falklands

While Saddam Hussein represents the archetypal unconstrained authoritarian, the Argentine military junta of the late 1970s and early 1980's provides an illustrative example of a constrained authoritarian leader. One the one hand, Argentina entirely

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[90] Coughlin, p. 287
[91] Marr, p. 26, Eisenstadt, p. 8
[92] Coughlin, pp. 279-280.
[93] Coughlin, p. 287

lacked democratic institutions, scoring a -8 on the Polity scale in 1982, only one point higher on a 20-point scale than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Nevertheless, the regime's institutions prevented any individual leader from personally immunizing himself against domestic punishment at the hands of other regime elites. According to the logic developed earlier, we would expect these types of leaders both to be more cautious about initiating conflict in general, and to be more likely to be punished afterwards if they are incautious or miscalculate. While a single case study cannot address the former question of whether constrained authoritarians are in general cautious – a question taken up in Chapter 6 – Galtieri's fate after the Falklands war does shed light on the consequences of military defeat for constrained authoritarians.

The Junta

On March 24, 1976, the Argentine armed forces toppled the constitutional government of Isabel Peron, banning all political activities and implementing a "full-blown system of state terror," including political killings, disappearings, torture, and other tactics to subdue opposition.[94] The military joined forces with economic liberals, and enacted free market economic policies in an attempt to integrate Argentina into the global economy, hoping that growth under new economic policies would prevent the resurgence of Peron-style populism.[95]

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[94] Vacs, 1987: 21.
[95] Vacs, 1987: 22.

The design of the new Argentine regime ensured that whoever held the Presidency could not personally control appointments to high office or otherwise personalize the regime. Three institutions – the Junta Militar, the Legislative Consultation Commission (CAL), and the President led the new regime, named the *Proceso*. The President held executive and legislative powers, but the Junta Militar was the "supreme organ" of the state, consisting of the service commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Junta exercised strict oversight over the President, could override the president's decisions, and both appointed and dismissed the president. Finally, each service nominated three members of its service to the CAL, which formally served as a legislative consultant to the president, but was really a sort of extension of the Junta. Since each branch of the army determined its own leadership, the President could not exert undue influence on the composition of the Junta or the CAL. Moreover, each branch of the military extended deeply into the government, holding ministerial and administrative positions at various levels. In sum, the separation of authority among the relatively autonomous branches of the armed forces blocked the concentration or centralization of authority by one individual, and prevented any individual leader from personalizing state institutions.[96]

Similarly, the institutions of the *Proceso* guarded against any individual leader subordinating the military forces to his personal aims, or reshaping them to ensure their loyalty to him individually. The President was supposed to retire from his military command (though this was a rule that was not always observed in practice),

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[96] Arceneaux, 2001: 111-15

and the Junta's check on Presidential powers prevented him from tinkering with the structure or composition of the security forces.[97] Since no individual leader was able to consolidate personal power, the Argentine regime experienced significant turnover of Presidents, including Videla, Viola, Galtieri, and ultimately Bignone.

The Domestic Political and Economic Context

By the time Galtieri took office in late 1981 – the third of a string of Presidents under the junta – unpopular economic and political policies were already causing protests and unifying opposition parties. Among the economic difficulties Argentina was facing were the overvaluation of the peso and the flood of cheap imports, which hurt the industrial sector and resulted in lost jobs and declining worker salaries. Moreover, the regime's market liberalization had not effectively encouraged investment.[98] In March 1980 a financial crash caused a public run on the banks, and Viola, who had assumed power in 1981, reacted with Keynsian, anti-cyclical measures. However, the economic conditions worsened, with an increase in external debt and inflation, and GNP decreasing by nearly 6 percent in 1981.[99]

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[97] The question of whether the President would be forced to retire arose when the very first President was chosen. Army generals Videla and Viola, candidates for the Presidency, resisted pressure from the Navy and Air Force to first retire from active duty. General Videla argued that restructuring the Army command would weaken its ability to fight domestic opposition "guerillas" and "terrorists." While the Navy and Air Force eventually agreed, these branches demanded that this situation be considered a "state of exception" that would be reviewed as soon as the security context permitted. Fontana, 1987: 45-8
[98] Vacs, 1987: 24, 5.
[99] Vacs, 1987: 25-7.

Thinking that a new leader might be able to improve the economic conditions, the junta removed Viola in December 1981, replacing him with General Galtieri. The junta believed that "the economic crisis was only temporary, and maintaining the original strategy would soon be rewarded with economic recovery and social peace."[100] Thus, they suspended political activities and enacted new stabilization policies. However, the short-term results of these measures were an additional rise in unemployment and a further fall in wages. This led to increased political mobilization, as opposition groups unified into the *Multipartidaria*, a group of Peronists, trade union activists, Radicals, and others.[101] The Multipartidaria led several demonstrations, and the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) organized a massive demonstration on March 30, where 30,000-50,000 members of the major opposition groups (including the Multipartidaria) took to the streets to demand a reversion to democracy[102].

The Decision to Occupy the Falklands

Much of Argentina's foreign policy at this time was directed towards securing its position in the South Atlantic. This goal put Argentina in direct competition with at least two countries. The first competitor was Chile, which borders Argentina and has overlapping territorial claims in the region; accordingly, Chile and Argentina had nearly 20 Militarized Interstate Disputes since the 1950s. In fact, in 1978, Argentina and Chile had mobilized their troops for an apparent war over disputed territory south

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[100] Vacs, 1987: 27.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Munck, 1998: 137

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of the Beagle Channel.[103] The second regional competitor was the United Kingdom,

because of its possession of the Falklands Islands (known as the Islas Malvinas in

Argentina), an island chain about 300 miles off the coast of Argentina. The UK had

settled the islands in the 18th century, but Argentina claimed the islands in 1820,

around the time it gained independence. Since 1833, however, the British occupied

the islands, to Argentina's continued dismay.[104]

The armed forces had been interested in the Falklands issue for years, and military

forces under the Junta were no exception. The Navy drew up plans for military

involvement in the Falklands in 1977, and again in 1980.[105] But while Argentina

always viewed the Malvinas as its rightful territory, scholars have linked Argentina's

renewed interest in the archipelago during the early 1980s to several factors. The first

was the outcome of the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, mentioned above.

Argentina and Chile had agreed to Vatican mediation in 1979, and in 1980, the

Vatican ruled in favor of Chile. Argentina felt this threatened its position in the South

Atlantic, and since it doubted that the Pope would reverse its support for Chile,

possession of the Malvinas Islands took on increased urgency.[106] The second factor

was that January 3, 1983 was the 150-year anniversary of the British occupation of the

Islands; the government believed that the civilian interest in the Malvinas would

increase, putting pressure on the government to take action.[107] Finally, Argentina had

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[103] "Dispute with Argentina over Beagle Channel", *Keesing's*, October 1978.
[104] See Freedman (2005, pp. 3-16) for an excellent overview of the competing territorial claims.
[105] Munck, 1998: 139, Paul 1994 p. 152
[106] Freedman 2005, p. 153, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 1990: 5, 6.
[107] Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 1990: 3, 4.

some reasons to believe that the international community might support its claims over the Falklands, and that Britain might even be open to ceding sovereignty. [108] Galtieri focused his attention on the islands as soon as he came to office in late 1981, with junta colleagues Admiral Anaya, a hawk who was also an old friend and supporter of Galtieri's, and General Lami Dozo of the Air Force.[109]

The more specific decision to invade in April of 1982 appears to have been motivated by Argentina's desire to confront Britain with a fait accompli that would bring the British to the negotiating table under conditions favorable to Argentina. The Argentines did not expect Britain to respond with military force, but rather to cut off diplomatic ties and impose sanctions.[110] The context of the decision involved a dispute that arose when an Argentine scrap merchant arrived in the Falklands to take apart an old whaling station.[111] Britain viewed this as a territorial violation, and suspected the workers of collaborating with the Argentine Navy to occupy the islands. After some back-and-forth and Argentina's refusal to evacuate the workers, Britain ordered the HMS *Endurance* and several other ships to the area to remove the workers. The Argentines felt that allowing British ships to land on the islands would be conceding sovereignty, and that if they wanted to use military force to occupy the islands, it had to be done before the British ships arrived in the vicinity. On March 23, at a meeting of the Junta, Anaya proposed that an Argentine ship should be sent to the

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[108] Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 1990: 6. See also Freedman 2005, p. 153.
[109] Freedman 2005, p. 153
[110] Freedman 2005, p. 187, Paul 1994 pp. 150-152.
[111] Munck, 1998: 140, Paul 1994 pp. 152-154.

islands.[112] "...It was the urgency of the dispute with Britain rather than the domestic situation which triggered the intervention. The islands needed to be occupied before British military reinforcements, already believed to be on their way, arrived in the South Atlantic. The objective was not to hold the islands indefinitely but to force Britain to engage in substantive negotiations on sovereignty."[113] On March 26, 1982 the Junta officially decided to order a military intervention, and on April 2, Argentine troops landed at Port Stanley and defeated the British garrison.[114]

War Outcome and Domestic Aftermath

Unfortunately for the Argentines, the British response to the invasion was not what they had hoped. The British did not back down, and what ensued was instead a real, if small, interstate war.[115] The British took a few weeks to transport their troops to the far-away scene, but once the forces arrived and started to attack the islands by air and sea on April 25, they quickly overwhelmed the Argentine forces. Argentina lost approximately 700 troops, while the UK lost about 250. Moreover, the British captured more than 10,000 Argentine prisoners, though they released the soldiers soon after the war. The Argentine troops at Port Stanley surrendered on June 14, effectively ending the war.

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[112] Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 1990: 62-4.
[113] Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 1990: 68. Others have argued that Galtieri had more diversionary motives, and promoted the war as a way to gain domestic support and shore up the military regime's stability (Munck, 1998: pp. 140-141, Paul 1994, p. 155).
[114] Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 1990: 67. For a recent definitive history of the Falklands campaign, see Freedman (2005), volumes I and II.
[115] Although, according to criteria I use in this and other chapters, the war is considered a war only for Argentina, not for Britain, which suffered fewer than 500 battle-related deaths.

After meetings with the other generals on June 15 and 16, Galtieri was forced to resign as Argentina's President and Commander in Chief of the Army, which he did on June 17.[116] There was no question that Galtieri was given primary responsibility for Argentina's defeat. "The greatest share of responsibility for the military fiasco naturally [fell] upon General Galtieri, given his position as President and also given the tarnished role of the branch which he command[ed]."[117]

The question of who would replace him, however, led to dispute between the branches of the military. General Alfredo Saint Jean was named interim President, the Navy and Air Forces withdrew from the junta altogether, and the Army appointed General Reynaldo Bignone as President.[118] Bignone ruled until the military regime fell in October 1983, due to mounting public pressure.

What, then, are the lessons of the Argentine case? As argued in Chapter 2, Galtieri, a constrained authoritarian leader, was unable to hold on to his position over the objections of other regime elites who blamed him for the defeat. The reader might wonder, though, whether Galtieri's removal also weakened the regime – this would be counter to the argument in Chapter 2, which suggested that elites in constrained authoritarian regimes should be able to weather the ouster of a leader. In the Argentine case, it does not seem to have been Galtieri's removal itself that precipitated

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[116] "Buenos Aires Junta Faces Deep Divisions," *The Washington Post*, J une 16, 1982, p. A1.
"Argentine Army Ousts President Galtieri In Shake-Up Over Surrender in Falklands," *Wall Street Journal,* June 18, 1982, p.2. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990, p. 411.
[117] Fontana, 1987: 167
[118] Arceneaux, 2001: 138 (See also Bouvard, 1994, 119-121)

the fall of the military regime 16 months later, but rather the multitude of setbacks the junta had faced, including not just the defeat in the Falklands, but also the terrible state of the economy and public outrage over the disappearing and torture of political dissidents.

Hiranuma resigns after the Nomonhan Incident and Nazi-Soviet Pact

The next case study assesses the fate of Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō, Prime Minister of Japan, appointed by Emperor Hirohito in January 1939. Under Hiranuma's leadership, Japan initiated an undeclared war against the Soviet Union over disputed territory on the border between Japanese-occupied Manchuria (Manchukuo) and the Soviet ally Mongolia, resulting in a massive victory for the Soviet Union and 20,000 Japanese casualties. What was Hiranuma's fate following this defeat?

Japanese Political Institutions

The political system in Japan in the 1930s involved a complicated and evolving blend of political actors and institutions. The Archigos database considers the Prime Minister to be the "primary effective ruler" in Japan at this time, though some authors (Bix 2000) argue that by the late 1930's, Emperor Hirohito played an underappreciated and pivotal role in both political and military decisions. (For example, Bix argues that by 1939, the Emperor genuinely exercised his titular role as

Supreme Commander of Japan's armed forces). Other important actors included the cabinet, a politically powerful and independent military, and a relatively weak Diet (composed of a combination of appointed and elected representatives).[119]

If the Prime Minister is considered the leader, however, the coding of Hiranuma as a constrained leader who neither controlled access to high office, nor personally disrupted the military hierarchy to suit his political needs, is unambiguous. Like most Prime Ministers, Hiranuma did of course enjoy a wide range of recognized decision-making powers, in particular by appointing and leading Cabinet-level ministers.[120] However, aside from the fact that Hiranuma appointed cabinet members, including the important War Minister, Hiranuma did not appoint other politically important actors such as the (hereditary) Emperor, the Emperor's advisors, and most top military officials.

The Nomonhon Incident

The foreign policy issues and attendant political and military decisions that ultimately culminated in the Nomonhon incident existed well before Hiranuma assumed the role of Prime Minister in early 1939. During the 1930s, Japan viewed the rising Soviet Union as the most important threat to its security, and the 1936 signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany further soured relations between Japan

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[119] The Diet was established in 1890, and consisted of a House of Peers (hereditary and nominated representatives) and a House of Representatives (from 1928, elected by universal manhood suffrage). See Shillony 1981 pg 17.

[120] Genko Horei Shuran, or Compilation of Laws and Ordinances in Force (Tokyo, 1927), Vol. I, bk. iii, p. 1.) *From Militarism in Japans Foreign Policy pg 10*

and the USSR.[121] The border between Manchukuo, occupied by the Japanese

Kwantung Army, and Outer Mongolia, which bordered the Soviet Union and relied on

Soviet protection under a defense agreement, was a natural point of conflict between

the Japanese and their Soviet neighbors.[122] Although there had been numerous small-

scale disputes along the Manchukuo/Mongolian border, large-scale violence first

erupted in July 1938 at Changkufeng in the form of clashes between "provocative"

Japanese forces and the Soviet Army.[123] A truce ended the fighting after two weeks,

with approximately 500 Japanese troops and 1,200 Soviet troops dead.[124]

After their relative success at Changkufeng, Kwantung Army leaders and their backers

in Tokyo remained confident of their success in a limited war against the USSR on the

Mongolian border (and many considered a larger-scale war with the Soviet Union

inevitable). According to Kutakov, "The Japanese military calculated that the

conquest of the Mongolian People's Republic, which did not have a large army, would

bring Japanese forces close to the Soviet border below China and put them within easy

striking distance of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Soviet Union's most vital artery of

communication; at the same time it would enhance Japanese prestige and expedite the

conclusion of a military alliance with Germany and Italy." [125] Oddly, given that Japan

viewed Mongolia as strategically important, the Japanese did not think that the Soviets

would send reinforcements to the area or side actively with Mongolia. Moreover,

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[121] Drea 1981; Young 1967, p. 82.
[122] Nish 2002, p. 132.
[123] Young 1967, p. 85.
[124] There is some ambiguity surrounding the outcome of the war. Changkufeng is coded as a victory for Japan by COW, but others, including Young (1967) consider it a "disastrous defeat" for Japan (p. 85).
[125] Kutakov 1972, p. 146.

political leaders, and to an even greater extent, leaders of the Kwantung Army and their counterparts in Tokyo, were confident that Kwantung Army could overwhelm Soviet troops.

As tensions built along the border, the Tokyo government potentially worsened the situation in the spring of 1939 when it delegated significant authority to the Kwantung Army in the document "General Principles in Dealing with Manchukuoan-Soviet Border Disputes." The document essentially allowed the frontier forces, under the command of the Kwantung Army, to reach independent determinations about the location of the border, and to use force to protect that border without first consulting Tokyo.[126] Tensions built on the Soviet side, as well; in March 1939, Stalin warned, in a speech before the Eighteenth Soviet Party Congress, that any aggression against Soviet frontiers would be met with "two blows for every one which it received."[127]

Fighting broke out anew on May 11, 1939 when Japanese and Outer Mongolian troops clashed near the village of Nomonhon, on the Khalka River. The precise initiation of hostilities is unclear, though most authors argue that the Kwantung Army took the first overtly aggressive actions against Outer Mongolian troops. Soviet forces were soon drawn into the fray. Despite apparent orders from Hiranuma and his cabinet to reign in the conflict, the Kwantung Army continued to escalate the conflict, and began a

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[126] Young 1967, p. 88.
[127] See Drea 1981, and "Memo from William Leeds to the British Embassy." March 20, 1939, p. 540 in *Soviet Union: Political Reports 1917-1970.* Stevenage, UK: MFK Group, 2004.

major ground offensive on July 2.[128] The Soviets launched a major counterattack,

involving air and ground forces, on August 20. By the end of August, the Soviets had

thoroughly defeated the Japanese, who suffered around 18,000-20,000 casualties to the

USSR's 5,000 and Mongolia's 3,000.[129]

Concurrent Foreign Policy Predicaments: Defeating China, Deterring the Soviet Union, and Allying with Germany

At the same time that the Kwantung Army was preoccupied in Mongolia, Hiranuma

faced other, even more important foreign policy issues. The first of these was the

ongoing conflict with China. Since the early 1930s, Japan had been fighting multiple

wars with China, attempting to seize Chinese territory and defeat Chiang Kai-Shek's

Nationalist forces Although relations between the two nations began deteriorating in

1933[130], by 1937 "China and Japan were now at war, in all but name" and the Japanese

army was heavily bogged down.[131]

Related to its conflicts with the Soviet Union and China, Japan faced important

strategic decisions about the extent to which it should align with Germany and Italy,

both as direct assurance against the Soviet threat, and because reducing the Soviet

threat would allow Japan to shift part of the Kwantung Army to the Chinese theater.

In 1936, under Prime Minister Hirota, Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern pact with

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[128] Nish 2002, p. 132; Drea 1981.
[129] Nish 2002, p. 132, Reynolds 2004, p. 141, COW dataset.
[130] Nish 2002, p. 103
[131] Jones 1954, p. 49

Germany.[132] This pact pledged Germany and Japan to not signing political treaties with the Soviet Union, though the Pact fell short of an actual alliance.[133]

Three years later, when Hiranuma came to office, the question of the extent of Japanese ties with Germany again came to the fore due in part to tense Soviet-Japan relations and Japan's fear of facing the Soviets alone. "With the army and the war minister favoring the escalation of hostilities against the U.S.S.R and the foreign minister and the finance minister who was closely connected with large business interests advocating better relations with Great Britain, France and the United States, the Five Ministers' Conference decided to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact."[134]

In March, Hiranuma convened a five minister conference (apparently including the Foreign Minister, Army Minister, Navy Minister, Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry, and Hiranuma himself). The main focus of the debate was whether the alliance with Germany would be unconditional, covering German entry into wars on the European continent, or whether Japan's commitments would be limited to the Soviet front. German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop demanded an unconditional alliance with Japan. Hiranuma and his War Minister Igataki were in favor of an unlimited alliance, but the Navy Minister and Foreign Minister were against such close ties.[135] On May 15th, the ministers reached a compromise solution that retained Japan's right to decide its own entry into wars. Ribbentrop rejected these conditions,

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[132] Nish 2002, p. 109
[133] Jones 1954, p. 25
[134] Kutakov 1972, pp. 36-37
[135] Kutakov 1972, p. 42, Nish 2002, p. 129, Reynolds 2004, p. 141.

and on May 22, Germany and Italy signed a bilateral pact without waiting for Japan, though writing the pact such that Japan might be added in the future.[136]

August 1939: The Nazi-Soviet Pact and Hiranuma's Ouster

As described earlier, the Soviet Union launched a major counterattack on the Mongolian border on August 20th, completely overwhelming the Japanese forces. But this was not the only foreign policy setback Hiranuma faced that week. An even harder blow fell on August 23, 1939, when Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact. The pact between the USSR and Germany dashed Japanese hopes of enlisting Germany's help in defeating or containing the Soviet threat.

The Hiranuma cabinet, viewed as responsible for failing to anticipate or prevent the agreement between Germany and the USSR, resigned within a week. Hiranuma's own resignation speech summarizes the fall of his cabinet succinctly:

> "With the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union... the Government has decided to break with the formula which thus far has been in preparation and to set up a new one based upon a different idea... as head of the Cabinet, I feel deeply responsible.[137]
> (8/31, pg 8)

Historians confirm that Hiranuma was seen as responsible.[138] The fact that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was announced in the midst of Japan's defeat by a party to the pact, the Soviet Union, only exacerbated matters.

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[136] Nish 2002, p. 130
[137] *The Trans Pacific*, August 31 1939, p. 8.
[138] Nish 2002, p. 134.

"The German-Soviet Pact destroyed the whole basis of
Japanese policy towards Europe and there was little
concealment of the dismay and bitterness in Tokyo. The
Pact came at a time when a full-scale battle was raging
between Japanese and Soviet forces at Nomonhan and at first
it appeared to have set the USSR free to throw her full
strength against Japan. The manner in which Germany had
acted in negotiating the Pact with the USSR was especially
humiliating. The Japanese public did not know that Germany
had violated a definite treaty commitment- Article 2[139] of the
secret protocol to the Anti-Comintern Pact- but it was clear
enough that Germany had thrown Japan over, had rendered
the pact worthless, and had made Japan look ridiculous in the
eyes of the world. She had also sealed the doom of the
Hiranuma Cabinet whose 'foreign policy had been betrayed',
as Hiranuma declared, and who were in the unhappy position
of having wrongly advised the Emperor to 'strengthen' the
Anti-Comintern Pact."(Jones, p. 126)

The question remains whether Hiranuma would have gone unpunished for Japan's

defeat at Nomonhan, had the Nazi-Soviet pact not been concluded. The speed of his

downfall after the conclusion of that pact suggests that punishment would have been

likely for a similar foreign policy failure – the loss of a limited war against the Soviets

on a strategically important border, resulting in tens of thousands of casualties. In this

case, even a leader of an authoritarian country was unable to insulate himself from

removal from office after a foreign policy failure – democratic institutions were not

required.

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[139] "The High Contracting States will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is menaced by the
disintegrating work of the Communistic International, to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of the
present Agreement or to participate in the present Agreement."
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/tri1.htm

Kuwatli is ousted after the Palestine War

The Syrian case is potentially less instructive than the preceding cases, because Syria

(with a Polity score of 5), while not fully democratic, featured a significantly more

liberal political system than the more autocratic regimes that are the focus of this

manuscript. Nevertheless, it technically fits the definition of a non-democratic regime

in which the leader neither personally controls access to high office, nor has

overturned the military hierarchy or created new security forces loyal to himself.

Moreover, the case illustrates one of the mechanisms through which leaders can be

punished for leading their countries into wartime defeat: military coup. The following

pages describe Syrian political institutions, and provide a brief history of President

Kuwatli's reign, a sketch of Syria's entry into the Palestine War in 1948, and

Kuwatli's ouster through a military coup in March 1949, 10 months after Syria's

failed intervention in Palestine.

Syrian Political Institutions

Syria had gained recognition as a sovereign state in 1944 after more than 20 years

under French mandate.[140] Its political system had been instituted by the French during

the mandate period, and featured an elected Parliament (the Chamber of Deputies), a

President elected by the Chamber, and a Prime Minister appointed by the President.

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[140] Although it was recognized as sovereign in 1944, Syria gained full independence only in April 1946 when foreign forces had fully evacuated (Olmert 64). Syria enters the Polity IV dataset in 1944.

After pressure from the British, who supported Syrian independence, the French

permitted elections to be held in July of 1943;[141] in August, the Chamber elected

Nationalist Shukri al-Kuwatli (Shukri al-Quwwatli) as President, and he appointed

Sa'dullah al-Jabiri prime minister. There was, and remains, some uncertainty over the

fairness of these elections; two weeks before the election, the *New York Times*

reported that "manipulation is possible" and that "how free the balloting will be

remains to be seen."[142] Moreover, Kuwatli supposedly "confided to a British diplomat

that 'everything had been arranged in advance,'" though newspapers and historians did

not report serious irregularities afterwards.[143] In any event, voter participation in

urban areas was low – approximately 20-30 percent, and the elections resulted in an

"overwhelming" victory for the Nationalist bloc.[144]

Although new elections were held four years later in 1947, these appear to have

suffered from some irregularities instigated by the Nationalists. Police (controlled by

the Nationalists) broke up at least one opposition newspaper, and occasional violent

clashes were reported in the lead-up to the elections and during the actual voting.[145]

The Nationalists were, nevertheless, defeated, though they retained a plurality of seats

in the Chamber.[146] Syria's constitution included a term limit of five years for the

president; in November 1947, Kuwatli convinced the Parliament to amend the term

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[141] Ernest Lindley, "De Gaulle in Syria," *The Washington Post (1877-1954);* Jul 14, 1943.
[142] Ernest Lindley, "De Gaulle in Syria," *The Washington Post (1877-1954);* Jul 14, 1943.
[143] Olmert, p. 53.
[144] Olmert, p. 53, see also Chaitani p. 15.
[145] Torrey p. 93, 97-98.
[146] Torrey p. 98.

limit so that he could remain in office.[147] He was re-elected in April 1948, one month before Syria's official military involvement in Palestine.[148]

The Parliament, though the product of relatively free elections, functioned poorly. Kuwatli, according to one historian,

> "sat atop of an edifice of nepotism and mismanagement eroded at the at the base by price inflation, by crop failures due to drought, and by rumblings of discontent from the emerging labour unions. Tired politicians, their energies spent in the abrasive argument with the French; untried institutions; the whole creaking network of family patronage and administrative venality; a young ill-trained and ill-equipped arm were all soon to suffer the trauma of the Palestine War. But Quwatli's constitutional amendment to perpetuate his regime blocked a movement of reform when this was still possible..."[149]

The regime was later described as a "western constitutional formula stretched like a new skin over the fissures of a traditional society."[150] Although Syria gained its independence, "France's manipulation of domestic politics since the establishment of the mandate had denied these individuals the opportunity to acquire experience in the practice of self-government and had not prepared [Kuwatli] to deal with the challenges that lay ahead,"[151] culminating in the military coup in 1949.

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[147] Moubayed pp. xviii-xix.
[148] Torrey p. 102-103
[149] Seale, p. 32-33.
[150] Seale, p. 45.
[151] Cleveland, p. 230.

Israeli Independence and Syria's Entry into the Palestine War

The inability of the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine to reach a formal agreement from 1945 until 1948 led Syria to enter into a regional war in May 1948 against Israel. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed UNGA Resolution 181, calling for an end to the British Mandate of Palestine by August 1, 1948, and the creation of one Jewish and one Arab state. Syrians, like their other Arab neighbors, vehemently opposed the creation of a sovereign Jewish state. "When word of the United Nations decision to partition Palestine reached Damascus, the whole city went on strike. A crowd estimate at over 10,000 persons went berserk..."[152]

The situation worsened in late November and December 1947 when Jews and Arabs clashed in Palestine as the British withdrew their troops. The Arab countries – in particular Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, who had formed the Arab League in 1945 – coordinated their political and military responses. Damascus was made the site of the Arab League's military committee, which supervised the preparation of "irregular military forces" who first entered Palestine in late 1947. [153]

In mid-May, the British mandate expired, Israel declared independence, and the state of Israel was quickly recognized by the United States and others. Over the following days, regular armies from Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria invaded Palestine.

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[152] Torrey p. 103.
[153] Maoz, p. 18.

Syria's troops numbered less than 3,000.[154] Although surprising in retrospect, "Syrian and Arab optimism knew no bounds" when it came to fighting the nascent Israeli state.[155] In April 1948, shortly before the invasion, Prime Minister Jamil Mardam had "confidently predicted victory in Palestine 'within a few days.'"[156] Mardam's optimistic estimate was shared by other Syrian politicians, who "flocked to join the units in order to become 'heroes' overnight."[157] Furthermore, Kuwatli's supporters who favored his re-election in 1948, believed that "he was a leader in solving the Palestine problem."[158]

Syria's Loss, Mardam's Resignation, and the 1949 Coup

Despite this optimism, the weakness of the Syrian forces was revealed within ten days as Israeli forces proved stronger than anticipated.[159] "The regular Syrian army which invaded Palestine [in May 1948] – some 3,000 troops – was itself not well-prepared for war, partly because of bad organization and intelligence, and partly owing to deficiencies in both the quantity and quality of its weapons."[160] Following early military setbacks, the Minister of Defense resigned on May 24,[161] and the Army Chief of Staff was replaced with Colonel Husni al-Za'im. The war was a complete failure

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[154] Ma'oz p. 19. Also, "Glubb Pasha estimated the number of Syrian troops in Palestine did not exceed 3,000; the CIA estimated that Syria had only 1,000 men deployed in Palestine by late June and another 1,500 men near the border in Syria for a total of 2,500 effective men." (*The War for Palestine* by Eugene Rogan, p. 196)
[155] Torrey, p. 104.
[156] Torrey, p. 105, fn 58.
[157] Torrey, p. 105.
[158] Torrey p. 102
[159] Seale, p. 33.
[160] Ma'oz, p. 18
[161] Torrey, p. 106; Although no cause was given by the Defense Mnister for his resignation, many believe that it was a result of "differences over military policy."

for the Arab armies. In turn, the domestic reaction to the Syrian Army's defeat was swift and sharp.

> "This colossal failure had a profound reaction in all the Arab states, but was quicker to appear in Syria. Violent political strikes and demonstrations, in which students took part, resulted in clashes with the police and loss of life. The political unrest was exacerbated by an economic slump and labour strikes, particularly in Aleppo where as everywhere a shortage of petrol handicapped transport and modern industrial plans. In the background was the army whose senior officers felt very strongly that they had been let down by the politicians." [162]

The main points of criticism were that the regime had failed to plan adequately for the war, due to negligence, incompetence, and large-scale corruption. [163]

The regime's turnover of top military personnel early in the war did not quell public discontent. Aside from criticisms regarding the military and political failures of the war, by the fall of 1948 the "representative government in Syria had become a shambles". [164] Unable to cope with mounting pressure from the public and Parliament, which was exacerbated by an economic slump, Prime Minister Mardam resigned in December 1948. The country was in "near anarchy," and the new cabinet asked Colonel Za'im, the new Army Chief of Staff, to restore order by imposing martial law. [165]

Za'im's role proved to be pivotal. Syria was at this point "a country without either a government or the prospect of one coming from a competent civilian leadership, but

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[162] Tibawi, p. 382.
[163] Ma'oz, p. 19, Torrey p. 105-106.
[164] Torrey, p. 109
[165] Torrey, p. 110; Haddad 197-198.

possessed of a turbulent and distressed citizenry, a collapsing economy, and an army which felt itself betrayed by a coterie of scheme politicians."[166] The army felt disgraced not only its defeat, which it blamed on the government, but also because of various scandals implicating senior army officers (including Za'im).

The army, led by Za'im, seized power from the discredited Kuwatli regime in a bloodless military coup in the wee hours of March 30, 1949.[167] The army secured public buildings, the police headquarters, radio station, and telephone exchange, and arrested Kuwatli and the Prime Minister. The Chamber was dissolved the following day, political parties were banned, and Za'im made himself head of state and President.[168]

The army's motivations seem to have been a combination of indignation at being blamed for the defeat in Palestine, as well as being the only functioning institution left in Syria. On the one hand, "It was quite clear by the spring of 1949 that there was a deadlock in the operation of democratic parliamentary government in Syria. The only power in the land that still possessed freedom of action was the army."[169] On the other hand, "the coup d'état led by Colonel Za'im was basically the outcome of the resentment and indignation felt among the officers because certain members of Parliament criticized the armed forces and blamed them for the defeat in Palestine. The officers were also indignant because the cabinet proposed to cut army

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[166] Torrey, p. 110.
[167] Maoz pp. 19-20, Chaitani p. 129, Seale pp. 44-45.
[168] Tibawi, pp. 383-384.
[169] Tibawi p. 383.

expenditures, demobilize a part of the armed forces and reduce the officers'

allowances...."[170]

In sum, the broader implication of the Syrian case is that the punishment of the leader

took place even without democratic institutions. In regimes in which the leader has not

ensured the personal loyalty of the military by tampering with normal military

organization, coups are difficult to prevent.

Farouk Survives the Palestine War... Until 1952

In May of 1948, Egyptian forces, alongside other Arab forces (including Syria,

above), invaded Palestine in an attempt to expel Jews from what they considered to be

Muslim territory. The military campaign was a complete failure for Egypt, with the

war ending in February of 1949 when Israel and Egypt signed an armistice. The

disaster in Palestine led to political and social unrest in Egypt, fueled by a political

opposition organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood.[171]

King Farouk's fate after the Palestine war is somewhat complicated. He survived the

war according to the threshold I use throughout this manuscript – recall that I consider

a leader to have "survived" a war outcome if he or she remains in office two years

after the war's end. However, Farouk was ousted in a military coup a year and a half

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[170] Haddad, p. 198.
[171] McBride, p. 175 and Annesley, p. 408

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after the cutoff, in July of 1952. What explains why Farouk survived for as long as he did, but ultimately was ousted? Was there any connection between the war outcome and Farouk's removal?

The Regime

I discussed the coding of Farouk, a semi-constrained authoritarian, in some detail in Chapter 4. In 1948, the year of the Palestine War, Egypt had a Polity score of 1. I coded Farouk as personally controlling access to high office, but not as having upset the military hierarchy or creating new forces loyal to himself personally. To briefly review the discussion in Chapter 4, Farouk had ascended to the throne in 1936. Although Egypt was a "constitutional monarchy," the constitution gave the King the power to appoint the prime minister, to dismiss the cabinet, to delay legislative sessions, and to disband the legislature.[172] Moreover, Farouk violated the constitution repeatedly when he felt it limited his power. In his study of Middle Eastern monarchies, Michael Herb (1999) emphasized the extent to which political power was concentrated in the king's hands, since no family dynasty or organized nobility was able to constrain the king.

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[172] Vatikiotis (1969) pp. 270-271. (Is this *The modern history of Egypt* PJ Vatikiotis - 1969 - Littlehampton Book Services (LBS) OR *The History of Egypt from Muhammad Al i to Sadat* PJ Vatikiotis - London, Weidenfetd & Nicolson, 1969)

Farouk Survives from 1948-1951

Farouk was able to survive the immediate aftermath of the Egyptian failure in

Palestine due to several factors, including Farouk's ability to appoint cronies to high

office, but also the ability to use Britain as a scapegoat for Egypt's problems.

First, in 1948, after Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha was assassinated by a member of

the Muslim Brotherhood, Farouk asked his close confidant Ibraham Abdel Hadi Pasha

to form a new government.[173] Hadi Pasha quickly suppressed the Muslim

Brotherhood, arresting many of its members and ordering the killing of its leader.[174]

However, after Hadi Pasha began investigating questionable arms deals committed by

Farouk and his circle, the King ousted him in July 1949.[175]

At this point, Farouk turned to the Wafdists, his former enemies, apparently because

they were popular at the time and because he believed they would cooperate with the

monarchy in order to hold on to power.[176] The strategy seemed to work: after the

Wafd Party returned to power in the elections of 1950 and Farouk allowed Nahas

Pasha (Farouk's old Wafdist enemy) to become Prime Minister, Britain became the

Egyptian government's scapegoat.[177] The government even instigated civilian attacks

on the British troops that remained in Egypt, and released imprisoned Muslim

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[173] Annesley, p. 412
[174] McBride, p. 156
[175] Hopwood, p. 29, Little, p. 104
[176] McBride, p. 164, Hopwood , p. 29
[177] Annesley, p. 414

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Brotherhood members so that they could add to the uprising.[178] For the time being, the attention of the Egyptian Liberation Army and the Egyptian people was focused on ending British influence in Egypt, not on ending the monarchy.

Farouk Loses Power in 1952

However, Farouk lost power in 1952 due to two key factors. On January 26, 1952, a major uprising burnt to the ground buildings in Cairo that represented western influence. Due to this uprising and attacks on its soldiers, Britain decided to remove most of its troops from Egypt (although the British did leave troops stationed around the Suez Canal zone) and slowly end its influence in the region.[179] When this occurred, Farouk had nothing more to protect his throne. He tried to keep his government stable and loyal by consolidating upper government positions with confidants and family members; in the six months after the January uprisings, Farouk appointed and dismissed four prime ministers.

On July 21, 1952, Farouk chose his brother-in-law, Ismail Sherin, as the Minister of War over General Mohamed Neguib. Farouk chose Sherin over Neguib because Neguid was thought to have been involved with a group of army officers (Free Officer's Movement led by Nasser) that openly defied the monarchy.[180] The 1948 war in Palestine left the Egyptian military feeling that it had been supplied with inferior

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[178] Annesley, p. 415
[179] Hopwood, p. 27
[180] McGregor, pp. 248-9

weapons and had been betrayed by the government.[181] This discontent, along with

King Farouk's and the monarchy's association with the British, ultimately caused the

officers to rise up. The day after Farouk's appointment of Sherin, the Society of Free

Officers, led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, Abdul Hakim Amer and Anwar el Sadat, moved

their plan into action. They successfully convinced the military to overthrow Farouk

on July 22, 1952. Farouk's young son was chosen as his successor, although since he

was too young to rule so a Regency Council was created.[182] The next year, the new

revolutionary government formally abolished the monarchy.

Conclusions

Farouk was not overthrown immediately after the 1948 war because domestic unrest,

both political and social, was directed at the British due to their influence in Egypt.

Farouk's control over appointments allowed him some freedom to maneuver,

appointing various confidants to Prime Minister, and allowing the Wafd Party, with its

focus on British interference, to dominate politics in order to divert attention from the

monarchy.

However, once British troops began to withdraw, the Society of Free Officers, which

remained disgruntled after Egypt's poor performance in 1948 and had been eyeing the

monarchy for some time, seized the opportunity. Having not tampered with the

military institutions, Farouk did not command the personal loyalty of the security

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[181] Hopwood, pp. 28-32
[182] Ibid.

forces, who blamed him for Egypt's humiliating defeat. The British also did not interfere, probably because Farouk did little to end the uprising in Egypt the year prior to his overthrow.

Discussion

What can we learn from these five cases? The case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq provided a benchmark to which to compare the remaining four cases in which a constrained or semi-constrained leader lost a war. The fates of Galtieri, Kuwatli, and Hiranuma were much different than that of unconstrained leaders such as Saddam Hussein. First, all were removed from office very soon after the end of the war (in Hiranuma's case, actually during the war). Moreover, in all of these cases, there was a clear link between the war that the leader had initiated, and the leader's removal. Galtieri was forced to resign by his generals two days after Argentina lost in the Falklands. Hiranuma was asked to resign soon after reports of Japan's defeat started filtering in, and immediately after the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (a huge reversal for Japan). Kuwatli, having failed to shore up support in the military, was ousted in a military coup less than a year after the Palestine War. Farouk's case was slightly more complicated, since he held on to power for 4 years, but was eventually ousted by army officers who blamed him for under-equipping the military and contributing to Egypt's humiliation against Israel.

Moreover, all of these ousters occurred at the hands of regime elites, rather than by overthrow of the population. Galtieri and Hiranuma were removed from within the institutional structure they had presided over, while Kuwatli and Farouk were ousted by top generals. In none of these cases, though, were the leaders removed through democratic processes involving the public or "mass uprisings".

As emphasized earlier, while the cases are instructive and interesting, it is important to keep in mind that the cases involving unconstrained leaders are "off the equilibrium path" in that they involve wars that a far-sighted leader should have avoided. However, the cases do suggest that the ways in which, and reasons that, the leaders were punished are consistent with the arguments discussed in Chapter 2, and the cross-national patterns detected in Chapter 4. The next question, taken up in the following chapter, is whether the same institutions that facilitate leaders' punishment *also* predict patterns of conflict behavior.

Chapter 6: Selectivity, Caution, and Success in International Conflict

The idea that domestic institutions affect countries' willingness and ability to use force internationally is now widely accepted. Most studies focus on the supposedly unique advantages of democracies, the general consensus being that democratic leaders are more likely to win wars than their autocratic counterparts. In this chapter, I question the conventional wisdom that democratic institutions, as typically understood, are the crucial determinant of victory in war. Rather, I argue that much more important are the more specific institutional incentives on state leaders, the primary decision-makers in international politics. Constrained autocrats, I argue, are nearly as likely to avoid defeats in wars as democratic leaders, regardless of the overall level of democracy in their country. In contrast, the subset of authoritarian regimes in which domestic institutions fail to constrain the individual leader are particularly likely to select losing wars. Making the distinction between different types of authoritarian regimes is crucial, because pooling unconstrained authoritarians together with constrained authoritarians has mistakenly led to previous findings of a "democratic advantage."[183]

In this chapter, I assess the hypothesis that domestically unfettered leaders – those who personally control both appointments to high office and have disrupted the military hierarchy – are more cautious about initiating losing conflicts. I do this by analyzing patterns of victory and defeat using two different types of conflict at different levels of intensity: interstate wars between 1919 and 1997, and Militarized

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[183] See, for example, Reiter and Stam 2002.

Interstate Disputes between 1946 and 1999. According to both the selection effects and war-fighting views, more accountable leaders should win a greater proportion of the conflicts they engage in than non-accountable leaders. After discussing the theoretical logic in greater detail, I test my argument empirically. I also consider competing views, including the idea that the level of democracy or selectorate size is a more important predictor of conflict behavior.

Chapters 4 and 5 indicated that democrats and constrained authoritarians are removed from office at substantially higher rates after they lose wars than they are either during peacetime, or after having won or tied a war. This was in stark contrast to unconstrained authoritarians, whose tenure usually weathered defeat. When unconstrained authoritarians did lose office, moreover, it was usually because foreign forces, not domestic elites, drove them out. The question asked in this chapter is whether the same domestic institutions that predict ouster after defeat *also* predict victory in wars and other military disputes.

I find that they do. To preview, the tests in this chapter again point to two very different variants of non-democratic rule. On the one hand, domestically unconstrained dictators pick fights, lose wars and other disputes, and yet maintain domestic rule. In contrast, constrained authoritarian leaders lack the tools to secure themselves against domestic criticism. These leaders, much like those in democracies, conduct foreign affairs in the shadow of domestic accountability, and also possess the practical means to make "good" foreign policy, since they have not undermined

military and intelligence-gathering institutions. Remaining non-democracies fall between these two extremes. Moreover, when I weigh my theory against the alternatives for each empirical test, I find that existing theories do not better explain these patterns of victory and defeat.

Theoretical Links between Regime Type and Conflict Outcomes

Scholars have offered two classes of explanations for the supposed democratic war-fighting advantage: the "selection effects" argument, and the "war-fighting" mechanism. The first, the selection effects view, argues that leaders who face accountability for foreign policy decisions are induced to be more selective about the conflicts they fight. Reiter and Stam (2002), building on Lake (1992), argue that because democratic leaders face a higher likelihood of being ousted if they lose conflicts, they are more careful to avoid wars they are likely to lose. Moreover, Reiter and Stam argue that democratic institutions such as political competition, the free press, and relatively apolitical bureaucracies encourage more accurate intelligence-gathering and discussion of policy alternatives than is possible in authoritarian regimes. Together, democratic leaders' motivations to avoid punishment, and democracies' ability to forecast war outcomes more accurately, lead to higher rates of victory in democracies. In contrast, Reiter and Stam argue, "autocratic leaders know that defeat in war is unlikely to threaten their hold on power. As a result, they will be

more willing to initiate risky wars that democracies avoid." (p. 20)[184] Moreover,

autocratic leaders are more likely to form biased or inaccurate intelligence

assessments, because policy alternatives are not debated openly and/or officials in

dictatorships are less likely to tell their leaders the truth about the quality of their

military forces, as was notoriously the case in Saddam Hussein's Iraq.[185]

The second view is the "war-fighting explanation", which suggests that liberal

institutions confer specific advantages to democratic belligerents once they have

actually begun combat. Reiter and Stam describe several possible reasons for a

democratic war-fighting advantage, all of which should hold whether the democracy

initiated the war or was targeted by another state. Their favored explanation is that

democratic norms and culture result in better relative soldiering by democratic

combatants; democratic culture could result in more motivated soldiers who are

willing to take greater initiative on the battlefield, and since democracies are less

likely to abuse prisoners of war, enemy soldiers are also more likely to surrender.[186]

Other potential reasons for the democratic combat advantage, according to Reiter and

Stam, are that democratic countries are more likely to enjoy reliable allies, and that

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[184] In a related vein, Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) argue that "leaders with large winning coalitions need to be more certain of victory than their small-coalition, autocratic counterparts before initiating conflict," though they do not test this prediction directly, focusing instead on the military effort devoted to war and the likelihood of initiating disputes under various conditions. See also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 4 (December 1995).
[185] Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray. "Saddam's Delusions." *Foreign Affairs*, (May/June 2006)
[186] In addition to Reiter and Stam, see Geoff Wallace, *Surrendering the Higher Ground: The Abuse of Combatants during War*, manuscript (2009), who finds that democratic belligerents are indeed less likely to harm prisoners of war.

democracies are better able to mobilize economic resources towards their war efforts, though Reiter and Stam find that these mechanisms fit the data less well.

This "triumphalist" view that democracies are more likely to win wars, both because of selection effects and combat advantages, has been critiqued on both methodological and theoretical grounds by a number of authors, in particular Desch (2002, 2008) and Downes (2009).[187] Desch and Downes argue that previous studies miscoded the data (including codings of who initiated the conflict), aggregated the data inappropriately, or mistakenly dropped observations (such as conflicts that ended in draws, rather than victory or defeat) from the analysis. Neither author dismisses the idea that accountable leaders might be more selective about initiating conflict; rather the objection seems to be that democratic leaders may not be more accountable than autocrats, or that despite plausible theoretical arguments in favor of a democratic advantage, the evidence simply does not support that argument.

Like Reiter and Stam, I argue that leaders who face a greater likelihood of domestic punishment are more likely to be held accountable for foreign policy failures, such as

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[187] See also Michael C. Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Michael C. Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 5-47; Michael Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Fair Fights or Food Fights?" *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 180-194; Ajin Choi, "Democratic Synergy and Victory in War, 1816-1992," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (September 2004), pp. 663-682; Risa Brooks, "Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay," *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Fall 2003), pp. 149-191; Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (August 2004), pp. 525-546. For a critique of the "marketplace of ideas" argument, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security* 29, 1 (Summer 2004): 5-48.

war, than leaders whose grip on power is more difficult to dislodge. Moreover, I agree that this accountability not only causes some leaders to be more selective, but that the institutions that generate accountability may also improve countries' ability to fight effectively once combat has begun. However, consistent with the arguments laid out in previous chapters, I contend that the likelihood of accountability is not a function of democracy per se. Rather, what matters is whether a domestic audience could oust the leader – whether that audience is large (composed of a voting public) or small (composed of other generals vying for power in a military junta). Like their democratic counterparts, constrained authoritarians should be less likely to initiate conflicts they will lose than semi- or unconstrained authoritarians.

In a related vein, there are reasons to expect significant variation in the quality of decision-making across different types of authoritarian regimes. As argued in Chapter 2, leaders who do not control appointments and the military are less likely to be surrounded by "yes-men" who rubber-stamp their policy decisions. Even in the absence of a democratic marketplace of ideas, elite competition for office may induce debate and criticism of policy options. This was certainly the case in regimes such as China after Mao and the former Soviet Union, where foreign policy decisions were made only after internal debate. Decision-making by constrained leaders contrasts with regimes in which the individual leader makes unilateral decisions without first vetting the idea with other top officials, such as Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait, discussed in Chapter 5.

Moreover, I argue that democracy is not the key predictor of battlefield effectiveness.

Reiter and Stam's war-fighting view suggests that democratic civic culture makes

militaries more effective, both by producing soldiers with greater initiative on the

battle-field, and making enemies more likely to surrender (since they do not fear abuse

at the hands of democracies). However, I contend that the more important distinction

is not between democracies and non-democracies, but rather between regimes in

which the leader has tampered with military institutions in order to survive, and those

in which the leader has largely left the military to professional management. Authors

such as Risa Brooks (2006) and James Quinlivan (1999) document some of the many

ways in which "coup-proofing" a regime, or ensuring a regime's stability by tinkering

with military institutions, can undermine the effectiveness of those institutions.[188]

These views are echoed by Stephen Biddle in his research on the determinants of

military power:

> "In autocracies, the threat of political violence by the military creates powerful
> incentives for civilian interventions that reduce the military's ability to develop
> professional expertise. Such interventions can include frequent rotation of
> commanders and purges of the officer corps; suppression of horizontal
> communications within the military; divided lines of command; isolation from
> foreign sources of expertise or training; exploitation of ethnic divisions in
> officer selection or unit organization; surveillance of military personnel;
> promotion based on political loyalty rather than military ability; or execution
> of suspected dissident offers. Such techniques can be effective barriers to coup
> d'état, but they systematically discourage soldiers from focusing on
> disinterested technical expertise, and they make such expertise hard to obtain
> for those few who seek it anyway. (Biddle 2004, p. 50)

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[188] Quinlivan, James T. "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East."
International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 131-165. See also Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle,
"Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," *Journal of Strategic
Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 171-212."

In Chapter 5, I provided examples of a number of ways in which Saddam Hussein, for example, organized the military hierarchy in order to prevent coups.[189]

Importantly, according to these scholars, such changes to military organization do *not* occur in every authoritarian regime and are not a function of democratic institutions per se. Rather, "civilian interventions" in the military, as we saw in Chapter 3, tends to occur mainly when an individual leader has secured the ability to control high-level appointments, and uses that control to tamper with the military to ensure the personal loyalty of his security forces. My measure of regime type, unlike previous measures, therefore allows us to distinguish authoritarian leaders who have systematically reduced military effectiveness from those who have not. It is unconstrained authoritarians who are most prone to undermining their own military effectiveness, not authoritarians across the board. These institutional changes in turn undermine the ability of some militaries to function effectively.

Unlike Reiter and Stam, I do not go to great lengths to disentangle the "selection effects" and "war-fighting" mechanisms, though like them, I do differentiate between war initiators (those who have truly "selected into" conflicts) and non-initiators to see to what extent the patterns hold up for these subsets of war participants. Both appear to play an important role in overall patterns of conflict selection, and are difficult to separate from each other both logically and empirically. Unconstrained leaders who start wars and other military conflicts do so even though they have systematically

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[189] See for example Woods 2006 and Brooks 1998.

weakened their militaries, precisely because they know that their tenure can likely survive even defeat in war. As argued in Chapter 2, the two mechanisms therefore contribute to patterns of military involvement in tandem and are not truly competing explanations.

Victory in Crisis and War: Cross-National Empirical Evidence

Victory in War, 1919-1997

Possibly the most serious foreign policy error a leader can commit is to allow his country to lose a war, either by attacking another state, or by allowing his state to be victimized. If leaders act in the anticipation that losing a war will hurt their tenure, they will be particularly likely to avoid involvement in lost causes. In contrast, leaders for whom losing a war will not entail significant domestic consequences will be more likely to take risky gambles. Moreover, leaders whose control over high office and the military undermines the quality of decision-making may be more likely to miscalculate.

In order to examine this possibility, I first analyze patterns of war outcomes by regime type. The Correlates of War (COW) dataset provides information on all wars and war participants from 1816 to 1997 (Sarkees and Schafer 2000). Between 1919 and 1997, the period for which I have collected regime type data, there are 153 individual cases

of war participation in the sample period.[190] However, as pointed out in Chapter 4, many of these war participants were only minimally involved in the conflict. I therefore limit the analysis to only those countries that suffered at least 500 battle-related deaths (including soldiers and civilians) according to the PRIO battle deaths data.[191] I also omitted the World War II participants from the sample since the war-fighting coalitions were so large, the wars are considered by most to be unavoidable "total wars" for participants other than Germany rather than wars in which most leaders had the choice to participate, and the decisions to join were arguably not independent.[192] Moreover, there is no reason to believe that a sample not including the WWII belligerents would be biased. This coding left 82 war participants in the sample, and were listed in Table 4.1 of Chapter 4 for the reader's reference.

Of these 82 war participants, 36 are considered by COW to be the initiators, while the remaining 46 either were attacked by the targeting state, or joined the war after it had begun. In most cases, a single state initiated the conflict. In others, such as the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, multiple states are coded as the initiator.

The COW dataset also provides a measure of the outcome of the dispute: win, lose, or draw. Unlike previous authors, I do not drop draws from the dataset (Reiter and Stam 2002). Rather, I define a trichotomous variable, *outcome,* that distinguishes whether the war resulted in victory, a draw, or defeat for the participant. Of the 82 war

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[190] Or 151, if you do not include France and Bulgaria's re-entries into World War II as separate cases.
[191] Lacina and Gleditsch 2005.
[192] That being said, future research will include World War II participants in the analysis,

participants in the sample, 28 are coded by the COW authors as winners, 15 as having

tied, and 39 as losers.

I begin with some cross-tabulations (regressions with control variables are shown later

in the chapter). The first column of Table 6.1 shows a simple cross tabulation between

"regime type" as it is typically coded and whether or not the initiator was a

democracy. Consistent with previous findings, democratic countries appear somewhat

more likely to win their wars, and substantially less likely to lose their wars, than non-

democracies. Due to the small sample size (based on both restricting the time period,

and the criteria for being considered a war participant) the differences are not

statistically significant.

[Table 6.1 about here]

Table 6.1: War Outcomes by Regime Type, 1919-1997

	Win	Draw	Lose	Total
Democracy	0.40	0.33	0.27	1.00
	6	*5*	*4*	*15*
Non-Democracy	0.33	0.14	0.52	1.00
	21	*9*	*33*	*63*
Total	0.35	0.18	0.47	1.00
	27	*14*	*37*	*78*

I next distinguish between types of non-democratic leaders using the same methods

described in previous chapters. Table 6.2 shows the rates of victory by regime type.

Table 6.2: War Outcomes by Authoritarian Regime Type, 1919-1997

Regime Type	Win	Draw	Lose	Total
Democracy	0.27	0.36	0.36	1.00
	3	4	4	11
Constrained Authoritarian	0.50	0.10	0.40	1.00
	10	2	8	20
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.50	0.00	0.50	1.00
	3	0	3	6
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.25	0.10	0.65	1.00
	5	2	13	20
New/Unstable Democracy	0.75	0.25	0.00	1.00
	3	1	0	4
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.14	0.36	0.50	1.00
	2	5	7	14
No Regime Data[193]	0.29	0.14	0.57	1.00
	2	1	4	7
Total	0.34	0.18	0.48	1.00
	28	15	39	82

Despite the small sample size, meaningful patterns emerge. Constrained

authoritarians actually appear to be more successful in wars than democracies in the

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[193] As before, this includes countries that were under foreign domination at the time the war started (3), and countries for whom I have to date been unable to determine the regime type coding (4).

sample, winning wars at higher rates than democracies (10 wars out of 20, compared to 3 wars out of 11), drawing at lower rates, and losing at the similar rates. Semi-constrained authoritarians have a slightly worse record than constrained authoritarians, winning half of their wars, but also losing half of them (there were no draws in this category). Unconstrained authoritarians, in contrast, were the least successful, losing 13 out of 20 wars, and winning only 5 in 20. New/unstable authoritarians also had a poor record, winning only 2 out of 14 wars, and losing 7 out of 14. New/unstable democracies, on the other hand, did quite well, winning 3 out of 4 of their wars.

Next, I differentiate between initiators on the one hand, and targets/war joiners on the other. The results are shown in Table 6.3. The patterns shed some light on whether selection or "war-fighting" mechanisms best explain these patterns, suggesting that the former is likely driving the results. Among the initiators, constrained authoritarians do best, followed by semi-constrained authoritarians (with a very small N) and new/unstable democracies. Unconstrained authoritarians again do poorly, losing more than half of the wars they initiate.

Targets and joiners, in contrast, generally do much worse than initiators. For democracies and constrained authoritarians, the patterns are striking: these regime types are substantially more likely to win if they started the war than if they were targeted. However, democrats and constrained autocrats are *not* substantially more likely to win if targeted. This casts some doubt on the "war-fighting" mechanism;

democrats and constrained authoritarians may not have a special advantage once a war

is started, but rather are more selective about entering wars in the first place.

Unconstrained authoritarians, in any case, are once again a category apart. They do

nearly as poorly when they are targeted as when they initiate, and in both cases are

much more likely to lose than they are to win. Interestingly, draws are rare for

unconstrained authoritarians, occurring in only 2 of their 20 wars, and only in cases in

which they initiated.

[Table 6.3 about here]

Table 6.3: War Outcomes by Authoritarian Regime Type, 1919-1997

	Initiators			Targets/Joiners			N (All)
	Win	Draw	Lose	Win	Draw	Lose	
Democracy	0.40	0.20	0.40	0.17	0.50	0.33	
	2	1	2	1	3	2	11
Constrained Authoritarian	0.64	0.09	0.27	0.33	0.11	0.56	
	7	1	3	3	1	5	20
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.50	
	1	0	1	2	0	2	6
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.27	0.18	0.55	0.22	0.00	0.78	
	3	2	6	2	0	7	20
New/Unstable Democracy	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	
	1	1	0	2	0	0	4
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.10	0.40	0.50	
	1	1	2	1	4	5	14
No Regime Data	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.33	0.17	0.50	
	0	0	1	2	1	3	7
Total	0.42	0.17	0.42	0.28	0.20	0.52	
	15	6	15	13	9	24	82

Next, Table 6.4 presents the data in a series of logistic regressions of war outcomes on regime characteristics, including some basic covariates. The decision to include control variables presents a subtle theoretical issue. If we believe that leaders estimate the relative costs and benefits before initiating a war, taking into account observable factors such as the relative balance of capabilities and other factors related to the likelihood of victory, then we should not control for those factors in estimating the effects of regime type. Put another way, leaders select into conflicts based on the observed and unobserved characteristics of themselves and their opponents; unconstrained leaders are more likely to select into wars against powerful targets precisely because they have little to lose for doing so. The characteristics of the target states are therefore part of what is to be explained, not to be treated as an independent predictor variable. Nevertheless, the results are shown below for the reader's reference.

I treat constrained authoritarians as the base category, so that we can compare both whether democracies are less likely to draw or lose wars, and whether unconstrained authoritarians are more likely to do so. As covariates, I include a measure of the state's military capabilities as well as whether or not it was the initiator. Due to the small sample size, it is infeasible to include interaction terms of the sort analyzed by Reiter and Stam (2002), who use a larger sample of countries and test whether both democratic initiators and democratic targets prevail at higher rates. With 82 observations and 7 regime types, we cannot meaningfully test for all of these interactions. However, we can check to see whether, controlling for capabilities and

whether or not the state initiated, unconstrained leaders are indeed significantly more likely to draw or lose in war.

Table 6.4 indicates that the differences between unconstrained authoritarians and constrained authoritarians are significant at conventional levels in a one-sided test, with a z-score of 1.85. Counter to the democratic advantage hypothesis, democracies are actually slightly more likely to draw or lose than constrained authoritarians, though the results are nowhere near statistically significant. Predictably, the coefficient on initiator and military capabilities are both negative: states that initiate hostilities, and that are stronger militarily, are both less likely to lose or draw in wars.

[Table 6.4 about here]

Table 6.4: Ordered Logit Analysis of War Outcomes, 1919-1997[194]

Variable	Outcome
Initiate	-0.465
	(1.02)
Military Capabilities[195]	-1.700
	(0.44)
Democracy	0.391
	(0.55)
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.176
	(0.18)
Unconstrained Authoritarian	1.187
	(1.85)
New/Unstable Democracy	-1.470
	(1.21)
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.747
	(1.12)
No Regime Data	0.622
	(0.70)
Observations	82

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Finally, I check whether other factors are driving the differences between authoritarian

regime types. First, perhaps the results are driven by the fact that within the sample,

constrained authoritarians have higher Polity scores than unconstrained authoritarians.

Model 1 in Table 6.5 tests this possibility by checking whether, within the set of non-

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[194] Positive coefficients indicate a higher likelihood of drawing or losing.
[195] Military capabilities were used using the COW – CINC composite index of military capabilities.

democratic states, relatively more democratic countries are more likely to win wars. The reference category for these models is constrained authoritarians. Surprisingly for the proponents of a "democratic advantage," the coefficient on Polity score is positive, indicating that "more democratic" non-democracies are more likely to lose or draw than less democratic non-democracies. Moreover, even when controlling for Polity scores, unconstrained authoritarians are significantly more likely to have worse war outcomes than their constrained counterparts.

[Table 6.5 about here]

A second possibility is that the results are being driven by selectorate size. According to the logic of selectorate theory, higher values of w/s should be associated with higher probabilities of victory, since leaders with comparatively larger winning coalitions should have greater incentives to provide national security than small-coalition leaders. Models 2 and 3 show ordered logistic regressions of war outcomes on w/s. Model 2 indicates that although the coefficient on w/s is in the predicted direction, the coefficient is distinguishable from 0 with a p-value of only .29. When w/s is included along with authoritarian regime type, the coefficient on w/s stays about the same, and the coefficient on unconstrained authoritarian is still positive and significant. Even when controlling for selectorate size, unconstrained authoritarians are more likely to lose or tie.

Table 6.5: Ordered Logit Analysis of War Outcomes (Polity/Selectorate Theory)[196]

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Initiate	-0.673	-0.494	-0.639
	(1.22)	(1.10)	(1.11)
Polity score	0.110		
	(1.45)		
Capabilities	-4.382	-0.941	-3.877
	(0.79)	(0.24)	(0.66)
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.436		-0.263
	(0.44)		(0.23)
Unconstrained Authoritarian	1.632		1.404
	(2.18)*		(2.01)*
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.789		0.783
	(1.06)		(1.09)
No Regime Data	1.416		0.151
	(1.06)		(0.15)
w/s		-0.976	-1.360
		(1.07)	(1.09)
Observations	61	75	62

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

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[196] For both Polity scores and selectorate theory, the effects are measured only on the sample of non-democratic states. This is because both Polity scores and selectorate scores are highly correlated with whether or not a country is a democracy, so the coefficient on the Polity variable is affected by the differences in war outcomes between unconstrained authoritarians and democracies. Moreover, the most interesting question is whether Polity and selectorate scores explain variation *among* authoritarian regimes, so dropping democracies from the analysis does not hinder this question and avoids the problem of collinearity.

In sum, the findings for war outcomes corroborate the findings in previous chapters. The same types of leaders in Chapters 4 and 5 who were least likely to punished are also the least likely to win wars. In contrast, constrained authoritarians and democrats appear equally likely to win wars.

Outcomes of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1946-1999

Above, I analyzed rates of victory and defeat in the most serious types of international conflicts: war. However, a similar logic should also operate at lower levels of conflict, such as militarized disputes short of war. I therefore analyze the outcomes of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), defined as "united historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property or territory of another state."[197]

The MID "outcome" variable differentiates between victory, yields, and other outcomes such as the release of naval vessels. Below, I tabulate the outcomes for MIDs between 1946 and 1999. For multilateral disputes, I only include conflict dyads that originated the dispute, dropping joining states from the analysis.[198] I also drop all MIDs in which the only militarized action was directed at a fishing vessel, since these

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[197] Jones, Bremer Singer 1996, p. 168
[198] For example, for MID 0027, the Berlin Wall Crisis in 1961, 8 states are eventually involved in dyadic disputes with each other, for a total of 16 dispute dyads. Here, to focus on the outcomes of disputes that the initiator selected into, I include in these analyses only the originating states, in this case the US and USSR.

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are not genuinely interstate disputes, and appear to be distributed non-randomly throughout the dataset.[199]

[Table 6.6 about here]

Table 6.6: Dispute Outcomes for MID Initiators, 1946-1999

Outcome (raw)	N	Outcome	N
Victory for Side A	49	Win	71
Yield by Side B	22		
Stalemate	1,124		
Compromise	74	Draw	1,286
Released	88		
Victory for Side B	24	Lose	51
Yield by Side A	27		
Unclear	30	Missing	31
Joins Ongoing War	1		
Total			1,439

The most natural way to treat the outcome variable is to differentiate among wins, losses, and draws (see Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001 for a similar treatment). I create a trichotomous variable *outcome* coded as "win" if the dispute ended in victory for the initiator or yield for the target, "draw" if the dispute ended in compromise, stalemate, or release, "lose" if the dispute resulted in yield by the initiator or victory for the target, and missing if the dispute ended in "joins ongoing war", or "unclear".

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[199] See Weeks and Cohen (2009) and Tomz and Weeks (2009).

Columns 3 and 4 show how I convert the raw outcome variable into the dependent variable. It is apparent from the table that draws are by far the most prominent dispute outcome (89 percent of all dispute outcomes).

The large number of MID initiations (1,439) in the sample allows us to perform more sophisticated statistical tests of the relationship between regime type and dispute outcomes. However, using the larger sample also requires some adjustments to the regime type coding scheme since Geddes did not code regime type for all of the country-years in the sample, and I have not yet filled in all of the missing values. In the analyses below, I code as "other non-democracies" any regimes for which I do not have data on authoritarian constraints, and which also do not fit into another category (such as new/unstable authoritarian). In order to reduce the number of countries in this category, I also distinguish between two types of monarchies in a way that closely reflects my argument.

Geddes does not code monarchies, and therefore does not provide information about whether the leader has tampered with the military hierarchy or controls appointments. However, scholars have argued that a crucial determinant in whether or not the leader is accountable is whether the monarch rules alone, or with the assistance of the extended ruling family.[200] Michael Herb distinguishes between dynastic monarchies – regimes which "the family forms a ruling institution", and non-dynastic monarchies in which the ruler rules alone. In dynastic monarchies, Herb argues, members of the

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[200] Herb 1999.

family share an interest in maintaining the continued health of the dynasty, and cooperate to keep the leader in check. The leader does not control appointments; instead, family members rise to high office through seniority, and the "king or emir cannot dismiss his relatives from their posts at will" (though as the head of the regime, he does play a major role in appointments).[201] While Herb does not explicitly discuss the extent to which the individual leader has tampered with the military, he argues that "the family has the authority to remove the monarch and replace him with another member of the dynasty."[202] Importantly, dynastic monarchies differ from unconstrained regimes in that although family members hold high office, they do not hold their position at the whim of the leader, and will retain power and influence even if the leader is removed. Regime insiders therefore will have incentives to remove the leader if he endangers the prestige or authority of the dynasty, for example by losing a war or military dispute.

In contrast, non-dynastic monarchies tend to more closely resemble "personalist" regimes or unconstrained autocrats. Although family members within non-dynastic regimes can expect that one of them will inherit the throne, they are excluded from holding important posts in the regime. Rather, the king can promote loyal followers to high positions, similar to his unconstrained counterparts. Moreover, leaders of non-dynastic regimes such as Shah of Iran typically have "solid control over the state and its coercive apparatus" which, according to the logic laid out earlier, should allow

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[201] Herb 1999, p. 33.
[202] Herb 1999, p. 238.

them to impede coordination by elites.[203] In sum, leaders of dynastic regimes should behave more like constrained authoritarians, while non-dynastic monarchs, like unconstrained autocrats, will be less selective about conflict, since they face a lower risk of punishment *ex post*. For the analyses below, I categorize dynastic and non-dynastic regimes according to Herb's coding.

Using these augmented regime type codings, Table 6.7 reports average rates of victory, draw, and loss by regime characteristics. The table reveals great variation in dispute outcomes by regime type. Democracies are the most likely out of any regime type to win disputes (.11), though they lose disputes at similar rates to other regimes (.03). Constrained authoritarians win disputes at a lower rate than democracies (.07), but they also lose disputes at a slightly lower rate (.02). Unconstrained authoritarians nearly never win disputes (.01), and lose at rates that are higher-than most other regimes (.06). Similar patterns characterize non-dynastic monarchies, hypothesized to be similar to unconstrained authoritarians.

[Table 6.7 about here]

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[203] Herb 1999, p. 219. While many non-dynastic regimes are "constitutional monarchies", moreover, their parliaments are typically "little more than an arena in which politicians divided up, and fought over, the spoils of rule." (p. 211).

Table 6.7: MID Outcomes by Regime Characteristics, 1946-1999

	Win	Draw	Lose	Total
Democracy	0.11	0.86	0.03	1.00
	36	*273*	*8*	*317*
Constrained Authoritarian	0.07	0.91	0.02	1.00
	10	*139*	*3*	*152*
Semi-Constrained	0.02	0.95	0.03	1.00
	2	*97*	*3*	*102*
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.01	0.93	0.06	1.00
	3	*233*	*14*	*250*
Non-Dynastic Monarchy	0.00	0.92	0.08	1.00
	0	*36*	*3*	*39*
Dynastic Monarchy	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
	0	*15*	*0*	*15*
New/Unstable Democracy	0.06	0.88	0.06	1.00
	3	*45*	*3*	*51*
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.06	0.92	0.03	1.00
	13	*211*	*6*	*230*
Other Non-Democracies	0.01	0.94	0.05	1.00
	3	*228*	*11*	*242*
No Regime Data*	0.10	0.90	0.00	1.00
	1	*9*	*0*	*10*
Total	0.05	0.91	0.04	1.00
	71	*1286*	*51*	*1408*

To gain a better picture of the significance of the regime type differences, taking into account the three different possible dispute outcomes, I next carry out an ordered logit analysis of dispute outcomes. In the first specification, I compare stable democracies to all other regimes. The findings reflect the typical finding in the conflict literature: democracies appear significantly less likely to experience worse conflict outcomes than other regime types.

[Table 6.8 about here]

In the second specification, shown in Column 2, I differentiate between authoritarian regime types. In this specification, constrained authoritarians are the base category. Coefficients on each regime type should therefore be interpreted as indicating whether that regime type is significantly more or less likely to experience adverse conflict outcomes.

Table 6.8: Ordered Logit Analysis of MID Outcomes, 1946-1999[204]

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Democracy	-1.15	-0.49	-0.02
	(2.93)**	(0.95)	(0.05)
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian		0.79	0.90
		(1.72)	(1.95)
Unconstrained Authoritarian		1.26	1.63
		(3.13)**	(3.38)**
Other Non-Democracy		1.12	1.67
		(2.57)*	(3.29)**
New/Unstable Democracy		0.65	0.73
		(0.80)	(0.89)
New/Unstable Authoritarian		0.21	0.29
		(0.52)	(0.65)
No Regime Data		-0.57	-0.80
		(0.61)	(0.74)
Non-Dynastic Monarchy		1.64	1.64
		(2.02)*	(1.77)
Dynastic Monarchy		0.65	0.80
		(1.99)*	(1.45)
Major Power – Major Power			0.60
			(0.95)
Minor Power – Major Power			0.78
			(1.54)
Major Power – Minor Power			0.18
			(0.41)
Initiator Capabilities Share			-0.67
			(1.63)
Contiguity			0.66
			(2.16)*
Ally			-0.29
			(0.74)
Alliance Similarity			0.03
			(0.08)
Status Quo Eval. Initiator			-0.48
			(0.96)
Status Quo Eval. Target			-0.12
			(0.27)
Territorial Revision			-0.05
			(0.15)
Government or Regime Revision			-2.05
			(3.76)**
Policy Revision			-0.71
			(1.96)*
Other Revision Type			-0.75
			(1.55)

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[204] Positive coefficients indicate a higher likelihood of losing compared to winning.

Observations	1408	1408	1408

Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

The results confirm the analysis of war outcomes from earlier in the chapter.

Democracies are slightly less likely that constrained authoritarians to have higher

values on the outcome variable (0=win, 1=draw, 2=lose), but the results are not

statistically significant. Unconstrained authoritarians, moreover, are significantly

more likely to have losing dispute outcomes compared to constrained authoritarians.

Non-dynastic monarchies, which were hypothesized to be similar to unconstrained

authoritarians, are also more likely to draw or lose in the MIDs they initiate. Counter

to the hypothesis, dynastic monarchies, argued to be similar to constrained

authoritarians, are also significantly more likely to have non-winning dispute

outcomes. Referring back to Table 6.7, we see this is because of the 15 MIDs that

those regimes initiated, they "drew" in all 15 – they did not win or lose any MIDs.

As with the analysis of war participants above, it is not clear that including control

variables in the analysis will lead to more accurate inferences about the effect of

regime type – in fact, it may induce a sort of post-treatment bias, since the

characteristics of the conflict into which leaders select are a consequence of the

"treatment" of regime type. If leaders take into account the relative costs and benefits

of initiating a particular dispute, factoring in their potential opponent's relative

military capabilities and other factors, then we should not include those variables in

this analysis since the attributes of the dyad are an outcome to be explained.

Similarly, Fearon (1994) argues that conditional on a country having decided to challenge a target, relative military capabilities should not predict the dispute outcome, since the challenger has already taken them into account when deciding whether to initiate the MID in the first place. With these caveats in mind, I report the results of including control variables in Table 6.8. The findings do not change. Even when controlling for relative military capabilities, alliance status, and the type of issue at stake in the dispute, democracies are no more likely to win disputes than constrained authoritarians. In contrast, unconstrained authoritarians remain significantly more likely to have adverse conflict outcomes. In these specifications, non-dynastic and dynastic monarchies are no long significantly more likely to draw/lose, however.

Next, I assess the extent to which alternative theories explain victory in MIDs, or whether other characteristics of regimes, correlated with my regime type measures, are driving the results. First is the possibility that the regime type categories are simply picking up heterogeneity in the level of democracy among authoritarian regimes, with unconstrained authoritarians simply being the "most autocratic" of the non-democratic states. This logic is in contrast to my argument that it is not the overall level of liberalism or democracy that matters, but rather elite institutions allowing domestic audiences to punish incautious or incompetent leaders.

Table 6.9 shows the results of an ordered logit analysis of dispute outcomes, but this time controlling for Polity scores. The sample is restricted to the set of authoritarian regimes, since Polity scores are already taken into account when distinguishing

between democracies and non-democracies. If Polity scores are driving the results, then we might expect the inclusion of Polity scores as a control variable to explain the differences between constrained and unconstrained authoritarians. However, Table 6.9 indicates that not only is the Polity variable not significant, but including it does not attenuate the differences in dispute outcomes between constrained and unconstrained leaders.

[Table 6.8 about here]

Moreover, selectorate theory would suggest that states with high w/s should be more sensitive to crisis outcomes, and therefore likely to avoid MIDs in which they will lose. The coefficient on w/s should therefore be negative. Table 6.9 shows two analyses: one controlling only for w/s, and also controlling for w/s and regime type.[205] In both analyses, the coefficient on w/s is significant and in the expected negative direction, suggesting that perhaps leaders with larger winning coalition-to-selectorate ratios are more cautious. However, controlling for w/s while also differentiating between regime types does not change the core finding that constrained authoritarians are significantly different from unconstrained authoritarians in their conflict behavior.

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[205] These analyses include only non-democratic states in the sample. The reason is that otherwise "democracy"

Table 6.9: Ordered Logit Analysis of MID Outcomes, 1946-1999

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.93		0.61
	(1.65)		(1.07)
Unconstrained Authoritarian	1.50		1.13
	(3.05)**		(2.28)*
Other Non-Democracy	1.52		1.28
	(2.84)**		(2.43)*
New/Unstable Democracy	1.49		1.07
	(1.26)		(1.05)
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.08		-0.16
	(0.17)		(0.36)
Non-Dynastic Monarchy	1.91		1.19
	(2.03)*		(1.36)
Dynastic Monarchy	0.65		0.33
	(1.61)		(0.77)
Polity	-0.05		
	(1.02)		
w/s		-1.53	-1.49
		(2.45)*	(2.17)*
N	1042	1044	1044

Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

In summary, this chapter has prevent a variety of evidence indicating that the

hypothesis of a "democratic advantage" in war-fighting does not hold, and that

democracies are also not more selective in their selection of sub-war military crises

and some kinds of authoritarian regimes. An analysis of all war participants since

1919, and all MID initiators from 1946-1999, indicated that constrained authoritarians

are approximately as likely to achieve favorable outcomes in both wars and MIDs. This is not surprising, since Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that constrained authoritarians are punished at similar rates for losing wars as democratic leaders are. They therefore have every incentive to be selective and cautious in their foreign policy decisions. While the small number of war participants in the sample period does not allow us to tease apart fine distinctions between a "selection" and "war-fighting" mechanism, the results did show that democracies are not only as likely to lose wars as constrained autocrats when they are the initiator, but they are also no more victorious when they are targeted. This suggests that democracies benefit from neither a selection or war-fighting advantage as compared to constrained authoritarians.

In stark contrast, unconstrained authoritarians fit our worst stereotypes of the irresponsible, despotic "rogue state." Recall that Chapter 4 demonstrated that unconstrained authoritarians are nearly never ousted after losing wars. According to the logic of selection effects, these leaders have fewer incentives to scrutinize their decisions to go to war from every angle. Their rates of defeat in both wars and MIDs are therefore substantially higher than those of other states.

Chapter 7: Audience Costs and Credibility in International Bargaining

The idea that democracies have an advantage over autocracies in signaling their intentions is now axiomatic. Audience costs, or the domestic punishment that leaders would incur for backing down from public threats, are thought to increase leaders' ability to convey their preferences credibly during military crises.[206] These audience costs are typically assumed to be higher in democracies, where democratic institutions increase the likelihood that the leader will actually face punishment for backing down.[207] Therefore, scholars typically argue that democracies have an advantage over other regime types in crisis bargaining and making credible commitments more generally.

As I have argued throughout this manuscript, however, the conventional wisdom rests on an underestimation of the vulnerability of leaders in non-democratic regimes.[208] Building on my argument from previous chapters, I develop a logic of autocratic audience costs that takes into account that most authoritarian leaders require the support of domestic elites who act as audiences in much the same way as voting publics in democracies.[209] While variation in audience costs can be seen as a research

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[206] Fearon 1994.

[207] Fearon 1994, Eyerman and Hart 1996, Partell and Palmer 1999, Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001, Prins 2003. Schultz 1999 also presents evidence consistent with that hypothesis. Slantchev 2006, in contrast, argues that audience costs are only higher in democracies when press freedom is strongly protected.

[208] I will use the terms non-democratic, authoritarian, autocratic, and dictatorial interchangeably, though some scholars attribute more specific meanings to these terms.

[209] Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003.

question in its own right, this chapter also serves as an additional empirical test of my argument about how autocratic regimes vary in their foreign policy decisions. As in earlier chapters, non-democratic leaders who have not undermined domestic institutions of accountability should behave in systematically different ways than despots.

While drawing on the theory developed earlier, I will also develop the theory further in order to make specific predictions about signaling in international crises. I will argue that in generating international credibility, the crucial issues are not only whether the relevant domestic audience could punish the leader for backing down, but also whether the possibility of coordination is observable to foreign decision-makers. While the small groups of supporters in autocratic regimes differ from the more inclusive audiences that can punish democratic leaders, autocratic elites can nevertheless visibly remove incumbents when domestic politics are stable enough that outsiders can infer this possibility. These conditions hold in many autocracies.

Together, these insights about punishment and visibility have important implications for understanding variation in the abilities of regimes to make credible threats and promises. Tests of the effects of regime type on foreign policy must therefore take into account differences between autocracies. I show that existing empirical support for the claim that democracies have a signaling advantage in military disputes results from treating a heterogeneous set of autocracies as undifferentiated. Disaggregating the group of authoritarian regimes reveals that democracies are not more successful in

signaling their resolve than most types of authoritarian regimes. The exceptions are: leaders who control access to high office and/or have tampered with the military hierarchy for political gain; certain types of monarchies, in which the leader has the means to impede elite coordination; as well as new democracies and unstable non-democracies, where the threat of removal is not observable to outsiders.

I begin with a theoretical discussion of the necessary conditions for generating audience costs. I then argue that autocratic regimes meet these requirements when elites have incentives and ability to coordinate to punish the leader and the potential of punishment is visible to foreign decision-makers. Statistical analysis of militarized interstate disputes strongly supports the hypothesis that democracies are not better at generating audience costs than most autocracies.

The Logic of Audience Costs

The audience costs proposition suggests that states can send informative signals about their resolve by making public threats in international crises.[210] Because leaders could suffer domestic consequences for making a threat and then not carrying it out, they are able to create potential domestic consequences for backing down. This in turn gives their threats greater credibility.

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[210] Schelling 1963, Fearon 1994

Since the concept of audience costs was first articulated by James Fearon, scholars have assumed that democracies have an advantage in generating audience costs, and hence an advantage in signaling resolve.[211] Although Fearon does not deny that some autocrats might be able to create audience costs, he proposes a democratic advantage since democratic leaders cannot control *ex post* punishment for backing down from a threat. The risk that reneging will be punished domestically, in turn, renders the threat more credible internationally. In contrast, dictators are assumed to exert greater control over their tenure, implying an inability to credibly jeopardize their political futures. Thus, "democracy" is often used in this literature as shorthand for accountability.[212] A recent body of work has found empirical support for the hypothesis that democracies have a signaling advantage attributable to audience costs.[213]

But the possibility that authoritarian regimes exhibit predictable variation in their ability to generate audience costs, and moreover that democracy is not necessary for generating audience costs, merits further attention. Elections and democratic institutions are only one way in which domestic groups can coordinate to hold leaders accountable. In order to re-evaluate prevailing arguments about how audience costs vary across political systems, it is helpful to clarify the logic of audience costs.

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[211] Fearon 1994.

[212] See, for example, Guisinger and Smith 2002 p. 180

[213] Eyerman and Hart 1996, Partell and Palmer 1999, Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001, Prins 2003. In addition, Schultz's (1999, 2001a) finding that democracies are less likely to be resisted in international crises can be interpreted as evidence in favor of higher democratic audience costs, though Schultz presents a distinct theoretical mechanism where resolve is revealed through public party competition.

Three Elements of Audience Costs

A leader's ability to generate domestic political costs is influenced by three central

factors. First, audience costs require that the domestic political audience has the

means and incentives to coordinate to punish the leader. Second, domestic actors must

view backing down after having made a threat as worse than conceding without

having made a threat in the first place. Third, outsiders must be able to observe the

possibility of domestic sanctions for backing down. Non-democratic states vary

greatly with respect to these three variables.

Domestic Actors Can and Will Coordinate to Sanction the Leader

The first factor influencing audience costs is whether a domestic audience can and will

punish the leader for backing down from a threat; the ultimate punishment being

removal from office. Fearon does not lay out explicitly when a domestic group

qualifies as an audience, though he argues that "kings, rival ministers, opposition

politicians, Senate committees, politburos, and, since the mid-nineteenth century, mass

publics informed by mass media" have all counted as relevant audiences

historically.[214]

Building on this logic, the working hypothesis has been that leaders are much more

vulnerable to domestic punishment in democracies than in non-democracies, due to

the existence of self-enforcing institutions specifically designed to hold leaders

accountable. In non-democracies, in contrast, sanctioning the leader is thought to be a

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[214] Fearon 1994, (p. 581).

much riskier and costlier endeavor. Scholars of International Relations have therefore tended to assume that autocratic leaders are largely unaccountable to domestic groups.

As I argued in Chapter 2, certain types of autocrats are much more likely to be punished than others. Two issues are central to a leader's tenure: whether the leader can increase the costs of turnover, and whether he can increase the costs of ouster. As for the costs of ouster, regime insiders will be more reluctant to try to oust a leader when they face a high probability of detection and punishment for plotting. Thus, when the leader can monitor regime elites, he is less likely to be held accountable for his decisions. I argued in Chapter 3 that we can proxy for the costs of ouster empirically by measuring whether the leader has overturned or disrupted the military hierarchy, or created new military forces loyal to himself personally.

Second, regime insiders consider the costs of turnover – whether they will lose the perks of high office if a new leader is installed. This is more likely when the leader controls political appointments, because regime insiders cannot know for certain that they will retain their privileged position under a new leader. In contrast, if institutionalized procedures such as intra-party elections or seniority-based promotion determine access to high government jobs, regime insiders will be more likely to survive the leader's turnover, and are consequently more likely to hold the leader accountable for foreign policy (and other) choices.

Domestic Audiences Disapprove of Backing Down

In addition to the likelihood that the leader could be punished in general, the second

factor influencing audience costs concerns how audiences view leaders who back

down from threats. For public threats to be informative through an audience costs

mechanism, backing down must actually be costly for the leader in that regime.

There are at least two plausible reasons why domestic audiences might impose

audience costs on leaders who back down. The first reason is that bluffing hurts the

leader's international reputation, and hence her future ability to bargain effectively; it

is therefore in the audience's interest to replace the leader and regain credibility.[215]

Even actors who actually supported the decision to back down will, *ex post*, have

incentives to remove leaders if they anticipate that this will help the country bargain

more effectively in the future. An alternative reason that audiences may disapprove is

that a failed bluff conveys information about the leader's competence more

generally.[216] Regardless of the rationale, experimental evidence suggests that subjects

more strongly disapprove of leaders who back down after making threats, compared to

leaders who made no threat in the first place.[217]

For the purposes of predicting variation in audience costs across political systems,

then, the question is whether members of domestic audiences in democratic regimes

are on average more likely to value credibility or competence than audiences in

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[215] Fearon 1994, McGillivray and Smith 2000, Guisinger and Smith 2002
[216] Smith 1998.
[217] Tomz, 2007.

various types of autocratic regimes. There is no clear theoretical reason that this would be the case. Therefore, the second key precondition for audience costs is likely to be present not only in democracies, but also in autocratic regimes.

Outsiders Can Observe the Leader's Insecurity

Finally, the last requirement for sending credible signals via audience costs is that the target state perceives that the leader could face domestic sanctioning. Here, the critical question is whether politics are stable enough for outsiders to determine whether the leader faces an accountability group in practice. In regimes with new democratic institutions such as parliaments or elections designed to hold the leader accountable, it remains unclear whether the leader and domestic groups will play by the official "rules of the game" until the rules have been tested. Similarly, in unstable non-democratic regimes, observers will have trouble discerning whether the leader shares control of the state apparatus with elites, or rules alone. Thus, leaders of states that have recently undergone institutional change – whether nominally democratic or not – will find it difficult to publicly and credibly jeopardize their political futures.

In stable regimes, in contrast, foreign decision-makers can typically determine whether the leader rules alone, or is plausibly accountable to parliament, voters, or groups of elites such as politburos and juntas. Similarly, they can see whether the leader conducts purges and repeated firings of high-level officials, or is forced to accept the existence of potential rivals in government. In the Khrushchev-era Soviet Union, for example, Western media ran a series of articles detailing Khrushchev's

political insecurity both before and after events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.[218]

Moreover, even if the individual leader is new in office, if the regime is relatively

stable, foreigners can observe whether the leader's predecessors were removed from

office by fellow elites, or lost office solely through death or violent revolutions by

regime outsiders. For example, during the Argentine military junta of the late 1970's

and early 1980's, foreign newspapers reported about individual leaders' support from

within the officer corps and three-man junta, and could easily learn details of how

successive leadership turnovers occurred.[219]

The visibility condition described here is quite undemanding: the only requirement is

that the opposing state knows that the leader faces a real probability of domestic

sanctioning. Recall that the "audience cost" does *not* arise because the domestic

audience disagrees with the leader's policy. Rather, the cost is imposed because the

leader either hurts her international credibility or reveals her incompetence. For

example, for democracies to have higher audience costs on average does not require

that outsiders read public opinion polls about the government's policy statements.

Rather, threats by democracies are credible because outsiders observe that domestic

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[218] Published before the Cuban Missile Crisis, "Is Mr. Khrushchev Pressed By Military Clique?", *London Times*, Tuesday, Sep 05, 1961 suggests that Khrushchev was forced to listen to military influences in the elite. After the crisis "Moscow Rallies Support For Mr. Khrushchev's Policy," *London Times*, Nov 6, 1962 reports that Khrushchev was facing domestic criticism for removing the missiles. "Mr. Khrushchev Reported to be Facing a Crisis" (*London Times*, April 2, 1963), "Mr. Khrushchev Regains Some Support" (*London Times*, April 30, 1963), "Mr. Khrushchev To Keep His Job," *London Times*, (May 20, 1963), detail the rise and fall of the Soviet leader's political support – and imply that he did not control his own fate in office.

[219] "President Videla is confirmed for second term." *London Times*, Thursday, May 04, 1978; pg. 6; Issue 60292; col C "Argentina's next president may face two crises" (News) From Tony Emerson, *London Times* Monday, Oct 06, 1980; pg. 5; Issue 60742; col A. "Viola replaced in Argentina by junta rivals". Patrick Knight, *London Times* Saturday, Dec 12, 1981.

groups could punish the leader. Similarly, outsiders do not need information about authoritarian elites' policy preferences as long as they know that elites have the means and incentives to punish the leader if necessary.

This relatively permissive visibility condition contrasts with alternative theories predicting that democracies are better at signaling resolve, such as Schultz's theory about the information conveyed by opposition parties during crisis bargaining.[220] Schultz argues that the office-seeking motivations of opposition parties lead them to decide strategically whether to support or oppose their government's threat to use international force, based on their expectations about the outcome. When the opposition stands behind its government, this increases the target's belief that the threat is genuine.[221] For Schultz's mechanism to work, a polity must allow political competition that is legitimate, institutionalized, public, and in which opposition parties have access to policy-relevant information. This involves a higher informational requirement than an audience costs logic, which requires only that outsiders believe that domestic groups in the challenging country could make it costly for the leader to back down. Rather, the logic I develop suggests that open party competition and free mass media are not required for the generation of audience costs. Rather, regime stability is the crucial condition, as this allows outsiders to learn the rules of the domestic political game.

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[220] Schultz 2001a.
[221] Like the idea that audience costs are higher in democracies, Schultz's theory predicts that on average, threats issued by democratic challengers should be more credible than threats issued by non-democratic challengers.

Hypotheses about Variation in Audience Costs

Above, I argued that three conditions determine whether a state should be able to generate audience costs. One is whether the domestic audience views backing down in a negative light. I argued that there is no reason to believe that this varies systematically across regimes. The two remaining conditions do, however, vary systematically, and are therefore crucial for making predictions about variation in audience costs: whether the leader can be punished by domestic actors, and whether the possibility of punishment is visible to outsiders. In the following section, I discuss how punishment and visibility vary across regimes in order to generate testable predictions about crisis bargaining.

Consistent with the arguments developed throughout this manuscript, **constrained autocrats** – non-democratic leaders who neither control appointments nor have overturned the military hierarchy – can be held accountable by domestic elites. Moreover, if the regime is relatively stable, outsiders should be able to observe the possibility for punishment. To code whether a regime is "stable", I use the Polity IV variable "durable," which counts how many years it has been since the regime underwent a three-point or more change in its aggregate Polity score. **Semi-constrained** autocrats who *either* control appointments, or have tampered with the military, should be less able to generate audience costs since domestic audiences are less likely to punish them. Finally, **unconstrained** autocrats – those who *both* control appointments, and have overturned the military hierarchy/created new military forces

– should find it relatively more difficult to generate audience costs than either the constrained or the semi-constrained autocrats. Countries that do not meet the three-year condition are coded as new/unstable authoritarians (described in greater detail below).

In addition to the categories mentioned above, below are two classes of non-democratic regimes not coded by Geddes that merit discussion: monarchies and non-democracies that do not meet Geddes' criterion of having been consolidated for three years.

The first group of non-democracies omitted by Geddes includes **monarchies** such as Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Iran until 1979. As described in Chapter 6, Geddes does not code monarchies, and therefore does not provide information about whether the leader has overturned the military hierarchy or controls political appointments. However, scholar Michael Herb distinguishes between two types of monarchies: dynastic monarchies, in which the leader is accountable to the ruling family, resembling constrained authoritarian regimes, and non-dynastic monarchies, which more closely resemble unconstrained authoritarians.[222] According to the logic laid out above, leaders of dynastic regimes should be able to generate audience costs, while non-dynastic monarchs, like unconstrained autocrats, will find it difficult to generate audience costs since they face no true accountability group.

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[222] Herb 1999.

As discussed earlier, Geddes also omits country-years that do not meet her classification of a "regime," or "sets of formal and informal rules and procedures for selecting national leaders and policies."[223] Therefore, she does not code regimes that ultimately did not last for at least three years, though she does include the first three years of regimes that did eventually last for three years or more. Here, I code as **new/unstable authoritarian** any regime that experienced a substantial change in Polity within its last three years and also has a Polity score below 7 in that year. This means that some country years originally categorized as military, personalist, or single party by Geddes are now coded as new/unstable authoritarians; this makes sense since observers at the time could not have known that the regime would ultimately last. In terms of elite coordination, these regimes are a grab-bag. Some leaders will not have had enough time to gain control over the coercive apparatus; others will have risen to power after a civil war or revolution and will enjoy substantial control. However, as a group, these regimes will suffer in terms of the visibility of audience costs. The rules of the game will not be clear to outsiders (nor, probably, to insiders), so foreigners will have a difficult time judging whether the leader truly faces domestic accountability. For this reason, new/unstable authoritarians will have difficulty generating audience costs.

Similar to the new/unstable authoritarians described above, there are **new/unstable democracies**, or regimes that are democratic according to Polity but have not yet persisted for three years. Since Geddes only codes regime type for authoritarian

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[223] Geddes 2003, p. 70.

regimes that are ultimately in existence for three years, we must be careful to treat democracies similarly. Otherwise, the "democracy" category would include a disproportionate number of young or unstable regimes compared to the autocratic categories. This final category is similar to new/unstable authoritarians in that while domestic groups may sometimes be able to depose the incumbent, foreigners will find it very difficult to assess whether the new laws reflect the true rules of the game.[224] Like new/unstable authoritarians, new democracies do not meet the visibility condition and therefore their leaders will have difficulty generating audience costs.

Finally, there are **mixed non-democracies** that fit none of the criteria described above: they are not stable democracies or new democracies, have not experienced regime change in the last three years, and yet their autocratic regime type was not coded by Geddes. This group of regimes includes the post-Soviet states, Iran, South African under apartheid, and a number of anocracies – regimes where participation is only partially regulated. While this group represents a diverse set of regimes, there is no reason to think that individual leaders have inordinate capacities to monitor and punish elite criticism in these states. Moreover, since all regimes in this category have experienced regime stability for three years or more, the leader's political insecurity should be visible to outsiders. Mixed regimes should not have a disadvantage in generating audience costs compared to other stable regimes in which elites can coordinate.

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[224] For a related argument, see Mansfield and Snyder (2005).

Quantitative Analysis of Militarized Interstate Disputes

The previous section provided a theoretical rationale for re-examining the relationship between regime type and audience costs, instead classifying regimes according to the likelihood of elite coordination and whether this is visible to foreign decision-makers. Below I present empirical tests of the predictions developed above, namely that democracies and "constrained autocrats" should all be able to generate audience costs. In contrast, leaders who control appointments and have tampered with military institutions find it easier to impede elite coordination, while new/unstable authoritarians and new democracies do not meet the visibility condition. These types of regimes should therefore have greater difficulty generating credibility in international crises.

The strategic nature of crisis behavior presents methodological challenges when testing for the existence of audience costs. As Schultz notes, leaders have incentives to avoid precisely those situations in which we would expect to observe these costs directly.[225] Therefore, in order to test hypotheses about audience costs, we must look to dependent variables that take into account leaders' strategic decision to avoid situations in which backing down would be likely. Fearon points out that one observable implication of states' ability to make informative threats, for example by generating audience costs, is that threats by such states will on average be more

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[225] Schultz 2001b.

effective than threats by states without such an advantage.[226] Schultz uses this insight

to argue that if democracies are systematically more able to transmit information about

resolve, this should be reflected in lower rates of resistance to democracies' threats.[227]

The Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data set contains a record of every interstate

threat or use of military force since 1816.[228] A MID is coded when an initiating state

uses or explicitly threatens force against a target state. Targets sometimes respond

with a militarized action of their own, while other times they choose to forgo a

military response. To capture whether some types of initiators encounter more

resistance from their targets than other initiators, Schultz analyzes the variable

"RECIP," which has a value of 1 if the target state responded with a militarized action,

and 0 if the target state made no militarized response to the challenger's threat or use

of force. This provides an indication of whether the target was hesitant to escalate the

crisis because it thought the threat was genuine. On average, we should expect that

initiators with a high ability to generate audience costs should be less likely to face

resistance than states with a low ability to generate audience costs.[229] Accordingly,

democracies, constrained autocrats, and dynastic monarchies should face lower

reciprocation rates than personalist regimes, non-dynastic monarchies, new/unstable

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[226] Fearon 1994.
[227] Schultz 1999, 2001a.
[228] Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004
[229] It bears reemphasis that there are alternative mechanisms through which democracies may be able to generate credible threats. Schultz (1999, 2001a) argues that democracies generate more credible threats because public debate by opposition parties allows the government to signal its resolve more effectively. Both higher audience costs and the existence of public opposition parties imply corresponding lower rates of resistance to threats, though the model developed by Schultz would not be able to explain why single party or other authoritarian regimes would generate credible threats since public opposition is typically banned.

authoritarians, and new democracies. Moreover, there is no reason to expect that democracies should encounter lower reciprocation rates than any of the remaining regime types meeting the coordination and visibility conditions.

Table 7.1 depicts a first cut at the data: targets' rate of reciprocation conditional on whether or not the challenger is a democracy.[230] This comparison between democratic and all non-democratic regimes represents the typical way the effects of regime type are operationalized in the conflict literature. Here, democracies are defined as regimes scoring 7 or higher on the combined Polity IV scale and having persisted for at least three years, though similar patterns hold when new democracies are included.[231] Column 1 includes all crises since 1816; column 2 represents the 1946-1999 period, for which Geddes codes authoritarian regime type.

[Table 7.1 about here]

Table 7.1: Target Reciprocation Rate by Regime Type of Challenger

Challenger:	1946-1999
Democracy	.48 (324)
Non-Democracy	.56 (1115)
Total	.54 (1439)
Chi-square p-value	0.007

[230]As in Chapter 6, I dropped all disputes that consisted solely of incidents where a state actor attacked or threatened a fishing vessel. I follow Schultz in restricting the sample to "originator dyads", where both states were involved in the dispute from its first day. I constructed the dataset using EuGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000).
[231] Changing the democracy threshold to be more inclusive does not substantively affect the results report below.

This table indicates that, from 1946-1999, democratic challengers are met with lower rates of resistance than challengers of other regime types. Moreover, a chi square test indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between democracy and the rate of reciprocation of target states.

The next step is to analyze rates of target reciprocation after disaggregating autocratic regime types. As described above, I generated variables according to Geddes' codings of whether the leader has overturned the military hierarchy/created new military forces, and whether the leader personally controls appointments to high office. I also generate categories for dynastic monarchies, non-dynastic monarchies, new/unstable authoritarians, and new democracies. All remaining regime years are coded as "other non-democracies;" this category includes all country-years that are not democratic, new/unstable authoritarians, or monarchies, but are nevertheless omitted from Geddes' coding.[232] I chose to include these in the analysis rather than drop them, though given the heterogeneous nature of the regimes in this group, it is difficult to generate predictions about these regimes.

Table 7.2 provides a different analysis of the data, depicting the rates of target reciprocation when authoritarian regimes are disaggregated. Recall that targets should resist at lower rates against challengers with higher ability to generate audience costs.

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[232] "Mixed non-democracies" include countries that are not considered democratic according to Polity IV, but are also neither monarchies nor coded by Geddes. In practice, this category includes the post-Soviet republics, Iran after the fall of the Shah (67 observations), South Africa under apartheid (20 observations), Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union (22 observations), and a host of countries that while not considered democratic by Polity IV, were not autocratic enough to merit inclusion in Geddes' study of authoritarian regimes. Of the 1582 post-1945 MIDs in the sample, 205 involve challengers that were mixed non-democracies.

Table 7.2 reveals that although democratic challengers meet lower rates of resistance when compared to all non-democracies, the supposed democratic advantage disappears when non-democracies are differentiated from each other. Reciprocation rates of constrained authoritarians are nearly as low as those of democracies, while the reciprocation rates of "other" non-democracies are actually the lowest of any regime type. Semi-constrained authoritarians follow. Non-dynastic monarchies, unconstrained authoritarians, and new democracies feature the highest reciprocation rates, suggesting that when these regimes make challenges, their threats are perceived to be less credible by the target states. Preliminary evidence therefore confirms that there is significant variation in non-democracies' ability to signal, and is consistent with the hypothesis that democracies do not have an advantage over non-democracies in which elites can visibly coordinate.

[Table 7.2 about here]

Table 7.2: Target Reciprocation Rates by Regime Type of Challenger, 1946-1999

Challenger Regime Type	Reciprocation Rate	Number of Observations
Democracy	0.48	324
Constrained Authoritarian	0.51	154
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	0.58	104
Unconstrained Authoritarian	0.64	253
Non-Dynastic Monarchy	0.63	41
Dynastic Monarchy	0.56	16
Other Non-Democracy	0.43	243
New/Unstable Democracy	0.69	52
New/Unstable Authoritarian	0.60	242
No Regime Data	0.60	10
Total	0.54	1439

The next step is to ensure that the relationships suggested in Table 7.2 are not due to confounding variables such as relative power, military capabilities, geographic proximity, or the issues at stake in the dispute. A binary dependent variable model such as logistic regression allows us to control for variables correlated with regime type that may also affect reciprocation rates. Table 7.3 reports the results of a logistic regression of target reciprocation on various predictor variables. Along with the regime type variables, I include: several measures of the distribution of power within the crisis dyad, including the initiator's share of capabilities and whether each side is a major or minor power; a variable indicating whether the states are contiguous on land or across less than 400 miles of water; whether the two states are part of a formal alliance; a weighted measure of the similarity of the two states' alliances; how closely aligned each state is with the current leader of the international system (to give an

indication of each state's evaluation of the "status quo"); and finally, the issues at stake in the dispute.[233] The appendix contains detailed descriptions of each control variable.

Model 1 replicates the conventional finding about audience costs for 1946-1999. The results indicate that based on the typical specification, states targeted by stable democratic challengers are somewhat less likely to reciprocate disputes with military force than states who are targeted by non-democratic challengers. However, unlike previous findings, the coefficient on democracy is not significant. This appears to be due to the removal of fishing disputes from the data.

[Table 7.3 about here.]

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[233] All variables generated using Eugene software, version 3.1, Bennett and Stam (2000).

Table 7.3: MID Reciprocation by Regime Type of Challenger, 1946-1999

	(1) Non-democracies base category	(2) Democracies are base category	(3) Bilateral disputes only
Democracy (>2 years)	-0.30		
	(0.18)		
Constrained Authoritarian		-0.04	0.29
		(0.27)	(0.28)
Semi-Constrained Auth.		0.35	0.41
		(0.29)	(0.30)
Unconstrained Authoritarian		0.77	0.60
		(0.23)**	(0.25)*
Other Non-Democracy		0.14	0.17
		(0.24)	(0.24)
New/Unstable Democracy		0.63	0.58
		(0.33)	(0.35)
New/Unstable Authoritarian		0.31	0.39
		(0.22)	(0.23)
No Regime Data		0.17	1.09
		(0.64)	(1.12)
Non-Dynastic Monarchy		0.40	0.37
		(0.39)	(0.40)
Dynastic Monarchy		-0.00	-0.27
		(0.59)	(0.63)
Major Power-Major Power	-0.09	0.09	-0.18
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.37)
Minor Power –Major Power	0.17	0.19	0.26
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Major Power –Minor Power	0.46	0.62	0.58
	(0.22)*	(0.25)*	(0.27)*
Initiator Capabilities Share	-0.56	-0.59	-0.69
	(0.24)*	(0.25)*	(0.27)**
Contiguity	0.75	0.80	0.67
	(0.15)**	(0.15)**	(0.17)**
Ally	-0.07	-0.12	-0.04
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Alliance Similarity	0.24	0.28	0.47
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Status Quo Eval. Initiator	0.20	0.30	0.41
	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Status Quo Eval. Target	-0.17	-0.12	-0.30

	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.33)
Territorial Revision	0.26	0.24	0.02
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Government or Regime Revision	0.05	-0.01	-0.37
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.35)
Policy Revision	-1.01	-1.01	-1.12
	(0.16)**	(0.16)**	(0.17)**
Other Revision Type	-1.26	-1.27	-1.53
	(0.34)**	(0.34)**	(0.37)**
Constant	0.19	-0.26	-0.20
	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.36)
Observations	1439	1439	1139
Robust standard errors in parentheses			
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%			

In all models, control variables perform consistently with previous work. Geographically contiguous targets are more likely to reciprocate with military force, and disputes about policy-related issues are less likely to be reciprocated than disputes about other issue types.

I next test whether these results change when non-democracies are treated not as a homogenous group, but rather as distinct regime types according the criteria outlined above. Consistent with the approach taken above, I add new dummy variables indicating whether or not the initiator was a constrained, semi-constrained, or unconstrained autocratic, a non-democratic interregnum, a new democracy, a dynastic monarchy, or a non-dynastic monarchy. I also include dummy variables marking whether a state is an uncategorized non-democracy (a regime not coded by Geddes),

or whether there is no regime type data at all for that state. Consolidated democratic regimes are now the base category; coefficients should be interpreted in relation to the probability that a country challenged by a stable democracy resists the challenger's threat. The results of key specifications are reported in Table 7.3; tables of further specifications are available on request.

Recall that based on the logic of audience costs, unconstrained autocrats, new/unstable authoritarians, new democracies, and non-dynastic monarchies were hypothesized to have a lower ability to generate audience costs than other regime types. The statistical analysis indicates that compared to democracies, unconstrained authoritarians are the only regime type that is significantly more likely to face resistance when they initiate military disputes, consistent with the possibility of a lower ability to generate audience costs.

In contrast, constrained autocrats, and indeed most other types of authoritarians, do not appear to face any more resistance to their threats than democrats. This is consistent with the idea that non-democratic leaders who are constrained by domestic institutions are able to generate audience costs and communicate their resolve in international crises. The same is true for dynastic monarchies in which the leader is constrained by his own family, and "other non-democracies," a grab-bag of non-democratic regimes that were not coded by Geddes.

"Semi-constrained" autocrats – leaders who either control appointments or have tampered with military institutions, but not both – were hypothesized to fall somewhere between constrained and unconstrained leaders in their ability to generate audience costs. And indeed they do; the coefficient for semi-constrained autocrats is positive, but smaller than that for unconstrained autocrats and not statistically significant.

Moreover, the central results are consistent when the sample of disputes is restricted to bilateral disputes only (Model 3 in Table 7.3). The data confirm the hypothesis that many non-democracies can make credible threats against other states because of domestic audience costs their leaders would otherwise incur from backing down. Most non-democracies are no more likely than democracies to face military resistance from targets. "unconstrained" autocrats are significantly more likely to face reciprocation than democracies.

It is also useful to assess the substantive effect of regime type on the probability that a target resists. Using CLARIFY, I estimate the probability that the target state reciprocates conditional on the regime type of the challenger.[234] I set all control variables to their mean or median values, and consider a situation in which the issue at stake is a policy – the most common revision type in the dataset. Table 7.4 presents the predicted probability of reciprocating against an initiator of the given regime type.

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[234] Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2000

Table 7.4: Predicted Probability of Reciprocation by Regime Type of Challenger

Regime Type	Point Estimate	95% Confidence Interval
Stable Democracies	.36	(.27, .46)
Constrained Authoritarian	.36	(.26, .47)
Dynastic Monarchy	.38	(.15, .65)
Other Authoritarian	.40	(.32, .50)
No Regime Data	.42	(.16, .72)
New/Unstable Authoritarians	.44	(.36, .53)
New Democracies	.45	(.32, .59)
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	.45	(.33, .58)
Non-Dynastic Monarchy	.47	(.29, .64)
Unconstrained Authoritarian	.55	(.47, .64)

Note: all variables are set to their median values. The revision type is set to "political", since this is the most common revision type in the dataset. The patterns are consistent across other revision types, as well. All estimates are calculated using CLARIFY.

Democracies, constrained authoritarians, dynastic monarchies, and authoritarian regimes that had not been coded by Geddes at all, face the lowest estimated reciprocation rates, with predicted probabilities of reciprocation between .36 and .40. New/unstable authoritarians, new democracies, semi-constrained authoritarians, and non-dynastic monarchies follow, with reciprocation probabilities around .44-.47, though the confidence interval contains the point estimates for the first four regimes.

Unconstrained authoritarians, in contrast, face the highest estimated rates of resistance; their threats face a predicted probability of resistance of .55. Unconstrained authoritarians, therefore, are approximately 1.5 times as likely to face

reciprocation as democratic or constrained authoritarian regimes. The differences

between unconstrained authoritarians and other regimes, moreover, are statistically

significant. In fact, these unconstrained authoritarians appear to have been, in part,

driving the findings of previous researchers that non-democratic regimes are

systematically disadvantaged at signaling compared to democracies.

Robustness and Alternative Explanations

Finally, it is worth addressing the robustness of the results, as well as alternative

interpretations of the findings. First, I subjected the results to additional specifications

to ensure that the results are not being driven by other variables correlated with regime

type. For example, I control for measures of economic development to ensure that

unconstrained authoritarians were not proxying for "weak" regimes, by adding per

capita energy consumption to the analysis.[235] It might also be the case that

unconstrained authoritarian regimes tend to challenge types of regimes that are

unusually prone to reciprocate. I therefore estimate the model controlling not only for

the challenger's regime type, but also for the target's regime type. The regime type

findings are not affected.

Another robustness check is to ensure that individual states are not driving the results.

In some cases, individual states make up a large proportion of states in their regime

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[235] Peceny et al. 2002.

category. I exclude high-conflict countries such as the Soviet Union, China, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea, Thailand, the United States, India, and Israel both separately and in various combinations that could potentially affect the results. The results are robust to excluding these countries from the sample.

An additional question is whether regime categories simply capture variation in levels of democracy. One possibility is that unconstrained authoritarians are merely the "most autocratic" of the autocracies; the conventional wisdom would predict that the most autocratic regimes should be least able to signal. To assess this possibility, I take two approaches. First, I include Polity scores in the logit model to see whether challengers' Polity scores explain variation in reciprocation. This estimation is reported in Model 1 in Table 7.5. I estimate the model only on the sample of non-democratic states, with unconstrained regimes as the base category, since the main question is whether Polity scores explain variation within autocracies.[236]

[Table 7.5 about here]

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[236] Moreover, including the Polity score in an estimation that includes the whole sample leads to problems of collinearity because the *democ* variable is correlated with Polity scores at .79.

Table 7.5: Does Level of Democracy Explain Differences in Signaling Among Authoritarian States?[237]

	(1)	(2)
Constrained Authoritarian	-0.79	-0.76
	(0.29)**	(0.30)*
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	-0.46	-0.48
	(0.29)	(0.29)
Other Non-Democracy	-0.50	-0.62
	(0.24)*	(0.25)*
New/Unstable Democracy	0.37	-0.06
	(0.49)	(0.39)
New/Unstable Authoritarian	-0.35	-0.52
	(0.23)	(0.21)*
Non-Dynastic Monarchy	-0.41	-0.48
	(0.39)	(0.40)
polity2	-0.03	
	(0.02)	
w/s		-0.17
		(0.41)
Major Power-Major Power	0.04	0.04
	(0.40)	(0.42)
Minor Power –Major Power	0.19	0.10
	(0.31)	(0.32)
Major Power –Minor Power	0.48	0.45
	(0.30)	(0.32)
Initiator Capabilities Share	-0.73	-0.79
	(0.29)*	(0.30)**
Contiguity	0.93	0.92
	(0.18)**	(0.18)**
Ally	-0.33	-0.36
	(0.19)	(0.19)
Alliance Similarity	0.08	0.05
	(0.30)	(0.30)
Status Quo Eval. Initiator	0.47	0.45
	(0.46)	(0.46)
Status Quo Eval. Target	-0.46	-0.52
	(0.40)	(0.40)
Territorial Revision	0.19	0.20
	(0.21)	(0.21)
Government or Regime Revision	0.21	0.29
	(0.33)	(0.33)

[237] Non-democracies only; "unconstrained" authoritarians are the base category

Policy Revision	-1.07	-1.02
	(0.19)**	(0.19)**
Other Revision Type	-1.13	-1.09
	(0.40)**	(0.40)**
Constant	0.55	0.95
	(0.44)	(0.40)*
Observations	1089	1068
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%		

Model 1 in Table 7.5 indicates that within the sample of non-democratic states, the

level of democracy does not in fact explain significant variation in target reciprocation

rates. Moreover, controlling for Polity scores does not wash out the differences

between constrained and unconstrained authoritarians: even when taking into account

Polity scores, which takes into account factors such as political participation,

competitiveness of the political process, the existence of political parties, and formal

constraints on the executive, constrained authoritarians are significantly less likely

than unconstrained authoritarians to face resistance to their military actions.

Next, Table 7.6 shows the average Polity score by regime category within the sample.

[Table 7.6 about here]

Table 7.6: Average Polity Scores in Sample by Regime Type, 1946-1999

Regime Type	N	Average Polity2 Score	95 % Confidence Interval
Democracies	320	9.00	(8.88, 9.14)
Constrained Authoritarian	154	-6.58	(-6.94, -6.22)
Semi-Constrained Authoritarian	104	-7.33	(-7.66, -6.99)
Unconstrained Authoritarian	253	-7.60	(-7.82, -7.36)
Non-Dynastic Monarchies	41	-7.49	(-8.60, -6.38)
Dynastic Monarchies	16	-9.44	(-10.08, -8.79)
Other Non-Democracies	243	-3.43	(-4.06, -2.80)
New Democracies	52	8.00	(7.66, 8.34)
New/Unstable Authoritarians	242	-2.86	(-3.39, -2.33)
Total	1425	-1.67	

Consistent with what one might expect (if the Polity measure is picking up variation in executive power), constrained authoritarians are slightly less "autocratic" than semi-constrained authoritarians, who in turn are slightly less autocratic than unconstrained authoritarians. However, these differences are small: for example, only a one-point difference (on a 20-point scale) between constrained and unconstrained authoritarians. Moreover, new/unstable authoritarians are substantially less authoritarian than constrained authoritarians, yet as Table 7.4 revealed, were nonetheless substantially more likely to face target resistance to their militarized actions. Both the statistical analysis and a simple comparison of Polity scores indicate that level of democracy cannot explain variation in audience costs among autocratic countries.

I also tested to see whether other ways of measuring regime type, such as Bueno de Mesquita et al's winning coalition divided by selectorate size (w/s) measure explains

variation in reciprocation rates. It could be, for example, that my regime type

measures are simply proxies for selectorate size. Model 2 in Table 7.5 shows the

results of a model that includes w/s as an explanatory variable: not only is the

coefficient on w/s not significant, but the earlier findings about regime type are not

weakened.

A related empirical concern might be that the "unconstrained" authoritarians variable

is actually picking up measurement error in the relative military capabilities data.

Available measures of capabilities are well known to be imperfect. Since

unconstrained authoritarian regimes are often secretive, it could be that estimates of

these regimes' military capabilities are biased upward in comparison to other regime

categories. Consistent with that line of reasoning, Peceny et al., following Quinlivan,

argue that personalist leaders are particularly wary of military coups, and that "coup-

proofing" the regime requires leaders to weaken the military apparatus.[238] The

inability of unconstrained authoritarian states to induce their targets to acquiesce might

therefore be because unconstrained regimes tend to be weaker, rather than less able to

signal. But this would only be a problem if capabilities share were an important

predictor of reciprocation rates. In fact, *capshare* is not a significant predictor of

reciprocation when the models are estimated on a sample that excludes unconstrained

authoritarian regimes (thus, on a sample of states with potentially less biased

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[238] Peceny et al 2002., Quinlivan 1999

capabilities measures).[239] Since *capshare* does not predict reciprocation rates, it seems

unlikely that biased measurement of capabilities is driving the results.

Finally, the high reciprocation rate to unconstrained authoritarian challengers could

indicate that unconstrained authoritarian regimes have lower "values for war," not

higher audience costs.[240] Schultz (1999, 2001a) points out that states believed to face

higher costs for war will face higher rates of resistance by their targets. An alternative

interpretation of these findings is therefore that unconstrained authoritarian regimes

who have initiated a crisis find war relatively less attractive than other regime types.

A variant of this argument builds on Stanislav Andreski's insight: regimes that depend

on the military to maintain power find it relatively less attractive to send their forces

abroad, even if the military is equally strong as in other regime types.[241] Thus,

unconstrained authoritarian leaders, many of whom rely on the military to quell

domestic opposition, might want to keep it close at hand, making war-fighting

comparatively more costly. But the opposite hypothesis might also be defended: it is

often thought that militaries place a high value on fighting wars and, therefore,

sending the military off to war might either divert its attention from a coup or make it

lend even more support to the regime. Moreover, unconstrained authoritarian leaders,

who are relatively immune to threats from elites or the population, would be less

sensitive to the human costs of fighting than other regime types, mitigating the costs of

war even if they are reluctant to deploy their forces. Thus, higher costs for war in

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[239] In fact, the finding that the initiator's share of capabilities does not predict reciprocation rates supports the prediction of Fearon's 1994 model.
[240] Quinlivan 1999
[241] Andreski 1980.

unconstrained authoritarian regimes are unlikely to explain the findings reported above.

In summary, the conventional theory that democracies are systematically superior to non-democracies in generating audience costs underestimates the difficulties most autocrats face in maintaining power. The literature on audience costs has taken a narrow view of accountability – one that focuses primarily on electoral procedures for removing leaders. This chapter argues that most non-democracies do in fact meet the basic requirements for generating politically significant audience costs. Only when the leader can use monitoring and punishment to prevent elite coordination, or when foreign decision-makers cannot observe the possibility of such coordination, can states not generate audience costs. My statistical analysis of behavior in Militarized Interstate Disputes shows that threats by democracies are not significantly more credible than threats by most autocratic regimes. Unconstrained autocrats, new democracies, and unstable non-democracies, on the other hand, are much more likely to face resistance from the targets of their threats.

The evidence in this chapter not only supports the existence of autocratic audience costs, but also casts doubt on alternative theories about the effects of domestic politics on international relations. Schultz has argued that public, legitimate, and institutionalized party competition helps states credibly reveal resolve in crises.[242] This theory cannot, however, explain my finding that constrained authoritarians can

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[242] Schultz 2001a

generate threats that are as credible as those issued by democracies. The analysis

therefore indicates that autocratic regimes can attain international credibility even

when the majority of the population is formally excluded from political participation.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The findings presented in this dissertation suggest that the conventional understanding of the relationship between regime type and foreign policy is at best incomplete, and at worst, wrong. In contrast to the idea that non-democratic rulers are much more difficult to dislodge from rule after defeat, I found that certain types of authoritarians – those who are constrained by domestic audiences – are nearly as likely to be ousted after defeat in war as other types of leaders. I also found that constrained authoritarians are approximately as likely to win wars, win sub-war militarized disputes, and signal effectively in international crises as democratic states. Unconstrained authoritarians, on the other hand, appeared much more likely to lose wars, lose disputes, and signal ineffectively than both democracies and constrained authoritarians. Lumping together these unconstrained authoritarians with constrained authoritarians, moreover, appeared to be driving previous findings of a "democratic advantage."

Implications for International Relations Scholarship

The overall implication of this analysis is that scholars (and policymakers, as I'll discuss below) misplace attention when they focus on electoral competition and other elements of democracy, rather than theorizing about less normatively appealing forms of political rivalry. Autocratic leaders, while they may exert enormous control over

their subjects, are not usually immune from domestic threats to their tenure. The standard dichotomy, therefore, masks important variation between types of authoritarian regimes, and may lead to mistaken inferences about the effects of democratic domestic institutions on foreign relations. This analysis shows that by analyzing differences between non-democratic regimes, we are led to question previous assumptions about the relationship between democracy and international relations. Perhaps more importantly, analyzing the effects of domestic politics in non-democracies offers a fresh avenue for gaining insights into international behavior.

If, as I have argued, some autocratic elites can truly hold leaders accountable, we might expect a number of related patterns to hold as well. This suggests numerous avenues for future research. First, non-democracies might vary in the extent to which domestic groups can punish leaders for other foreign policy failures. Scholars should therefore investigate the effects of regime type on questions such as the credibility of promises made in international treaties and the sacrifices states will make to maintain friendly relations with other countries.

Moreover, the identity and interests of elite audiences – and therefore the sorts of actions for which they might punish leaders – are poorly understood. Here, I argued that elites do have incentives to punish leaders for foreign policy failures. However, elite preferences over foreign policy may vary systematically across non-democracies, influencing when domestic groups will be motivated to hold leaders accountable. For example, even elites in regimes that can hold the leader accountable may be

indifferent to some issues that concern democratic decision-makers, including wartime

casualties and economic deprivation, open trade, international norms, or other factors

affecting states' decisions about international relations.

Implications for Policymakers

The analysis is not only of theoretical importance, but also suggests practical

implications for policymakers. According to many scholars, uncertainty about other

states' intentions significantly increases the likelihood of international conflict.[243]

Under anarchy, states that cannot discern another state's intentions will tend to assume

the worst, amassing arms and potentially creating a "security dilemma" that increases

distrust and makes conflict more likely.[244] As Fearon points out, however, domestic

audience costs can alleviate the security dilemma by increasing states' ability to

convey intentions. Just as leaders may generate domestic costs by backing down from

a threat, they can also incur costs by reneging on peaceful promises such as

commitments not to invade neighboring states. Thus, higher audience costs may

alleviate the security dilemma by reducing uncertainty about whether a promise to

keep peace is genuine.

Dyads in which both states face domestic costs for ill-chosen policies, moreover, are

often hypothesized to be more peaceful in their international relations than other

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[243] See, for example, Glaser 1992 and Waltz 1979.
[244] Jervis 1978

dyads. The conventional wisdom about the relationship between democracy and accountability supports the view that democratization increases peace, or that "The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world."[245] However, my analysis suggests that the current focus on democratization as a way to foster international cooperation requires further scrutiny. If, as Mansfield and Snyder have argued, democratization actually increases the danger of war, then it may make sense to leave a constrained authoritarian leader alone rather than attempt to install democratic institutions.

The findings suggest that fostering democratic institutions, especially where they are unlikely to take root, may not ameliorate the security dilemma or induce countries to be more peaceful. Rather, the logic laid out here suggests that leaders and international organizations, rather than focusing only on the spread of mass participatory institutions, might instead encourage more minor reforms within the ruling elite. For example, they might make aid conditional on the leader allowing collective oversight of appointments and security organs. At the very least, policymakers should be hesitant to discourage existing institutional arrangements at the elite level, be they single party regimes, military juntas, or other regime types, if these arrangements allow elites to hold leaders accountable.

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[245] President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 2005. Text available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/.

References and Appendices

Control Variable Definitions[246]

a. **Major/Minor power dyads.** These are dummy variables indicating whether the crisis dyad consists of an (initiator-target) major-major, minor-major, or major-minor power dyad. Minor-minor power dyads are the reference category.

b. **Initiator Capabilities Share.** This variable was generated using the Correlated of War National Capabilities Index. Initiator Capabilities Share is the initiator's score on the capabilities index divided by the sum of total capabilities in the dyad.

c. **Contiguity.** A dummy variable indicating that the two states are either contiguous on land or across at most 400 miles of water.

d. **Ally.** Dummy variable coded 1 if the two states share a defense pact, neutrality agreement, or formal entente.

e. **Alliance Portfolio Similarity.** Weighted global S score between the two states in the dyad.

f. **Status Quo Evaluation Initiator/Target:** S score between country and system leader using countries in the "relevant region".

g. **Revision Type.** Dummy variables indicating whether the issue at stake involved territory, government or regime, policy, or "other" revision according to the MID dataset. The reference category contains crises with no specific revision.

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[246] All data generated using Eugene v. 3.1 (Bennett and Stam 2000) unless otherwise noted.

Regime Type Variable List

1.	PARTY	Is the regime led by a dominant party?
2.	PRIOR_PARTY	Did the party exist prior to the leader's election campaign or accession to power?
3.	INDEP_PARTY	Was the party organized to fight for independence or lead some other mass social movement?
4.	SUCC1_PARTY	Did the first leader's successor, or does the leader's heir apparent, hold a high party position?
5.	SUCC2_PARTY	Was the first leader's successor or is the current heir apparent a member of a different family, clan, or tribe than the leader?
6.	LOC_PARTY	Does the party have functioning local level organizations that do something reasonably important, such as distribute agricultural credit or organize local elections?
7.	COMP_PARTY	Does the party either face some competition from other parties or hold competitive intra-party elections?
8.	MEMB_PARTY	Is party membership required for most government employment?
9.	HIGH_PARTY	Does the party control access to high government office?
10.	ROUT_PARTY	Are members of the polituro (or its equivalent) chosen by routine party procedures?
11.	INCL_PARTY	Does the party encompass members from more than one region, religion, ethnic group or tribe (in heterogeneous societies)?
12.	FAM_PARTY	Do none of the leaders' relatives occupy very high government office?
13.	LEADERCIV_PARTY	Was the leader a civilian before his accession?
14.	SUCCESSORCIV_PARTY	Was the successor to the first leader, or is the heir apparent, a civilian?
15.	CIVMIL_PARTY	Is the military high command consulted primarily about security matters?
16.	CIV_PARTY	Are most members of the cabinet or politburo-equivalent civilians?
17.	MIL	Is the leader a retired or active-duty general

		or equivalent in the state's armed forces?
18.	SUCC1_MIL	Was the successor to the first leader, or is the heir apparent, a general or equivalent?
19.	SUCC2_MIL	Is there a procedure in place for rotating the highest office or dealing with succession?
20.	ROUT_MIL	Is there a routine procedure for consulting the officer corps about policy decisions?
21.	HIE_MIL	Has the military hierarchy been maintained?
22.	INCL_MIL	Does the officer corps include representatives of more than one ethnic, religious, or tribal group (in heterogeneous countries)?
23.	NORM_MIL	Have normal procedures for retirement been maintained for the most part? (That is, has the leader refrained or been prevented from forcing his entire cohort or all officers from other tribal groups into retirement?)
24.	MERIT_MIL	Are merit and seniority the main bases for promotion rather than loyalty or ascriptive characteristics?
25.	DISS_MIL	Has the leader refrained from having dissenting officers murdered or imprisoned without trial?
26.	PARTY_MIL	Has the leader refrained from creating a political party to support himself?
27.	PLEB_MIL	Has the leader refrained from holding plebiscites to support his rule?
28.	CAB_MIL	Do officers occupy positions in the cabinet other than those related to the armed forces?
29.	LAW_MIL	Has the rule of law been maintained? (That is, new constitutions may have been written and laws decreed, but once decrees are promulgated they are followed until new ones are written.)
30.	NOPARTY_PERS	Does the leader lack the support of a party?
31.	PARTY_PERS	If there is a support party, was it created after the leader's accession to power?
32.	APPT_PERS	If there is a support party, does the leader choose most of the members of the politburo-equivalent?
33.	RUBBER_PERS	Does the country specialist literature describe the politburo-equivalent as a rubber stamp for the leader?
34.	PARTYURB_PERS	If there is a support party, is it limited to a few urban areas?

35.	SUCC_PERS	Was the successor to the first leader, or is the heir apparent, a member of the same family, clan, tribe, or minority ethnic group as the first leader?
36.	ELECT_PERS	Does the leader govern without routine elections?
37.	PLEB_PERS	If there are elections, are they essentially plebiscites, i.e., without either within-party or interparty competition?
38.	OFFICE_PERS	Does access to high office depend on the personal favor of the leader?
39.	HIER_PERS	Has normal military hierarchy been seriously disorganized or overturned, or has the leader created new military forces loyal to him personally?
40.	DISS_PERS	Have dissenting officers or officers from different regions, tribes, religions, or ethnic groups been murdered, imprisoned, or forced into exile?
41.	OFF_PERS	Has the officer corps been marginalized from most decision making?
42.	SEC_PERS	Does the leader personally control the security apparatus?

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